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ABSTRACT
This work considers the nonlethal targeting assignment problem in counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan, the problem of deciding on the people whom US forces should engage through
outreach, negotiations, meetings, and other interactions in order to ultimately win the support of
the population in their area of operations. We developed three models: 1) the Afghan COIN
social influence model, to represent how attitudes of local leaders are affected by repeated
interactions with other local leaders, insurgents, and counterinsurgents, 2) the network
generation model, to arrive at a reasonable representation of a Pashtun district-level, opinion
leader social network, and 3) the nonlethal targeting model, a nonlinear programming (NLP)
optimization formulation that identifies the k US agent assignment strategy producing the
greatest arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude of the population. We demonstrate
in experiments the merits of the optimization model in nonlethal targeting, which performs
significantly better than both doctrine-based and random methods of assignment in a large
network.
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1 Introduction
In this thesis, we describe a technical approach to assisting US Army units in deciding how to
win support of populations in counterinsurgency conflicts. In this chapter, we present the
motivation for this research, state the problem, and provide a synopsis of this thesis by
describing our modeling approach and experimentation plan. We also specify our main
contributions.
1.1 Research Motivation
Current US Army doctrine espouses that on-going and future threats to the United States are and
will likely be the result of "nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspiration of
their people" ( [1]: vi). Such fragile states, like Afghanistan, are prone to offer safe haven and
training ground for terrorists and other extremists who can threaten the US at home.
Consequently, the US has declared as part of its National Security Strategy an effort to help
establish stable, well-governed nations, and made it likely that the US military will continue to
operate in countries with weak governments in the future [1].
Insurgent movements, however, are often a natural consequence of weak governments. They
rely on the broad support of the local population and seek to overthrow these governments by use
of force. As a result, as shown in recent history, the US military finds itself conducting
counterinsurgency operations on the side of these fledgling host nation governments, with the
difficult dual tasks of defeating the insurgencies as well as strengthening the governments to
better provide for and protect their people.
The key distinction between counterinsurgency and other forms of warfare is the primary means
with which the army defeats the enemy. In counterinsurgencies, an army ultimately wins by
gaining support of the population and not by killing or capturing insurgents alone. Since
insurgents find grassroots support from among the population, excessive lethal operations by
counterinsurgents are likely to engender resentment and a backlash that will fuel the insurgency
[2]. Instead, counterinsurgents must conduct extensive nonlethal operations, a broad set of
influencing actions that include engaging in constructive dialogue with local leaders as well as
addressing root causes of poor governance by providing aid and reconstruction assistance for the
people [3], to successfully gain support of the population. We define local leaders as those
individuals within the population who by virtue of their authority, power, or position have
influence over the attitudes of a group of people. When counterinsurgents exploit the effect of
these local leaders and achieve popular support, they deny the insurgents the ability to find the
sanctuary and assistance that are critical to the movement's survival. Therefore, the focus in
counterinsurgencies is nonlethal rather than lethal operations, a hard lesson the US military
learned in the most recent counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis considers the nonlethal targeting assignment problem. This is the problem of
deciding on the people whom US forces should engage "through outreach, negotiations,
meetings, and other interactions" in order to ultimately win the support of the population in their
area of operations ( [3]: 4-28). In the counterinsurgency operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
units of battalions and companies are assigned vast amounts of territory and often charged with
winning the support of tens of thousands of people. These units, however, are also resource-
constrained in some form or another, including personnel, money, equipment, and time. These
constraints force units to be very selective in the number, type, frequency, and objective of the
operations they conduct. What villages they patrol, where they perform reconstruction projects,
and with which local leaders they conduct negotiations and outreach are just some of the daily
questions that commanders and staffs have to answer.
Targeting is a planning process that guides commanders and their staff to both prioritize
objectives and operations, and to synchronize the methods of engagement in order to accomplish
the mission. However, because success or failure of conducting nonlethal targeting is contingent
upon on human behavior and a whole set of known and unknown variables, it is extremely
difficult to truly predict how a nonlethal action on an individual will affect a group of people and
very challenging to value one target over another or the value of a group of targets. The current
methods of prioritizing and determining target value are qualitative at best and often based upon
the commanders' and staffs' intuition as well as their understanding of doctrine.
Given the tremendous difficulty of and the extreme importance placed upon nonlethal targeting
in counterinsurgency (COIN), we offer an alternative quantitative approach to address how units
can determine the best nonlethal targeting assignment strategies and how the sentiments of the
population might change as a result of them.
1.3 Technical Approach
We utilize operations research methods to begin to find solutions to this very complex problem.
Our ultimate goal is to develop a decision support tool that helps commanders and staffs make
better decisions on whom to target nonlethally in order to achieve the most popular support while
still operating within the unit's resource-constraints. In working towards this goal, we employ
the following technical methods: social network analysis, tractable agent modeling, and network
optimization.
Social network analysis is an interdisciplinary field of study that concerns the relationships
among individuals or groups of people who are represented as nodes with ties on a network [4].
It is founded on the idea that humans are interconnected, and that in order to understand human
behavior one must also understand the structure of the relationships among them. In this work in
particular, we model the various actors in a counterinsurgency (local leaders and Taliban and US
forces) as nodes and the relationships among them as ties on social network.
Tractable agent modeling is a modeling technique that analytically derives the emergent
collective behavior from the individual decisions of a group of autonomous entities called agents.
The agents are endowed with certain characteristics and interact with other agents based on a set
of simple rules. This approach is in contrast to agent-based modeling, a simulation technique
that can model complex human behavior [5] but seldom provides much analytic insight'. In our
work, we model local leaders in Afghanistan as agents who repeatedly interact in a social
network with other local leaders, and Taliban and US forces. Each agent possesses a scalar-
value attitude of favorability towards US forces, as well as probabilities of influencing each of its
neighbors' attitudes. We assume that local leaders change their attitudes (according to their
neighbors' influence probabilities), while the Taliban and US forces do not. In the presence of
these mutable and immutable agents, we not only explore dynamics of the attitudes of the entire
population in simulation, but we also analytically derive a means to determine the expected long-
term attitudes of all agents. This tractable model of agent behavior and interactions is based
primary on the work of Asuman Ozdaglar and others ( [6], [7]). Additionally, our model's
tractability subsequently leads us to a computational framework for network optimization.
The resulting collective behavior from agent-based simulation is often counterintuitive and "out of the reach from
pure mathematical methods" ( [5]: 7280).
Network optimization solves problems specifically formulated from a network graph and
involves the minimization (or maximization) of an objective function subject to some constraints
[8]. These problems can be linear or nonlinear, as well as continuous or discrete. In this work,
we formulate a modification of the assignment problem, a major class of problems in network
optimization that have been important in determining resource allocation and other areas [8].
Our nonlinear assignment problem solves for the assignment of US forces to local leaders and
Taliban forces on a network that maximizes the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term
attitude of the local leaders. The expected long-term attitude is the expected value of the random
variable of long-term attitudes of each local leader. The arithmetic mean is over all local leaders.
1.4 Experimentation
For our experimentation, we develop a fictional but realistic data set of local leaders in a rural
Afghan district. The first experiment focuses on determining the capabilities of the optimization
model in terms of runtime on networks of various sizes. The second experiment analyzes the
performance of the optimization model in finding globally optimal assignment strategies in a
small number of cases where the complete enumeration of assignments is possible. Finally, in
the third experiment, we compare the analytic and simulated performances of the optimization-
based assignment strategy with US Army doctrinal and baseline (random) strategies.
1.5 Contributions
This thesis makes four main contributions. First, it applies existing research on tractable agent
modeling of attitudes and interactions to the context of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
Second, it introduces a methodology for determining approximations of interpersonal influences
as well as topologies of Afghan social interaction networks based upon social science and
anthropological research. Third, it provides a consistent, quantitative method of determining the
value of nonlethal US targeting assignments and their predicted effect on the local population in
the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Lastly, it presents an optimization-based method of
nonlethal target assignment selection. Our main experimental result is that the optimization-
based assignments of US forces to local leaders on large networks achieved statistically
significant higher arithmetic means of expected long-term attitudes than the doctrinal-based
strategy.
1.6 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2, we provide an operational overview of the struggle for popular support in
counterinsurgencies. We describe the nature of insurgencies and how counterinsurgents, in
particular the US Army, plan and conduct operations to defeat them. We also provide a
functional decomposition of the nonlethal targeting process, the method by which US Army units
identify, prioritize, and synchronize efforts to co-opt or otherwise gain support of individuals in
order to win popular support. Lastly, in this chapter, we discuss the difficulties of performing
the nonlethal targeting in the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.
In Chapter 3, we present our modeling approach to assist US Army units with nonlethal
targeting. We present a detailed description of the models we formulated to represent social
influences between Afghan local leaders, as well as approximate the social network in which
these local leaders interact. This chapter also includes a detailed description of the mathematical
model we used to determine the most beneficial US nonlethal targeting assignments.
In Chapter 4, we describe our implementation of the models as well as the three experiments we
conducted to test the performance of our optimization formulation. We present analysis on the
model's runtimes, performance compared to optimality, and operational performance against
doctrine.
In Chapter 5, we identify specific areas for future research and offer insights as to how our work
might be integrated into the current US Army targeting process.
In Chapter 6, we review the nonlethal targeting problem, summarize the work presented, and
offer some conclusions.
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2 The Struggle for Popular Support in a Counterinsurgency
This chapter provides an overview of population-centric insurgency and counterinsurgency and a
more detailed view of the conflict in Afghanistan.
2.1 Popular Support in Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies
In conventional land warfare, armies fight in major engagements to destroy the opposing force
and control physical terrain on the battlefield. In stark contrast, in irregular warfare and its two
major forms, insurgency and counterinsurgency, each side fights for the political support of the
population [9]. The people, as opposed to the terrain, are now the battlefield ( [10], [11]). It is
precisely this objective that makes insurgencies and counterinsurgencies so complex.
Formally, an insurgency is defined as an "organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" [12]. It is also known
as a "protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an
established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent
control" [2]. Insurgents essentially attempt to persuade the population, through a variety of
strategies, to support or otherwise acquiesce to the insurgents' goals or force a political change.
A counterinsurgency (COIN) is defined as the "military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency" [2]. In this
subset of warfare, the Host Nation security forces and partners "operate to defeat armed
resistance, reduce passive opposition, and establish or reestablish the legitimacy of the Host
Nation's government" [9]. The end goals for the counterinsurgent are to demonstrate the strength
of the Host Nation government in providing for the physical and security needs of the people,
and for the people to consent to the government's rule.
In an insurgency/counterinsurgency conflict, each side's objective is the popular support of the
people [13]. Each side must make its case to the people and struggle for the legitimate authority
among them.
2.1.1 Defining Popular Support
While there is consensus in the notion that popular support is critically important in both
insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, much less agreement exists on how to define popular
support ([13], [10]) and correspondingly how to conceptualize it in a way that is measurable and
prescriptive (i.e., points to specific actions to achieve it). The disagreement, well discussed in
The Logic of Violence in Civil War by Kalyvas, lies in viewing popular support as either 1) a
confluence of attitudes, preferences, and allegiances, or 2) a set of observable behaviors [13].
One may think that a person who possesses the former would naturally exhibit the latter, and
conversely one who exhibits the latter also possesses the former. In fact, researchers have shown
that neither necessarily follows in the context of civil wars [13]. What one feels and what one
does can be quite different due what Kalyvas describes as,
variable and complex sets of heterogeneous and interacting motivations, which are
affected by preferences over outcomes, beliefs about outcomes, the behavior of others
and the networks into which people are embedded, and security considerations ( [13]:
95).
Compounding the problem is that genuine behaviors and attitudes are both difficult to detect and
measure by the counterinsurgent. While Kalyvas states that ultimately both the insurgent and
counterinsurgent want a credible commitment of the people, irrespective of motivations [13],
there is reason to believe that "attitudes inform decision-making processes and shape popular
thinking on the legitimacy of the actions in the conflict" [2]. In the end, this author subscribes to
the latter view that the counterinsurgent needs to influence attitudes in order to bring about the
desired behaviors.
2.1.2 Forms of Popular Support
Studies have shown in an insurgency there is a range of popular support for or against either side
with a significant portion of the population that is indifferent ( [3], [13]). This concept is best
depicted in Figure 2-1 from Army FM 3-24.2. Each component of the spectrum is explained in
more detail below.
* Active Support. Active supporters are those who personally or publically align with either
side. They view their side as the legitimate authority. Behaviorally, active supporters of
insurgents may join the insurgent group, provide logistical or financial support, provide
intelligence, provide sanctuaries, provide medical assistance, or provide transportation [2].
Active supporters of the government may join the army or police, take a government job,
provide quality intelligence to the counterinsurgents, or make public statements denouncing
the insurgents [10].
* Passive Support. Passive supporters are those who are lukewarm in their designation of a
side in the conflict. They are often partial to one side only due to their acquiescence and who
may be in closest proximity, rather than an overt or committed decision. Behaviorally,
passive supporters of the insurgency are those who allow insurgents to conduct activities in
their areas, or do not provide information to the counterinsurgents [2]. Passive supporters of
the government may acquiesce or submit to the counterinsurgents, or support government
operations if there is minimal risk [10].
I ndifferent. The indifference in a significant portion of the population is due to a survival
instinct and perhaps opportunism [13]. Indeed, when the population is caught in the middle
between two armed actors, there may be a tendency for the people to either 1) cater to
whomever is immediately present at the time, or 2) remain neutral until there is clearly a
victor.
FOR INSURGENCY AGAINST
AGAINST GOVERNMENT FOR
Figure 2-1: Range of Popular Support [3]
2.1.3 Moving Along a Spectrum of Support
A significant complexity is that the population can shift its allegiances (i.e. move along the
spectrum) repeatedly throughout the conflict ( [14], [13]). The vast majority of the population
caught in the middle is not comprised of ideologues that stubbornly support one side or the other.
Rather, they are people who make rational decisions of allegiance based upon the signals that
they receive at anytime during the conflict and which can lead them to shift one way or the other.
Some of the important signals include 1) who can protect them, 2) who can best provide for
them, and 3) who will ultimately win [15].
2.2 Operational Environment (OE) in a Counterinsurgency
Army Field Manual 3-0 defines the operational environment as "a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the
decisions of the commander" ( [9]: 1-1). The US Army has developed a systematic approach to
conceptualizing the operational environment in a counterinsurgency, which we highlight here.
The bottom line is that the operational environment in COIN is very complex and that the US
Army believes units must understand all the pertinent variables and considerations when trying
to gain support of the population.
2.2.1 Operational and Mission Variables
The US Army uses eight operational variables (PMESII-PT) to assist it in analyzing the OE.
They are:
* Political. The distribution of power and authority at all levels of government, including
formal and informal political systems.
" Military. The capabilities of the fighting force in all forms: Host Nation, allies, militias, etc.
" Economic. The broad categories of the economy in the particular area.
* Social. The characteristics of all societies and groups in the particular area.
* Information. The study of how information is collected, disseminated, as well as possibly
manipulated.
" Infrastructure. The basic capabilities and assets of a functional society.
" Physical Environment. The terrain and its impact on all sides of the conflict.
e Time. This is how time affects all sides of the conflict [3].
In addition to the operational variables, the US Army also analyzes its mission in the context of
the OE with the mission variables (METT-TC). They are:
e Mission. The unit's task and purpose.
" Enemy. An analysis of the enemy's disposition, composition, strengths, weaknesses, as well
as the five elements of the insurgency-leaders, guerillas, auxiliary, underground, and mass
base (explained in more detail in section 2.3.1).
e Terrain and Weather. An analysis of natural features and their effects on operations.
e Troops and Support Available. An analysis of the number of soldiers (from the allies and
Host Nation government) available to participate in the mission and their specific skills and
capabilities.
e Time Available. The analysis of the time frames (short, medium, and long term) in which the
mission is conducted.
" Civil Considerations. This is often the most important mission variable in COIN and one
which we will explain in more detail below [3].
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Figure 2-2: Example Considerations within each ASCOPE category [3]
2.2.2 Criticality of Civil Considerations
Because popular support is the main objective in the insurgency/counterinsurgency conflict,
understanding the civilian considerations is paramount [3]. A list of typical civilian
considerations from FM 3-24.2 is shown in Figure 2-2 [3]. The considerations are organized into
the major categories: area, structure, capabilities, organization, people, and events (ASCOPE).
We describe each category in more detail below:
* Area. This category entails the specific localities of a unit's assigned area of operations
(AO). It includes physical components of the terrain that may affect the population, but also
some less obvious or visible boundaries like ethnic, tribal, or economic lines.
" Structure. This category includes the physical objects and buildings in the AO that may be
important to the infrastructure and community.
* Capabilities. This category includes all the available means for the government to provide
goods, services, and civil stability to its people.
" Organization. This refers to the nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. The
segmentation of society can be very diverse, and each group will have its own interests and
activities.
e People (Means of Communication). This encompasses all the various ways in which the
people may communicate in the AO, both formally and informally, as well as the locations in
which that communication occurs. All groups and subgroups should be considered. This
category also includes the avenues of mass communication, but also interpersonal
communication and influence.
* Events. This category includes all significant occurrences in the AO, both public and private.
The events could be a single-occurrence or happen cyclically or routinely.
There are numerous considerations when dealing with a population, and understanding all of
them is critical to the long-term success of the insurgent or counterinsurgent [3].
2.3 Insurgency
In this section, we explore the aspects of insurgencies that are most pertinent to how the
insurgents gain popular support.
2.3.1 Generic Organization
An insurgency has three components [3]:
" Elements. Elements of an insurgency consist of leaders, guerillas (lower-level fighters),
underground (cellular organization of active supporters), auxiliaries (sympathizers with a
logistical role), and mass base (passive supporters).
" Dynamics. The dynamics of an insurgency are leadership, objectives, ideology, environment
and geography, external support, internal support, phasing and timing, and organizational and
operational patterns.
* Strategies. The six common insurgent strategies are urban, military-focused, protracted
popular war, identity-focused, conspiratorial, and composite and coalition.
Indeed volumes have and can be written about insurgent dynamics and strategies. In this work,
we will focus primarily on the dynamics component of an insurgency, in particular internal
support, and insurgent activities that generate it.
Internal support is defined as any support provided from within the country and has two general
categories: popular support and logistical support. In order for an insurgency to survive or
succeed, it must have both. Strong internal support is often provided by the mass base element
of the insurgency. This mass base permits or encourages the insurgents to operate in areas and
may even provide food and shelter for them [13].
2.3.2 Mechanisms of Mobilization
The specific methods that insurgents use to mobilize supporters or otherwise achieve
acquiescence from the population are:
e Persuasion. This is use of political, social, religious, security, or economic factors to
convince a person to support one side or the other.
" Coercion. This is the use of violence or threats of violence to forcibly gain support of a
person [13].
* Reaction to abuses. This method involves the insurgents instigating indiscriminate violence
by the counterinsurgent or propagandizing the actions of a harsh or corrupt government. The
result is the alienation of people away from the counterinsurgent and toward the insurgents.
" Foreign support. This is the involvement of a foreign government to finance, lend
legitimacy to, or otherwise foment an insurgency.
" Apolitical motivations. This is the involvement in the insurgency of foreign volunteers,
criminals, and mercenaries whose motivations are often money or extremism rather than
politics [3].
2.4 Counterinsurgency
In this section, we explore the pertinent aspects of US COIN doctrine, and how the military plans
and conducts COIN operations in order to gain support of the population.
2.4.1 Full Spectrum Operations
COIN is the simultaneous and continuous combination of the three types of operations: offense,
defense, and stability operations.
" Offense. These are "combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and
seize terrain, resources and population centers" [9]. Offensive operations disrupt the
insurgent's ability to establish bases and consolidate forces.
* Defense. These are "combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time,
economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations" [9].
Defensive operations protect and secure areas from insurgents.
e Stability. These are operations that "encompass various military missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief' [9].
Stability operations frustrate insurgent attempts to disrupt people's lives and/or prevent their
achieving support by effectively addressing population grievances.
Because the main objective is winning the support of the population, stability operations often
have more relevance and importance in COIN than the other types of operations [9]. Eliminating
insurgents, while sometimes necessary, is also more often detrimental to the cause by making
more enemies or generating grievances from the population. The strategy is a significant
mindset shift from conventional warfare where destroying enough of the enemy's forces is
sufficient.
2.4.2 Lines of Effort (LOEs)
Doctrinally, US Army units utilize lines of effort (LOEs) to plan, direct, and allocate resources to
operations. For a counterinsurgency, there are seven LOEs that essentially constitute a
prescription for countering the insurgent strategy, for establishing legitimacy of the Host Nation
government, and for winning the political support of the people [3]. Figure 2-3 is a graphic from
FM 3-24.2 that depicts how operating along the counterinsurgency LOEs are designed to
increase the proportion of the pro-government population while simultaneously decreasing both
the proportion of the pro-insurgent and neutral populations. Below is a more detailed description
of each LOE.
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Figure 2-3: Counterinsurgency Lines of Effort [3]
2.4.2.1 Establish Civil Security
This line of effort calls for the protection of areas, resources, and people from internal and
external threats. Civil security is a fundamental need before a society and government can
function adequately. US COIN doctrine recognizes that this LOE is only a temporary but often
necessary effort until the Host Nation can sufficiently protect its citizens from threats. Missions
in this LOE may include:
" Securing designated facilities and population centers.
" Conducting area security (patrols to disrupt insurgent bases and sanctuaries)
" Defeating insurgent forces [2].
2.4.2.2 Support Host Nation Security Forces
This line of effort involves training and building a dependable military and police force to
protect the people. In order for the Host Nation government to be recognized as a legitimate
n
s
authority, it must be able to provide security for its people. Missions for the US and allies in this
LOE may include:
* Establishing mobile training teams and providing advisers to work with the Host Nation
security forces.
" Establishing military and police academies.
e Conducting joint operations with Host Nation security forces [2].
2.4.2.3 Support to Governance
This line of effort involves the development and improvement of government institutions.
Insurgencies gain strength only when the Host Nation government is weak. Therefore, a strong
stable government that can provide direction and control of society is a necessity. Efforts along
this line include:
* Developing effective local governance.
" Supporting anti-corruption initiatives [3].
* Providing public administration.
* Keeping property and other public records.
" Establishing a public finance and taxation system [2].
2.4.2.4 Establish Civil Control
This line of effort builds or preserves the institutions, such as the judiciary and law enforcement,
within society that governs individual and group behavior. Efforts along this line include:
e Establishing and enforcing rule of law.
" Establishing public order and safety.
" Establishing a corrections system [3].
2.4.2.5 Restore Essential Services
This line of effort provides for a population's life support to include water, electricity, and
sewage. People expect their government to be able to provide these basics. As with establishing
civil security, US and allied efforts along this LOE are considered provisional until the Host
Nation government and other interagency organizations can provide these services. Activities
along this LOE include:
" Conducting assessments to establish needs and priorities for services.
" Partnering and planning with interagency organizations to restore services.
" Recognizing local sensitivities and employ as much local leadership, talent, and labor as
possible [2].
2.4.2.6 Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development
This line of effort includes the short- and long-term activities that reestablishes an economy and
stimulates sustainable economic activity. An area's stability is closely related to the population's
economic situation. Efforts include:
e Working with Host Nation government to reduce unemployment.
" Creating a secure environment where businesses can thrive.
* Being astute when giving out contracts for work and be sensitive to tribal or clan networks
[2].
2.4.2.7 Conduct Information Engagement
This line of effort involves informing and influencing the population by messages and actions to
gain political support for the government. It is a critical component of the counterinsurgency
LOEs. This effort includes:
" Broadcasting supportive themes and messages on all available media: radio, TV, newspapers,
flyers, billboards, and the Internet.
* Providing truthful accounts quickly and accurately to the public in order to counter insurgent
propaganda.
* Managing local expectations.
" Conducting all operations in a firm, fair, and professional manner, and in a manner respectful
of the population's cultures and values [2].
2.4.3 Planning Processes
The US Army utilizes several processes to plan and execute operations. For tactical-level
planning, it utilizes the military decision making process (MDMP) and one of its sub-processes
called the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). For tactical-level synchronization of
planning as well as for preparation and mission execution, the Army uses the targeting process.
Figure 2-4 depicts how all these processes fit together. We discuss what comprises each process
in the following subsections.
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2.4.3.1 Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
Executing military operations, especially COIN, is a very complex activity. It demands a
comprehensive, logical process that considers all factors pertinent to the operation, generates and
analyzes a set of possible options, and methodically selects the best option. This formal process
is known as the military decision making process (MDMP) and is used by US Army units with
staffs (battalion-level or above) to plan operations and prepare orders [16]. MDMP also
synchronizes the commander and the staff in the planning process.
The process is conducted in seven steps, broadly explained below, but explained in further detail
in Army FM 5-0 [16].
" Receive the Mission (Step 1). The unit gets the mission in the form of an operations order
(OPORD) from a higher headquarters.
" Mission Analysis (Step 2). Staff officers analyze the mission received by identifying
specified and implied tasks, any constraints of the mission, and limitations of the unit's
capabilities. It is in this step as well that the intelligence officer leads the analysis of the
enemy, environment, and terrain called the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
This process is explained in more detail in Section 2.4.3.2.
" Course ofAction Development (Step 3). After the staff thoroughly comprehends the mission,
staff officers then develop several plans (called courses of action or COAs) which can
...........
accomplish the mission. Each COA must meet the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and
acceptability. The staff briefs the COAs to the commander, who gives appropriate guidance
and approves them for further analysis.
* Course of Action Analysis- War Game (Step 4). The staff conducts a war game of each COA
as it relates to the enemy and friendly missions. They record anticipated shortfalls and
adjustments, and adjust the COA appropriately.
* Course ofAction Comparison (Step 5). The staff establishes certain criteria with which to
measure each COA, and conduct a comparative analysis.
" Course ofAction Approval (Step 6). The staff briefs the results of the war game, COA
comparison, and a recommended COA to the commander. The commander can select one,
none, or piece together an alternative COA with the available information and analysis.
* Orders Production (Step 7). With an approved COA, the staff begins generating the OPORD
to issue to subordinate units and directing them with the mission and tasks assigned.
2.4.3.2 IBP
As part of the mission analysis step in MDMP, US Army units also conduct a thorough analysis
of the threat and the operational environment in a sub-process called the intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB). Once initiated in step 2 of MDMP, the staff conducts IPB continuously
with updated information and staff estimates. The cyclic nature of the IPB process is depicted in
Figure 2-5.
Intelligence is vitally important in military operations, but especially in COIN. Because success
in COIN depends on the ability of the counterinsurgent to win support from the population over
the insurgent, intelligence in understanding the population is critical. Therefore IPB conducted
in COIN places a heavier emphasis on civil considerations as opposed to IPB in other military
operations [2].
IPB as it pertains to COIN contains the following steps:
* Define the Operational Environment (Step 1). This step involves establishing an area of
interest and influence based on terrain, infrastructure, and the population. This step also
involves a thorough analysis of all the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and the mission
variables (METT-TC). An in-depth examination of the civilian considerations also requires
assessing ASCOPE. Upon completion of this step, military planners and commanders are
able to identify all the salient aspects of the operational environment.
" Describe the Operational Environment's Effects (Step 2). This step involves synthesizing
and understanding the information from step one, and determining the impacts and
significance of the aspects identified. In addition, this step identifies the root causes for the
insurgency and why the population would be drawn to support it.
" Evaluate the Threat (Step 3). This step involves thoroughly examining the enemy
composition, capabilities, methodologies, and vulnerabilities.
" Determine Threat Courses ofAction (Step 4). Finally, this step involves determining what
are the enemy's likely courses of action by synthesizing how the enemy uses the aspects of
the OE and their effects to influence the population to support the insurgency (determined in
steps 1 and 2) and understanding their ability to carry it out (determined in step 3) [17].
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2.4.3.3 Targeting
In addition to MDMP and IPB3 planning processes, the US Army also utilizes the targeting
process in COIN to focus the commanders and staff on identifying, prioritizing, and engaging
(lethally and non-lethally) personalities or areas to accomplish the mission. Targeting
encompasses the range of military activities from planning to preparation and execution. Lethal
targeting is attacking while nonlethal targeting is influencing. The targeted personalities or areas
can be either enemy or neutral. The process also considers the synchronization of the targeting
.. .... .  .. ..... ... . . .............
over time and space [18]. This work only concerns nonlethal targeting in support COIN. It is
accomplished in a cycle of four functions:
* Decide. This function involves the identification and prioritization of "individuals or groups
to engage as potential counterinsurgency supporters, [and] targets to isolate from the
population" [3]. This function also includes a decision on how the target is to be engaged
(through what means and methods). It occurs concurrently with the planning process
(MDMP).
" Detect. This function involves the effort to locate the target using a variety of capabilities
available to the US Army, including human intelligence (HUMINT) and soldiers on patrol.
For example, nonlethal targets may be detected through frequent reconnaissance patrols to a
leader's home to determine his/her presence, or through attendance at meetings to greet the
leader. This function occurs during the preparation and execution.
" Deliver. This function involves the execution of the engagement in accordance with the
'how' determined in the Decide function. For example, nonlethal targets are engaged when
information engagement is used to influence a local leader to support the counterinsurgents
or when a reconstruction project is initiated that earns favor from the population [3]. This
function also occurs during the preparation and execution.
* Assess. This function gives commanders an understanding on the effects of the potential
actions and actions taken on a target. Targets may be reengaged until the desired effect is
achieved or may be abandoned for another target depending on the results of this assessment
[18]. This function occurs throughout the entire process, but is most focused during and
immediately following execution.
Figure 2-6 from FM 3-24.2 lists some common targets (both lethal and nonlethal) chosen in
COIN. Given that nonlethal targeting is so important to COIN, we discuss it in more detail in the
following section.
Personality Targets
- Lethal
- Insurgent leaders to be captured or killed
- Guerillas
- Underground members
- Nonlethal
- People such as community leaders and those insurgents who should be engaged
through outreach, negotiations, meetings, and other interaction
- Insurgent leaders
-Corrupt host-nation leaders who may have to be replaced
Area Targets
- Lethal
- Insurgent bases or caches
- Smuggling routes
- Lethal and Nonlethal Mix
-Populated areas where insurgents commonly operate
- Populated areas controlled by insurgents where the presence of U.S. or host-
nation personnel providing security could undermine support to insurgents
- Nonlethal
- Areas lacking essential services (SWEAT-MSO) that support the government
Figure 2-6: Lethal and Nonlethal Targets in COIN [3]
2.5 Nonlethal Targeting in a Counterinsurgency
Nonlethal targeting is a critical activity in COIN. With the ultimate goal of winning the support
of the population, the use of nonlethal force may often be more effective than lethal force.
Indiscriminate violence or even targeted lethal operations will likely engender increased
resentment and bolster a known insurgent method of recruitment and mobilization ( [3], [15]).
As a process, nonlethal targeting is important because it helps units identify, prioritize,
synchronize, and appropriately engage targets. Units conducting a counterinsurgency have a
tremendous number of people from which to potentially garner support. Determining who may
be the most effective in gaining the support of a particular group or eliciting a specific behavior
from them is often difficult. Meanwhile, the same unit is often constrained in a variety of
resources used to conduct nonlethal targeting, including personnel, time, development money,
equipment, as well as ability to provide security and protection. In this chapter, we describe the
nonlethal targeting process in greater detail as well as its associated difficulties in COIN.
2.5.1 Targets and Nonlethal Activities
A target, according to FM 1-02, is an "area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability,
function, or behavior identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives,
guidance and intent" ( [19]: 1-184). The definition is broad enough to include people (as a
force), and a person's sphere of influence (as an area). Figure 2-6 lists some frequently
considered nonlethal targets. Sometimes, the term "target set" is used to denote a class or type of
person, whereas the term "target" refers to a specific individual within that target set.
Additionally, a nonlethal activity (the field manual uses the term 'nonlethal fires') is any method
of engagement that does not "directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are
designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and
facilities" ( [19]: 1-133). The term once again is broadly defined, and can encompass a myriad
of tasks. If one considers that a population favorable to the insurgents can provide them with
intelligence, sanctuary, and food, then that same population is certainly considered a legitimate
nonlethal target. To the counterinsurgent, the target is the population, and the desired effects are
for them to be supportive of COIN operations and to accept the legitimacy of the Host Nation
government. Common nonlethal activities that may achieve this desired effect include:
e Meetings (public or private). Meetings, sometimes referred to as engagements, are a
common form of nonlethal activity in COIN. They facilitate communication between the
counterinsurgent and a person or a group of people who might have influence over a segment
of the population. Depending on the culture, counterinsurgents might only be successful in
engendering support after a series of private meetings, the early ones of which can involve a
significant amount of socialization and trust-building [20]. At these meetings, both the
counterinsurgent and the targeted person(s) may request specific assurances or items from the
other. A public meeting, like a town hall, is another form of engagement usually used to
disseminate information and convey messages to the population in a more personal manner
than using mass media [3].
* Aid and assistance missions. This activity involves a demonstration of goodwill and the
distribution of aid to a particular town or village with the purpose of co-opting the population
or perhaps just one person. The assistance may be medical, veterinarian, educational (school
supplies), or subsistence (food and clothing). Similar to the well-digging example in Section
2.6.4, how the counterinsurgent delivers the aid can have as much of a nonlethal effect as the
aid itself. On one hand, a unit may give the aid out in a mass gathering, not realizing that it
could be undercutting the authority of local leaders to provide for their people. On the other
hand, a unit may give the aid to one particular person to distribute, thereby intentionally or
unintentionally distinguishing him above others.
" Reconstruction projects and economic stimuli. Another nonlethal activity in COIN is
providing reconstruction projects while simultaneously stimulating the local economy with
jobs. To engender the support of a key leader or the entire village, a counterinsurgent may
start a project in a village and accept a contract from a reconstruction firm that uses local
labor.
" Bestowing legitimate or perceived authority. Similar to the effect of aid delivery missions, a
counterinsurgent may bestow some real or perceived authority on a person by publically
praising him or being deferential to his wishes. For example, a counterinsurgent may refrain
from conducting night raids in a particular village after a request from the village elder.
* Providing security or protection from reprisals. Because of the insurgent's threat of violence
(as explained in Section 2.6.2.2), a significant nonlethal activity is providing protection for
an important person who actively supports the government. This could be in the form of
training and providing equipment to his bodyguards or even the counterinsurgents providing
security directly [21].
e Providing support or training to militias and paramilitary forces. In an effort to empower a
local authority to take charge of the security of his people against the insurgents, the
counterinsurgent can deputize an existing militia, or hire and train local villagers to serve as
an auxiliary police force. Often easier prescribed than done, it is important in this particular
effort to always make provisions to ensure that a militia leader's power never exceeds that of
the government [3].
2.5.2 Functional Decomposition of Nonlethal Targeting Activities
In this section, we describe in detail each of the steps of nonlethal targeting as executed by a
battalion headquarters. It is worth noting that counterinsurgency is a unique form of warfare in
which authority and responsibility are pushed down to lower units than in conventional warfare
because of the need to work locally with the population. While doctrinally the targeting process
is reserved for units with a full staff (battalions, brigades, and above), out of necessity a company
in COIN may piece together a small section of soldiers to mimic the critical components of the
targeting process ( [22], [23]).
Each stage of the targeting process actually represents the preparedness of the unit to engage a
particular target. Targets may be in different stages of the process and may complete a
'lifecycle' in different amounts of time (typically in weeks to months) [22]. The staff's
continuous challenge is to implement a management system that sorts out which targets are
prepared for action at which stage, while ultimately working to accomplish the mission.
An additional challenge of the targeting process is that it includes both lethal and nonlethal
targeting in the same functions. In the beginning of the process, the staff has the responsibility to
decide which targets need to be eliminated (lethally) and which need to be engaged as potential
supporters (nonlethally) [3]. The description of the targeting process that follows omits any
reference to lethal targeting and assumes that the staff has already separated the targets into the
appropriate categories.
Figure 2-7 depicts the four steps of nonlethal targeting with their associated inputs and outputs.
The description of each step follows:
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Decide
The targeting process has an expanded role and applicability in COIN. Units with a
counterinsurgency mission often face multiple objectives (such as influencing various people)
that must be acted upon at different times within a specified period. These objectives present
themselves more as a series of targets than something that can be fully predicted at the start of an
operation [3]. The targeting process in COIN, however, is still fully integrated into MDMP ( [3],
[18]). Unless a unit changes areas of operations, it will likely conduct an initial MDMP and
IPB (during which many base documents are produced), and afterward weekly, targeting-focused
MDMPs to drive operations. All the base MDMP products are continuously refined and updated
at each of the weekly MDMPs [3]. The targeting-focused MDMP concludes with the publishing
of a weekly fragmentary order (FRAGO).
In the following sections, we describe in detail the four functions of nonlethal targeting as
integrated into the weekly, targeting-focused MDMP process. We focus on the Decide function
and its sub-processes because of their relevance to this work.
2.5.3 Decide
The nonlethal targeting process begins with the decide function, which occurs in a meeting
called the targeting working group. This meeting, usually held weekly, is attended by the staff
after the commander has issued some nonlethal targeting guidance. The four inputs into this
function are 1) the higher headquarters' OPORD or FRAGO, 2) mission analysis and IPB
products, 3) previous assessments and reports from subordinate units, and 4) commander's
guidance. Each source may nominate potential nonlethal targets for the COIN mission. The
higher headquarters' order will likely specify target sets in the short or long term. The IPB
conducted by the battalion staff and based off of a thorough PMESII-PT and ASCOPE analysis
will produce a high value target list (HVTL) of the local population. Previous reports (generated
from a prior Assess phase) may suggest additional target sets or targets. And lastly, at any time,
a commander may issue guidance that nominates some more target sets or specifies a desired
effect on those target sets.
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Figure 2-8: Decide Function
In the decide function, staff members at the targeting working group process the inputs using a
targeting-focused MDMP to make decisions on the prioritization, synchronization, and means of
targeting.
2.5.3.1 Sub-process 1: Mission Analysis
This sub-process is typically an abbreviated version of the base mission analysis (Step 1)
conducted during the initial MDMP when the unit began COIN operations in a particular area.
All the four inputs of the decide function feed into this sub-process and provide it additional
targets to consider. The staff draws upon the previously produced IPB products (threat model,
situation template, enemy COAs, and the HVTL) and carefully considers how the new targets
might weaken the enemy. The staff briefs and presents the refined IPB products and the target
value analysis to the commander, who in turn provides more specific targeting guidance. The
target value analysis is an accounting of each potential target and how it enables enemy actions.
The outputs of this sub-process are: 1) the refined IPB products, 2) a target value analysis, and 3)
commander's additional targeting guidance [ 18].
2.5.3.2 Sub-process 2: COA Development
In this sub-process, the staff takes the outputs from the mission analysis sub-process and meets in
another targeting working group to generate friendly COAs. After considering how each target
can negatively affect the enemy, the staff decides what nonlethal actions can achieve that effect.
Each COA is condensed into a readable format consisting of a sketch and mission statement.
.. .
.. . .........
Decide
Each COA will also contain the proposed high payoff target list (HPTL), which is a list of
prioritized lethal and nonlethal targets, organized by phase of the COA. Doctrinally, these
targets are those "whose loss to an enemy will contribute to the success of the mission" ( [3]:
4-30). Furthermore, the staff must also conduct target de-confliction, a step that ensures that
within each COA, no person is redundantly targeted or subjected to engagements of mixed
intentions. Finally, the staff must create assessment criteria, i.e., standards on measuring the
success of the targeting action. The outputs are: 1) friendly COAs in a sketch and statement, 2)
HPTL, 3) target de-confliction, and 4) assessment criteria [18].
2.5.3.3 Sub-process 3: COA Analysis and Comparison
In this sub-process the staff analyzes the proposed COAs and mentally plays a war game of each
against the enemy. Based off of the IPB products (such as the enemy COAs and situation
templates) the staff anticipates how their friendly COA will do against the enemy. After making
any necessary refinements, the staff will compare the COAs and produce drafts of the following
products in support of each COA [18]:
" Intelligence Synchronization Plan. This is a plan to coordinate the collection of intelligence
by all assets at the unit's disposal or can request. There are a variety of assets used to collect
intelligence, but the ones most often employed to nonlethal targeting are patrols and
HUMINT. Each of the assets listed in this plan are tasked to answer specific questions for
the unit (a list called information requirements) [3].
" Target Selection Standards. These are criteria that every target must meet before it can be
acted upon by a unit. According to FM 3-24.2, the selection standards for nonlethal targets
"may include background information on an individual, meetings he may attend, and known
associates" ( [3]: 4-30).
" Attack Guidance Matrix (A GM). This document associates every approved target with a
corresponding directive on how and when the action will take place. This document also lists
the desired effect after the engagement [3].
e Target Synchronization Matrix (TSM). This key document consolidates the information from
the HPTL, intelligence synchronization plan, and the attack guidance matrix. In generic
form, a TSM may be organized like Figure 2-9.
Figure 2-9: Generic Target Synchronization Matrix (TSM)
2.5.3.4 Sub-process 4: COA Approval and Orders Production
This is the final sub-process of the decide function. This function involves the brief of the
previous draft versions of the targeting products for the commander's approval. The outputs of
this function are commander-approved products listed below:
e High-Payoff Target List (HPTL).
* Intelligence Synchronization Plan.
e Target Selection Standards.
e Attack Guidance Matrix (A GM).
e Target Synchronization Matrix (TSM).
e Targeting FRA GO. This is the fragmentary order issued to subordinate companies that
directs who, when, and how to target, and to what effect. Included in this order is the
approved target synchronization matrix [18].
2.5.4 Detect
Detect is the second step in nonlethal targeting and involves all subordinate units and assets
working to locate the HPTs so that they can be engaged. This entire step is driven by the
intelligence synchronization plan (an output of the Decide step before) [3]. The inputs to this
function are the TSM and the targeting FRAGO. The subordinate units receive these inputs and
develop plans that accomplish the required tasks and answer the commander's information
requirements. For example, the targeting FRAGO can direct a subordinate company to locate a
particular local leader, coordinate a meeting with him to discuss the security needs of his people,
and ascertain the leader's favorability of US forces. In this detection step, the commander then
plans and executes a patrol or series of patrols to talk with the people to determine the physical
location of the leader. The output for this step is a confirmation of a location or disposition of a
target that enables delivery of the nonlethal activity.
2.5.5 Deliver
Deliver is the third step in nonlethal targeting and is the execution of the plan developed in the
Decide phase of the process [3]. The inputs include the confirmed detection from the previous
step as well as the TSM and Targeting FRAGO. In this function, the designated unit or asset
conducts the nonlethal activity, typically one of those listed in Section 2.5.1. In the previous
example, this action may involve a unit leader conducting a follow-up meeting with the local
leader and discussing security needs and both sides' desired behaviors. Depending on the
nonlethal activity on a particular target, this step could take a significant amount of time. The
only output in this step is an after-action report from the unit that conducted the activity. Often
times, this report is a written patrol debrief, followed by a verbal brief of the results to the
battalion intelligence officer.
2.5.6 Assess
The fourth and last step of the nonlethal targeting process is conducting the assessment of the
activity and its effect on the target and the enemy. The inputs are the after-action report from the
Deliver step as well as any unit analysis. The battalion staff then reviews these items, possibly
receives more command guidance, and conducts their own analysis based on the assessment
criteria developed in the Decide step. The analysis focuses on determining 1) the success of the
activity in achieving the desired effect, 2) the need to repeat and if so, for how long, and 3) any
exploitation targets that might have been discovered or gained in the process. The output of this
step is an assessment and a report back into the targeting working group which may delete the
particular HPT or re-nominate the target as a HVT.
2.6 Case Study: Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan
While the US military has participated in a significant number of counterinsurgencies in the past,
in this work we examine in depth the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, which continues to
pose significant challenges today.
The US military and its allies have been operating in Afghanistan for over 8 years, since the
invasion in late 2001 following the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban government in Afghanistan had
provided a safe haven for terrorists who planned and conducted these attacks. The coalition
achieved their first objective of toppling the Taliban regime relatively quickly. The second
objective, to establish a stable democratic Afghan government, has been much more difficult.
While there are many reasons for this difficulty, the primary one is the reorganization of the
Taliban as a formidable insurgency. This section highlights the Taliban insurgency as a case
study in the difficulties of gaining the support of the population.
2.6.1 Some Aspects of the Afghan Operational Environment
Volumes have been written on Afghanistan. This section merely presents some aspects of the
operational environment in Afghanistan that is particularly relevant to this work. Specifically,
we focus on the interrelatedness of the political, social, information, and physical environment
operational variables, and how this interrelatedness leads to the emergence of influential local
authorities among the Pasthuns, Afghanistan's largest ethnic group.
Figure 2-10: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan [24]
2.6.1.1 Pashtun Locality and the Terrain's Effect on Communication
While years of war have displaced many Afghans as refugees, Pashtuns are estimated to make up
42% of the country's population or about 11.9 million people [25] . Figure 2-10 depicts the
Pashtun-dominated territories, mostly in the south and east, relative to other major ethnic groups
in Afghanistan.
Approximately 70-77% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas [26]. We identify five
levels of locality as: household, village, village cluster, district, and province. The household is
the primary unit of locality [27]. Each household includes several generations of the extended
family [27] totaling up to approximately 40 people all of whom live in the same 'compound'
[28]. The oldest male or patriarch is often considered the head of household [27]. Multiple
households together form a village. There may be between 100-200 households in a village, but
the number can vary significantly. Villages that grow or are in close proximity to other villages
may form a village cluster, which might share resources, representative councils, responsibility
for security, or representation to the government [29]. Multiple villages form a district, which is
a construct established by the Afghan central government. There are currently 398 recognized
districts in Afghanistan, each headed by a sub-governor. Lastly, districts are grouped as
provinces. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan, each headed by a provincial governor
appointed by Afghanistan's president.
2.6.1.2 Pashtun Social Structure
Ethnic Pashtuns have a traditional tribal structure, where membership is determined through
patrilineal kinship. People identify first with a main tribe (from the earliest ancestor) but further
sub-divide themselves into one of many sub-tribes (also known as clans or khels) [30]. Figure
2-11 depicts the five largest tribes of Pashtuns and the numerous sub-tribes associated with them.
While tribes today give individual Pashtuns a group identity, they have questionable efficacy in
organizing individuals to collective action [31] .2
2 Much of the decline in tribal importance can be attributed to the long Soviet-Afghan War as well as the subsequent
civil war within Afghanistan. Three noticeable effects are the increased influence of fundamentalist mullahs, the
marginalization of tribal authorities, and the rise in strength of warlords. The wars led many Afghans to flee as
refugees to Pakistan. While there, entire generations of youth were raised in a non-tribal and religiously
fundamental environment [49]. The Taliban, educated in madrassas (religious schools), had come to subscribe to
Deobandi beliefs of Islamic fundamentalism and an intolerance of the modem practice of Islam. Following the war,
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Figure 2-11: Pashtun Tribes and Sub-tribes [32]
Researchers have identified another construct called qawm3 or solidarity group, which is an
influential unit [31] of "political and community cognition" [33]. Every Afghan is a member of at
least one qawm ( [34], [35]) in which exists norms of solidarity [34] and loyalty [35]. Being of the
same extended family, clan, village, region are common bases for membership ( [31], [33], [34],
[35]), but a qawm can also form on the basis of a shared political, social, economic, military, or
cultural identity (all of which can cut across familial and tribal ties) [36]. For example, qawms
can form among people who live in the same geographical area, are of the same profession, or
follow the same leader for some political goal [31]. While knowing the qawms in a village or
region may be extremely helpful, their varied basis for formation as well as their informality also
make this knowledge precisely difficult to obtain. Additionally, rural Afghans identify more
closely with their village qawm [37].
both the ordinary people and the religious students returned to Afghanistan no longer adhering to a rigid tribal
structure. In totality, there was a fracturing of traditional society. Tribal elders lost influence and were
marginalized. Only the religious leaders, or mullahs, seemed to have the overarching influence from religion [49].
Additionally, the funneling of foreign aid and weapons to Afghans created warlords or local strongmen.
3 Qawm is singular, and aqwam is the proper plural [35]. However, we will use qawms throughout this work for
clarity.
In additional to the social structures, we have knowledge of individuals who fill certain (possibly
overlapping) roles at the village, village cluster (regional), and district levels and have political
or religious authority over the people. We consider these individuals to be Pashtun local leaders,
and describe them each briefly here to provide an overview of who may have influence and at
what levels. The roles and the corresponding spheres of influence are depicted in Figure 2-12.
However, it is significant to note that researchers have observed diversity in the characteristics of
these authorities, and more importantly each authority's relative power is very much context and
locally dependent. In other words, Pashtun politics are highly person-centered [38]. As Rubin
writes, "Power in villages or tribes does not reside in any one person or structure but in fluidly
structured networks or influence. These networks are not based on any single principle: neither
wealth nor kinship suffices to assure a man influence" (page 198) [34].
Figure 2-12: Pashtun Local Leaders and Spheres of Influence
* Head of Household. The oldest male or patriarch is often considered the head of the
household [27] and holds undisputed authority within the household [29]. The household is
the primary unit of locality among Afghans and may include several generations of the
extended family [27].
* Jirga or council. A village jirga is a council made up the male elders of a village who have
some level of respect within the community [39]. The jirga meets regularly, but not
necessarily on a particular day, to discuss matters of importance to the whole village and to
settle disputes. This body favors inaction because it requires consensus and cooperation
among all members [39]. But when a decision is made, it is binding to all participants [30].
The decision may be enforced by the community militia, or arbaki, which is comprised of
young unmarried men of the village [30]. There are multiple levels offirga, from
district/regional, provincial, and national. Higher (district/regional) level jirgas are
comprised of the more influential or respected persons from lower level jirgas [40].
" Malik or village headman. An executive authority for the village. He is someone who is
elected by the jirga to represent the village to the government. He communicates the
community interests to the government and news and government policies back to the
village. Because of his responsibilities, a malik is often required to be literate and may
therefore come from a well-educated family within the village. A malik may also be a tribal
elder or a landowner [39].
" Mullah/Ulema or Priest or Religious Scholar. A mullah is a religious leader and local
judicial authority of the village; there may be several mullahs in a village, depending upon its
size and population diversity [41]. They might or might not have had formal religious
instruction of lower degrees from madrasas or local religious schools ( [39], [42]). They are
often literate. They are all financed by people within the village. Because of the particular
role mullahs have in society, it may be difficult for other persons of influence (including
landowners and maliks) to confront them publicly [39]. Those who are on the next level of
religious hierarchy and scholarship above the mullahs are the ulema. The ulema are a higher
religious authority and are considered to be keepers of the scriptural tradition of Islam. They
hold higher degrees from madrasas and Islamic universities [42].
* Khan or tribal or sub-tribal leader. A sub-tribal khan is someone who is recognized as the
leader of a khel (sub-tribe) within the village. He is usually someone with clear patrilineal
descent, possesses wealth and land, and also exhibits a critical set of personal qualities [38].
These qualities include gallantry in war, superior rhetoric qualities, or sound judgment
exhibited during jirgas [30]. But because of the underlying egalitarianism among Pashtuns, a
khan may have a tenuous hold on his position, and be continuously compelled to convince
the village of his leadership and authority [30]. In addition to the sub-tribe, there is a khan
for the tribe as well.
* Woluswal, the district sub-governor. He is appointed by Afghanistan's President and reports
to the provincial governors. He represents the government at the district-level and may assist
in conflict resolution through his relationship with the district jirga or police [43]. While he
has a limited capacity of office, he is nevertheless influential through his own personal
relationships and wields some power by acting as a 'gatekeeper' between the people and
government services [43].
" Ufiserpolis, District Police Chief. A representative of the government who leads the Afghan
Police assigned in the district. In tandem with the district sub-governor, a police chief can
wield authority and also positively or negatively affect attitudes towards ISAF and the
Afghan government.
" Mujahed or qumandan, warlord or commander. A person who has amassed significant power
through patronage (legal or illegal) and an armed private militia ( [33], [38]). Warlords are
often former mujahedeen and a product of the destabilization of society due to the Soviet-
Afghan War and subsequent civil war. There are local and regional level commanders who
exert various levels of influence [33].
* Criminal or mafia elements. A person involved in robbery, vandalism, kidnapping or the
smuggling of arms or opium. Criminals can be influential at local/village level or have more
expansive influence in the region [44].
Some recent polling results show that villagers report the presence of influential people at the
local level, particularly traditional leaders (maliks, elders), mullahs, and their father (see Figure
2-13) ( [45]). When asked who's opinion is more important to them, villagers reported their
father, husband, and family most often (see Figure 2-14) ( [45]). Also, rural Afghans rely upon
local leaders for information significantly more than urban Afghans (see Figure 2-15) ( [46]).
Overall, the effectiveness of these individual authorities are difficult to determine empirically,
but case studies and field research indicate a strong loyalty or adherence to decisions made by
these individuals or bodies ( [33], [45], [30], [47]).4
4 As examples, ajirga's decision is binding to the whole village ( [30]) and enforced with the mobilization of
community militias ( [30], [33]). Also, a mullah's opinion on topics of religious concern are heavily weighted
( [45], [47]).
Figure 2-13: Survey Results of the Most Influential Person in the Neighborhood [45]
Figure 2-14: Survey Results of One's Own Opinion on who is Most Important [45]
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Figure 2-15: Reported Sources of Information by Percentage [46].
2.6.2 Taliban Insurgency Summary
In this section, we describe how the Taliban insurgency organizes, and the specific tactics they
are known to employ in order to get the support of the population.
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2.6.2.1 Composition
The Taliban as an enemy force in Afghanistan is generally comprised of three tiers of people
with various levels of involvement in the insurgency.
e Tier I: Full-timefighters. These are the core militants who comprise a majority of the
leadership and possess most of the training and technical expertise. They are estimated to
comprise 25% of the total enemy force [48]. These individuals are also likely to be the more
ideologically motivated to the Taliban movement [32].
e Tier II: Local guerillas. These individuals fight close to their home [48] and can be
considered "part-time fighters" [32]. They are locally recruited by full-time fighters to
provide operations support. They usually get involved for economic self-interest, as well as
other reasons such as honor, prestige, or for local and tribal identity [48].
" Tier III: Village underground. This covert group of people provides an additional support
structure for fighters. They help with reconnaissance, intelligence, and intimidation of
government supporters [48].
The Taliban exhibit both a hierarchical structure for reporting and direction on policy matters, as
well as a network structure for reporting and direction concerning operations. These two forms
are captured in Figure 2-16.
Regional Commands
Local Command
Village Cells
IndIvidual Talibans
A. Typical reporting and direction
for policy decisions
B. Reporting and direction for
conduct of coordinated operations
Figure 2-16: Taliban Organizational Structure [32]
2.6.2.2 Operations
We focus on the village cells of Taliban, which are usually comprised of 10-50 Tier II local
guerillas or part-time fighters, and a small but undetermined number of Tier I full-time fighters
[32]. The Taliban have known mechanisms of increasing infiltration into villages and
communities.
* Gain afoothold. Village cells typically establish a presence in an area in one of two ways.
First, a small armed group can originate from within tribal and territorial boundaries and
declare itself "the local Taliban" [32]. They subsequently work to acquire recognition from
the local or regional commander but also retain some latitude to conduct operations in
cooperation with other village cells [32]. Another way the Taliban can originate is from
outside tribal and territorial boundaries (possibly due to repulsion from the previous location
of operations or an expansion of operations). In this method, the culturally-aware Taliban
and local sympathizers would first approach the tribal elders for permission to enter tribal
lands and villages. They would generally travel in small groups of 10-20 and identify those
locations and groups of people who were hospitable to them [49].
" Gradually increase control and strength. Once the Taliban gained a foothold in the area,
they systematically worked to marginalize the other power figures in the area. They would
permit local leaders to speak openly of things agreeable to Taliban, but would silence any
contrary opinions with threats and demonstrative acts of violence [49]. The Taliban are most
effective at communicating at the local level via night letters 5 and interactions with the
people ( [50], [51]). Village cells are also responsible for its own recruitment, which
"exploits family and clan loyalties, tribal lineage, personal friendships, social networks,
madrassa alumni circles, and shared interests" [32].
* Inflict a campaign of violence and intimidation. If the Taliban experienced any resistance to
control or influence, they would conduct a methodical campaign of violence to remove the
opposition known as "armed propaganda" [48]. Such activities included intimidation,
kidnappings and assassinations ( [52], [32]). For example, from 2005-2006 twenty pro-
government mullahs were killed and forty wounded by the Taliban [49]. More recently in
2009, more than fifty Afghan government officials and tribal elders have been killed by the
Taliban [52]. For every one killed, there are numerous others who are forced to flee the area
as refugees, which in turn further weaken the resistance to the Taliban.
5 Night letters, known as shahnamah, are written warnings and threats often posted on the doors of mosques or
homes of known government supporters. The Taliban messages in them resonate with the populace because they
are powerful and easy-to-understand. The messages include how both the Afghan Government and the Coalition are
responsible for "collateral damage and threats to poppy harvest and tribal customs" [50].
2.6.3 US Army COIN in Afghanistan
Recently, General Stanley McChrystal, the new commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan 6, signaled a shift in COIN strategy in Afghanistan from
killing or capturing insurgents towards 1) protecting the population, 2) providing improved
governance, 3) winning the war of perceptions, and 4) embracing the people [15]. Critically, he
also instructed his soldiers to
Build connections... Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Earning the
trust of the people is a large part of our mission. Build relationships with tribal,
community, and religious leaders. Success requires communication, collaboration, and
cooperation [15].
In this section, we discuss the increased emphasis on finding and influencing key local leaders as
a major tenet of US COIN doctrine in Afghanistan.
2.6.3.1 Lessons from Iraq on Finding Key Local Leaders
Counterinsurgency strategy, as explained in Section 2.4, is fundamentally about winning the
support of the population through a combination of efforts that includes demonstrating the
government's legitimacy as well as unequivocally protecting the people from the insurgents.
However, in a resource-constrained environment (i.e., limited troops and time), a major difficulty
is determining a strategy of actions that wins even more of the population by considering societal
factors and local power structures.
In recent history, one can look at the results of the US strategy in Anbar Province, Iraq from
2006-2007 to see the rapidly cascading effects of winning over and supporting key leaders.
While not always effective [21], the US military conducted a deliberate information engagement
campaign with tribal leaders and eventually recognized and actively supported efforts by sheikhs
to resist Al Qaeda [53]. The effect on decreasing violence was dramatic when these sheikhs,
who commanded their large tribes and militias, allied together to side with the US and against Al
Qaeda [53], [21].
Afghanistan is likewise embroiled in an insurgency, but social dynamics are much different there
than in Iraq. There is general consensus that a large tribal mobilization solution does not exist
6 General McChrystal was selected by the President of the United States and confirmed by the US Senate in June
2009 to assume command of the NATO Coalition in Afghanistan.
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for Afghanistan ( [54], [31], [48], [55], [30]). While Arab tribes tend to be more hierarchical,
Pashtun tribes are much more decentralized [48]. Indeed, very tenuous alliances form among
Afghans which can change quickly for a multitude of reasons [54]. A recent white paper from
the US Army Afghanistan Research Reachback Center states,
[T]he way people in rural Afghanistan organize themselves is so different from rural Iraqi
culture that calling them both 'tribes' is deceptive. 'Tribes' in Afghanistan do not act as
unified groups, as they have recently in Iraq. For the most part they are not hierarchical,
meaning there is no 'chief with whom to negotiate (and from whom to expect results)
[31].
Nevertheless, researchers and military strategists alike seem to conclude that finding the key
influential people within Afghan society (if not at the tribal-level, then at another reasonable
level) is an important step in winning ( [10], [54], [31], [56], [57]) They prescribe that pro-
government forces should identify local community leaders who have respect among the
population, earn their support, and use their influence to "wean" most of tier II and III away from
the insurgency [48].
However, finding these key leaders is not enough to guarantee success. Protecting them is
paramount, especially after a person has decided to support the government at high risk [54].
Kilcullen writes,
It is extremely important, in analyzing an insurgency, to be able to put oneself in the
shoes of local community leaders. In insurgencies and other forms of civil war,
community leaders and tribal elders find themselves in a situation of terrifying
uncertainty, with multiple armed actors- insurgents, militias, warlords, the police and
military, terrorist cells- competing for their loyalty and threatening them with violence
unless they comply... counterinsurgency measures must be designed to help the
population to choose between the government and the insurgent, and to enforce that
choice once made. This implies the paramount moral obligation to protect and defend
populations that have made the dangerous choice to side with the government [48].
Furthermore, winning over the right number of local leaders is an important consideration.
Constrained by resources, a counterinsurgent ideally wants to win over and protect a critical
mass of key leaders that in turn achieves cascading effects on the population and other key
leaders [54].
2.6.3.2 Reconciliation with the Taliban
The problem of identifying the key leaders to engage with has a close corollary: how to co-opt
them so that their now favorable influences can propagate to others. In a conflict environment
such as COIN, one might identify key leaders who are truly neutral as well as those who have
leanings towards the insurgency or even actively supported them in the past. This situation
naturally leads to questions about reconciliation with or "flipping" the Taliban [54]. In fact,
within the past year, US and Afghan politicians, US military officials, and researchers have
increasingly discussed if and how to reconcile with the some portions of the Taliban insurgency
( [54], [58]). A few researchers have suggested that dramatic allegiance flipping is indeed
plausible ( [31], [54], [58]), and may be based on the motivations of the lower-level fighters
including the desire to be on the winning side [54], desire for employment or money [58], or just
simply pressure "by internal dissension or external forces" [31]. However, all seem to agree that
the actual implementation of a coherent policy would be extremely difficult and complex.
2.6.4 Difficulties in Nonlethal Targeting in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, things are rarely as they seem, and the outcomes of actions we take,
however well-intended, are often different from what we expect. If you pull the lever, the
outcome is not what you have been programmed to think. For example, digging a well
sounds quite simple. How could you do anything wrong by digging a well to give people
clean water? Where you build that well, who controls that water, and what water it taps
into all have tremendous implications and create great passion. If you build a well in the
wrong place in a village, you may have shifted the basis of power in that village. If you
tap into underground water, you give power to the owner of that well that they did not
have before, because the traditional irrigation system was community-owned. If you dig a
well and contract it to one person or group over another, you make a decision that,
perhaps in your ignorance, tips the balance of power, or perception thereof, in that
village. Therefore, with a completely altruistic aim of building a well, you can create
divisiveness or give the impression that you, from the outside, do not understand what is
going on or that you have sided with one element or another, yet all you tried to do is
provide water [59].
These remarks by General McChrystal highlight some of the unique challenges with non-lethal
targeting in Afghanistan. As stated from the outset, the operational environment in COIN is
extremely complex. Because the goal is to ultimately gain support of the population, units must
thoroughly understand and leverage a whole host of variables, both operational and mission
(PMESII-PT and METT-TC), in order to win. Given the strength of the Taliban insurgency and
the unique cultural and tribal conditions in Afghanistan, the problem of nonlethal targeting is
even more complex. Here we discuss the difficulties of nonlethal targeting in the Decide and
Assess functions.
2.6.4.1 Difficulties in the Decide Function
The decision function's output can be divided into several broad subtasks: who to target, in what
priority, and with what means. Who to target is addressed in the development of the HVTL and
has several challenges including 1) determining a person's value, 2) measuring the strength of a
person's influence, 3) determining the extent of a person's influence on others, 4) measuring a
person's intentions or motivations, 5) determining whether a person is able to be co-opted.
Target priority is addressed in the development of the HPTL and has additional challenges
including: 1) the uncertainty of determining a person's value, and 2) the uncertain opportunity
costs of targeting another person. Deciding with what means to influence is addressed in
development of the friendly COAs. It adds to the list of challenges including, 1) determining
who is the best 'ambassador' (i.e. unit leader) to that person, 2) what nonlethal activity or
activities can achieve the desired effects, and 3) how much the unit must be prepared to expend
to influence the person.
2.6.4.2 Difficulties in the Assess Function
The Assess function requires the unit be able to judge the effectiveness of the targeting effort as
well as determine the opportunities for reengaging the person. Judging effectiveness is a
difficult task because that staff may not be able to 1) measure the true impact on the targeted
person 2) determine how long-term the impact is, and 3) determine the second- and third-order
effects on other connected persons. The additional difficulties for finding the opportunities for
reengagement also include 1) determining how many times or for how long the targeting effort
should be made, and 2) determining what other persons are now more vulnerable to favorable
influence.
The difficulties with nonlethal targeting in Afghanistan are indeed immense. This work intends
to address some of those difficulties by presenting an integrated decision support tool that helps
military professionals better perform the Decide function. The models and tool are discussed in
the following chapter.
3 Modeling Approach and Formulation
3.1 Modeling approach
In Chapter 2 we presented counterinsurgency as a politico-military struggle for the support of the
population, detailed some of the current research on Pashtun Afghan social structure, and
explored some implications of influencing local leaders to more effectively win that popular
support. Furthermore, we explained how the US Army currently conducts nonlethal targeting
and identified difficulties and uncertainties in the Decide function of selecting individuals to
influence. To enhance the analysis required for nonlethal targeting among Pashtuns, we propose
the inclusion of social influence modeling into the process.
This social influence modeling we put forward is actually comprised of three different models;
the first is the Afghan COIN social influence model (a tractable agent model to represent how
attitudes of local leaders are affected by repeated interactions with other local leaders, insurgents,
and counterinsurgents), the second is the network generation model (to arrive at a reasonable
representation of a Pashtun district-level, opinion leader social network), and the third is the
nonlethal targeting model. The functional overview of these models is shown in Figure 3-1.
Predicated on our social influence model, we developed the nonlethal targeting model as a
nonlinear programming (NLP) optimization formulation that identifies the k-agents to target
nonlethally in order to have the greatest expected effect on increasing favorable attitudes among
the population. It is important to note that we formulated this nonlethal targeting problem as a
modified assignment problem on the generated social network. The goal was to "assign" a fixed
number of US Agents to k local leaders in an opinion leader social network in order to optimally
influence the expected long-term attitude of the population in favor of the US forces. In a similar
vein to other classical assignment problems 7, we do not prescribe how to influence (i.e., how to
accomplish the assignment), but we do provide insight into the best use of resources that achieve
the desired favorable influence (as will be shown by experiments in Chapter 4).
7 For example, the static weapon-target assignment problem (WTA) tries to minimize the total expected
survivability of n targets by assigning a selected number of m different type weapons ( [107], [108]).
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3.2 Related Literature
In this section, we highlight several strands of related literature to this work in order to convey
the richness of the field and the scholarship devoted to these ideas.
3.2.1 Social Science Literature on Opinion Leaders and Influential People
Opinion leadership has been an area of much interest in social science since Katz and Lazarsfeld
[60] first hypothesized that a small number of individuals play an important role in shaping
public opinion. They developed the "two-step" model of communication to explain the diffusion
of innovations, ideas, and even commercial products: first from the media to the opinion leaders,
and then from the opinion leaders to their primary groups (social circles that "actively influence
and support most of an individual's opinion, attitudes, and actions" ( [60], pg. 48). Interestingly,
Katz and Lazarsfeld said that these individuals were not necessarily the public or hierarchical
leaders, but rather were ones much less well known but who still had tremendous influence on
the people they know (like neighbors, relatives, coworkers, and friends) [60]. Numerous
researchers have since criticized the original formulation of opinion leadership and subsequently
proposed modifications on how to identify them in societies (detailed in Weimann [61]). One
such modification was the Personality Strength (PS) Scale methodology, which confirmed a
previously critical observation [62] that "influentials" 8 actually tended to be on higher social
strata [63]. In addition, research suggests that the variable for being an "influential" is in fact
continuous rather than a simple dichotomy, and that influence is transmitted via a multi-step flow
(horizontal/vertical, direct/indirect, and downward/upward) rather than a simple two-step flow
[61]. Still others take exception to the identification of influential people altogether. Emerson
stated that contrary to the belief that a particular person is "influential" or "powerful", in fact the
idea of power or influence is a "property of the social relation, not an attribute of the actor" [64] .
An additional complication to identifying influential individuals or isolating the influence
process is the fact that individuals also determine who they interact with. As Lazer [65]
observed, individuals are not only passively affected by their neighbors, but also often actively
chose who those neighbors are. In order to understand the origin of a person's beliefs or
attitudes, one must examine both processes [65].
3.2.2 Opinion Dynamics Literature
Beyond descriptive social sciences, researchers in other fields have tried to develop
mathematical models to explain how an individual's beliefs and attitudes can change due to its
interactions with others. Early on, Abelson formulated an elemental model that characterized
how a pair-wise interaction of people can affect their scalar-value attitudes [66]. This effect was
a function of the "persuasiveness" of each individual and the difference in their attitudes, and the
effect on all individuals can be written as a system of differential equations. Furthermore, he
identified the dilemma that while such mathematical models lead to a universal agreement
among all agents9 , there are certainly cases in which this does not occur in real life. He
concluded by mentioning some possible variants to the model which would not necessarily lead
to a consensus. Later, DeGroot used the theory of Markov chains to model the weight an
individual gives to the opinion of a deterministic set of neighbors and subsequently calculated
the consensus opinion as the sum product of the steady-state 'probabilities' (opinion weights)
and the initial opinions [67]. While he explained that a consensus occurs only when the states of
the Markov chain are recurrent and aperiodic, he failed to mention how the model should be
8 The term "influentials" was used to distinguish the revised conceptualization of opinion leaders from the original
conceptualization by Katz and Lazarsfeld.
9 We use the phrase "universal agreement among all agents" as the definition of consensus.
amended to account for the diversity of opinions in real life ( [68], [69]). Subsequently, Friedkin
and Johnsen developed the structural theory of social influence, which uses the model of a
system of linear equations to explicitly consider how non-consensus opinion distributions can
occur. In this model, an individual's future opinion is a convex combination of the person's
exogenous initial opinion and the endogenous weighted current opinion of his neighbors ( [69],
[70]). This was shortly followed by work from Deffuant, et al [71] and Hegselmann and Krause
[72] who each developed the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics that
specified a threshold for agent interaction (i.e., interactions and influence could only take place if
the opinions of two agents were within some bound of each other). Later Deffuant further
studied the effect of extremist agents on a variant of the bounded confidence model [73]. In his
work, an agent has both an opinion and an uncertainty that is expressed as a confidence interval
around its opinion. Extremist agents have not only extreme opinions, but also less uncertainty
(or more influence). His research explored the parameter space in which extremist agents caused
the polarization of the rest of the agents' opinions in a complete graph.
Lastly, the models most incident to this work are the spread of misinformation model developed
by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi [6] and the persistent disagreement model
developed by Acemoglu, Como, Fagnani, and Ozdaglar [7]. The spread of misinformation
model characterized agent beliefs in a social network in the midst of influential agents. This
model posited that the pair-wise interactions between agents in a network were probabilistic in
two ways: 1) in the frequency of their meeting, and 2) in the type of interaction (averaging,
forceful, or identity) between the agents. Operating on the assumption that everybody in the
network is influenced by someone else ("no man is an island"), this work proved that the
presence of forceful agents (agents who had a positive probability of forcefully influencing
another agent) leads to the formation of a consensus among all agents, but that consensus is a
random variable with some unknown distribution [6]. The researchers also found a bound for the
difference between the consensus in the midst of forceful agents and the consensus without them.
The persistent disagreement model extends the misinformation model further by designating
non-homogenous stubborn agents (those whose disparate opinions do not change) and trying to
characterize the resulting expected long-term attitudes in the network that necessarily do not
reach a consensus [7].
3.2.3 Key Person Problem (KPP) Literature
Another growing field of research is the identification of key people in groups of individuals
who can facilitate the diffusion of an idea or behavior. This strand of literature tries to solve the
Key Person Problem (KPP), a phrase first used by Borgatti [74]. Borgatti developed two new
measures of centrality of an agent in a network. The first one quantified the disconnectedness
resulting from the removal of k-agents from a network. The second one quantified the
connectedness of k-agents to the rest of the agents in a network. Using the new formulations of
centrality, he then could find the k-agents that maximally disconnected or maximally connected
the network with a simple greedy algorithm [74]. In a related problem, Kempe, Kleinburg, and
Tardos developed an optimization formulation for finding the k-agents whose directed activation
would lead to the maximum number of agent activations in the entire network. They used both
the threshold and independent cascade models of diffusion in their work [75]. While this was an
NP-hard problem, the researchers showed that a hill-climbing algorithm would guarantee a 63%-
approximate solution [75]. Overall, the KPP literature we found, while related to this work in
sharing the goal of selecting the best k-agents for some objective, falls short by modeling the
diffusion of binary behaviors, rather than trying to affect continuous attitudes.
3.2.4 Afghan Application of Network Modeling
In research more applicable to Afghanistan, Geller developed an agent-based computational
model for analyzing the formation of qawms (traditional solidarity groups) among Afghan agents
[36] as well as tested the diffusion of information on the resulting network [76]. Geller first
identified 10 actor-types common in Afghan society and differentiated the actor-types into two
categories: "strongmen" and "ordinary agents" [36]. A representative sample of assorted agents
then drew upon a model of endorsements in exchange for goods and services and formed
interconnected qawms. With the network in place, Geller also tested the diffusion of messages on
it and found that propagating messages from "strongmen" led to a faster diffusion in the network
than seeding from a regular agent [76].
3.3 Afghan COIN Social Influence Model
Having shown the amount of scholarly and diverse literature on which this work is based, we
now proceed to describe the first of the three models. The Afghan COIN social influence model
is a tractable agent model 0 that allows us to analyze the effects of repeated interactions among
local leaders, Taliban insurgents, and US counterinsurgents on the attitudes of Afghan
population. It is a modification of the spread of misinformation model from Acemoglu, et al. [6],
and was enhanced to suit the context of a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.
3.3.1 Scope of the Model
Before we discuss model specifics, it is important to explain its scope. In this work we are
prescribing a process to analyze the influence of local leaders, insurgents, and counterinsurgents
on attitude dynamics of a fixed population given some coarse but realistically attainable data
measurements. We note upfront that in reality there is tremendous variability in local politics
between different villages and districts ( [38], [34]). Given this variability, it is difficult to
determine an appropriate level of analysis when considering the effects of leaders on population
sentiments that fits all of Afghanistan. There are certainly leaders at every level of analysis, but
whether those leaders have any effective influence on the population to support one side or the
other in a counterinsurgency is much more uncertain. The model we prescribe must be carefully
parameterized to match the local analysis of the operational and mission variables discussed in
Section 2.2.1. Depending upon the particular area, different local leaders at different levels may
effectively exert influence on the population.
We cautiously proceed by proposing a scope that may be applicable for this social influence
analysis. As a method of practice for better command and control, US Army units divide up its
area of operations (AO) into smaller sectors to be supervised by subordinate commands. More
recently in portions of eastern Afghanistan, a battalion typically takes responsibility for a
province, while a subordinate company takes responsibility for one or two districts within that
province ( [77], [78]). It is this latter level, specifically a company unit operating in a rural
Pashtun district, which we suggest as an appropriate starting point for our social influence
modeling approach. We base this suggestion upon the fact that the company is the smallest
conventional unit that interacts closely with the population and has resources for an intelligence
analytic capability, as well as anthropological findings that 1) rural Afghan populations tend to
be have tighter knit communities (qawms) [37], and 2) rural populations tend to be more reliant
' Tractable agent modeling is a modeling technique that analytically derives the emergent collective behavior from
the individual decisions of a group of autonomous entities called agents.
on traditional authorities [31]. We continue by discussing the basic building blocks of the COIN
social influence model.
3.3.2 Agent Properties
3.3.2.1 Agent identification
With an understanding of COIN as a struggle for the support of the population, we model two
types of actors generically found in the counterinsurgency environment. We will use the term
agent to signify these actors and eventually represent them as nodes in network. The first type is
the ideologically motivated agent consisting of Taliban insurgents and US counterinsurgents, all
of whose attitudes for their causes are immutable. We use S to denote this set of "stubborn"
agents, where US and TB represent the set of US and Taliban agents, respectively, and S = US U
TB. The second type of agent is the Pashtun local leader who has a mutable attitude on
supporting either side of the counterinsurgency. We use A to denote this set of all others. It is
important to note that we do not model every agent as necessarily representing only one person.
In general, we consider each agent to be representative of a number of people who collectively
exhibit the same attitude, or who expend resources on others (time, attention) at the same rate.
According to this concept of an agent or node, we made the following modeling decisions:
* Head of household. We represent all individual household members by a single male head of
household node. Based on the primacy of the head of households within the family ( [45],
[29]), we assume that attitudes are homogeneous within the same household, or are too
suppressed to matter.
* All other villagers and officials. We represent each of the local leaders within the village and
district to be its own distinct node. In our analysis of typical Pashtun villages and districts,
we identified those most likely to be considered a local leader (as listed and described in
Section 2.6.1.2). However, once again, we acknowledge tremendous variability across
villages and districts. Not all villages will have individuals who fill every single role
identified. Also, there are other roles beyond those listed, such as businessmen and other
government officials, who may have influence on the local population. Further still,
individuals may fill several roles, thus overlapping in their spheres of influence. It is critical
counterinsurgents conduct a thorough analysis of the population to identify all those who
need to be represented in the model.
* Taliban insurgents. We initially represent a village cell of insurgents as a single node under
the village cell leader since all operations by the cell are likely to be conducted in concert.
However, we also allow for the possibility of relaxing this assumption when we consider that
each insurgent within the cell could also intimidate and suppress the population at different
rates.
e US counterinsurgents. We represent US counterinsurgents as 3 different entities: the platoon
leader, the company commander, and the battalion commander. While all their subordinate
soldiers support missions in COIN, generally only these three types of leaders may conduct
nonlethal activities at the district level in the form of meetings and other activities listed in
Section 2.5.1. Each of these entities can simultaneously conduct separate engagements, all at
different rates.
We make a limiting assumption that the time horizon of analysis is such that all agents are
considered fixed in the environment; that is, no new agents appear or and no existing agents
disappear. We denote the set of all agents as V = S U A, and IVI = n.
3.3.2.2 Occurrence of Interactions
We assume that each agent meets another agent in a pair-wise interaction as a Poisson process
with rate 1, independent of all other agents [6]. Therefore, in a network of n agents, we say that
interactions over all agents occur as a Poisson process with rate n. In assuming a Poisson
process of interactions, we are claiming that there is at most one interaction at any given time.
Furthermore, we index these interactions over all the agents with k, k > 1. Lastly, note that the
time between interactions is clearly not fixed.
3.3.2.3 Attitude Estimation
An agent's attitude towards counterinsurgents can be measured in several ways, e.g., polling
instruments [46], conducting face-to-face meetings and focus groups [57], and subjective
assessments of population's behaviors and demeanor during interactions. This work does not
prescribe a method of detection of individual attitudes, but assumes that they can be measured
reasonably, accurately, and be distilled into a single numeric value.
We model an agent's attitude towards the counterinsurgents as a continuous random variable that
takes on a scalar value at each interaction occurrence (over all the agents). We denote Xi (k) as
agent i's attitude at the k-th interaction, where Xi(k) E [-0.5,0.5]. A negative (or positive)
value means low (or high) favorability towards the counterinsurgents, and zero means neutral.
This spectrum of attitudes is depicted in Figure 3-2. Extreme points along the scale denote a
greater strength of attitude [73]. In our model, the ideologically motivated agents, the US
counterinsurgents and the Taliban insurgents, possess immutable attitudes which remain at the
extreme points and do not change over time, i.e., Xi (k) = -0.5, V i E TB, V k > 0 and Xi (k) =
+0.5, V i E US, V k > 0.
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Figure 3-2: Attitude Scale
3.3.3 Attitude Dynamics
We model the attitude dynamics of all agents as a Markov chain, where the state of the system is
the set of agent attitudes at a particular interaction k, i.e., Xi (k) V i E V, and state transitions are
determined probabilistically from the pair-wise interactions between agents connected in a
network. The state of the system is also denoted as X(k) E RnX1, which is the vector of random
variables for the attitude of all agents in set V at the k-th interaction. The Markov property [79]
we assume is that the state of all agent attitudes will have the same transition probabilities to
another state of attitudes given the current state, regardless of the state history or how that state
was reached. Specifically, mutable agents change their attitudes as a result of memory-less,
person-to-person interactions with neighbors in the network1 . In this work, we broadly define
interactions as any exchange of information or ideas, including discussion, appeals, arguments,
threats, or intimidation.
Furthermore, we assume that every agent, when interacting with another agent, might retain
some fraction, called self-weight, of its own attitude. Any single agent may retain different
amounts of their attitude depending on who they interact with. We denote this with Ei E [0,1],
1 This assumption of agents' memory-less adjustments of attitudes is based on some research about how Afghans
are notorious for changing alliances in armed conflicts to be on the winning side [54] or even for economic
incentives [58].
which is the fraction of agent i's attitude that it retains upon interaction with agentj. The order
of the subscripts is significant: the first subscript signifies the agent's self-weight when
interacting with the agent signified by the second subscript. Note that the order of the subscripts
does not signify the order of the interaction, i.e., agent i's self-weight when interacting with
agentj is the same regardless of the order of the interaction. We also assume an agent's self-
weight when interacting with another particular agent is fixed, and that time does not affect how
much each agent retains of its attitude. Additionally, we view this self-weight as an endogenous
value to the individual and distinct from the persuasiveness of the other agent in the interaction.
The dynamics of the model at each interaction k, modified slightly from Acemoglu, et al. [6],
proceed as follows:
* Agent i initiates an interaction by some probability distribution over the population. This
distribution could be uniform (meaning every agent has an equal chance to initiate) or some
skewed distribution (meaning some agents may instigate interactions more frequently). From
among its neighbors, agent i then selects agentj uniformly at random with probability pjj.
" Conditioned on agents i andj meeting, one of three types of pair-wise interactions occur [6]:
I. Averaging. With probability flij, they reach a consensus equal to the average of their
prior attitudes:
Xi (k + 1) = X (k + 1) = 2i()+X k (3.1)2
II. Forceful. With probability at,, agentj 'forcefully' imparts (1 - Ey ) of its attitude on
agent i:
{X(k + 1)= Ei; -Xi(k) + (1 - Ey X (k) (3.2)
X;ii(k +1) = X (k)
III. Identity. With probability yi;, both agents exhibit no change in attitude:
(k+1)=Xk)(3.3)
X; i(k + 1) = X (k)(3)
and fli + ai; + y 1 = 1.
There are broad interpretations for each of these types of interactions. Interaction (3.1), called
the averaging interaction, effectively represents both agents communicating and discussing their
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own attitudes about supporting or not supporting the counterinsurgency, and parting with some
agreement on a middle ground. Interaction (3.2), called the forceful interaction, can be
interpreted as agent i essentially adopting agent j's attitude because agentj acts as its opinion
leader, or agent] uses some form of effective persuasion or influence. Note that only agent i's
attitude changes in this interaction. Interaction (3.3), called the identity interaction, occurs when
agents with disparate beliefs interact but fail to concede, and subsequently retain the same
attitudes as before. As a whole, these interaction types provide a richer set of dynamics than
models which support only binary decisions [73].
We further note that the interaction dynamics allow for essentially two effects: moving towards
someone else's attitude, or remaining the same. In this simplified model, we have not
formulated a dynamic where an agent moves away from someone else's attitude. Abelson
termed this as the "boomerang effect" and reasoned that it occurs when two partisan individuals
knowingly choose positions that are intended to oppose the other ( [66]: 153). This extension to
the model is potentially applicable to Pashtuns, who are known to have inter- and intra-qawm
conflicts [31]. However, such a model modification is left for future work.
3.3.3.1 Influence estimation
In our model, the influence that agentj exerts over agent i is probabilistic and governed by the
specific parameters: flij, acj, yi1 (which we call the interaction-type probabilities), and Eij (the
self-weight). We acknowledge that collecting such 'soft' data (like the strength of a person's
influence over another or the self-assurance of a person) is hard in a controlled environment and
extremely difficult among populations in conflict environments such as insurgencies.
Nevertheless, we proceed by reasoning through the influence estimation of each of the two
different types of agents: the mutable local leaders, and the immutable insurgents and
counterinsurgents.
For the mutable local leaders, we draw upon our knowledge of rural Pashtun society and choose
to differentiate opinion leaders by the largest sphere in which they exert influence: at the
household, village, and regional/district levels. Those who exert influence only within their own
household, we characterize their level of forcefulness as regular. Those who exert influence
further to within the village (a village leader), we characterize as forcefulo. And finally, those
who exert influence further still to within the region (a district/regional leader), we characterize
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asforcefull. Let R be the set of regular agents, F0 be the set offorcefulo agents, and F1 be the set
offorcefuli agents. For each pair of agents, each with a level of forcefulness, we determine a
reasonable assignment rule of interaction-type probabilities. For example, we may initially
choose the following three sets of parameterization rules:
fij=1.o, aij=o.o, yij=o.o, if ij E R
fhi =0.0, ai1 =1.0, yi =0.0, if i E R,j E F0 U F1
The interpretation of this first set is that a villager who is simply a head of household (E R)
always reaches a pair-wise consensus with another head of household, and always adopts a
village leader's attitude.
# flij=0.1, ai1 =0.0, yij=0.9, if ij E F0
f1j =0.1, aij=0.0, yij=0. 9, if i,j E F1
The interpretation of this second is that a village leader (E FO) or district/regional leader (E F1)
reaches a pair-wise consensus with another leader of the same level with small probability, but
would otherwise retain his attitude.
{fli =0.1, aj =0.4, yij =0.5, if i E F0,j E F1
The interpretation of this last set is that a village leader reaches a pair-wise consensus with a
district/regional leader with small probability, and either adopts the district/regional leader's
attitude or retains his own attitude with greater probability.
This is admittedly a coarse means of determining the interaction-type probability matrices
(#l, a, y), but is informed by studies of Pashtun society. In essence, the difference in levels of
forcefulness as determined by societal position between agents (data more easily obtained by
soldiers working with the population) is used as an estimate for the relative influence between
the agents. As soldiers understand more of the interpersonal relationships between pairs of
people, it would be possible to assign more accurate estimates of the probabilities. For example,
if soldiers in a particular area detect that the villagers seem more cohesive with each other but
more suspicious of district-level leaders, one may capture this by increasing the forceful
interaction-type probability between village leaders and heads of household, and decreasing the
forceful interaction-type probability between district leaders and village leaders. One would
simply to adjust the interaction-probabilities appropriately to reflect the perceived sentiments on
the ground.
We now consider how to characterize the influence of the immutable agents, the US
counterinsurgents and Taliban insurgents. We add two types offorceful agents to represent the
US counterinsurgent and Taliban insurgent (where Xvs (k) = 0.5 and XTB (k) = -0.5 for all k).
Let F2 be the set of these 'forceful2' agents. In the same manner of assigning the other
interaction-type probabilities, we can reasonably do the same for the forceful2 agents:
fl? =0.0, atj=1.0, yij =0.0, if i E R U F0 U F1,j E F2
p1i1 =0.0, aij=0.0, yi=1.0, if ij E F2
The interpretation here is that the US and Taliban agents can always persuade another local
leader to adopt its extreme attitude. While this is an example of a possible parameterization,
throughout this work we say that it fits for Taliban agents because their use of armed propaganda
and violence is very effective at persuading the population. However, we will later explore the
case when US agents do not have this certainty of persuasion, a more realistic case due to
uncertainty of the effectiveness of the nonlethal actions available to them.
3.3.4 Analytic Formulation of Expected Long-Term Attitudes
While the pair-wise interactions between two agents in the social influence model are fairly
simple, the entire system itself becomes quite complex for many agents connected in large
networks. However, our modeling technique is conducive to simulation and allows us to study
the emergent behavior of the entire system. Such simulations have been used extensively in
researching emergent behavior or the propagation of beliefs or actions in social networks ( [80],
[4]). We discuss our simulation in the following chapter. Moreover, by employing tractable
agent modeling, we were also able to compute the expected long-term attitudes for each agent
analytically. In this section, we explain the derivation for this result and discuss its implications
for our optimization formulation.
3.3.4.1 Derivation
We recall that there were three interaction-types, averaging, forceful, and identity, which
occurred with probabilities flj, atj, yij, respectively. We begin by writing the conditional
expected value of the resulting attitudes for a single pair-wise interaction between agents i andj:
E [Xi(k + 1)|X(k)] = flq (y + xik) + ai; [Ei; - Xi(k) + (1 - -X(k)] + yij -Xi(k)
Factoring all the terms, grouping like terms of Xi (k) and X (k), and substituting in yij = 1 -
fli + at; gives us:
E[Xi(k + 1)IX(k)] = fli X(k) + ai; -Ei; *X (k) + yi;2
ai; - Ei; + y X (k) + [a; (1 -
ai; - Ei; + (1 -fl#i - aij)] Xi(k)
Let oi; = (1 - E ai; + lfi . Given the equation above, we observe that o is the expected
weight agent i gives to the attitude of agentj. We then arrive at a concise expression for the
expected attitude of agent i, given that agents i andj meet.
E[Xi(k + 1)IX(k)] = (1 - wi; ) -Xi(k) + (wi;) -X (k)
In our model, conditioned on the same two agents selected, the resulting effect on each agent's
attitude is the same regardless of which agent is selected first to initiate the interaction.
From here, we assume that the above equation exactly captures the dynamic of attitudes for agent
i when meeting agentj, i.e., given that agents i andj meet (regardless of order),
Xi (k + 1) = (1 - wi; ) -Xi (k) + (wi; ) -X (k)
We further assume every agent in V has a uniform probability of initiating an interaction, such
that P (an agent initiates an interaction)= 1. Therefore, with probability .(Pi +pji), the following
attitude dynamic (written in terms of the expected weights wi; and Wfi for each pair of agents
i,j E V) occurs:
Xi (k + 1) = (I - wi;) -Xi(k) + (oi;) X (k)
(3.4)+ (wyi) -Xi(k)X (k + 1) = (1 - ;i) -X (k)
,Xk(k + 1) = Xk (k ) V k # ij
The conditional value of agent i's attitude at the next interaction is a function of not only the
probabilities where agent i elects others to interact with (pij V j: p1 > 0 ), but also the
probabilities where all other agents can select agent i to interact with (pi V j: pi > 0 ).
Let us examine more closely how agent i's attitude changes when interacting with agent j.
+ [aij (1 - E i
= [2i +
= [ l +
= 1-(ai(1 -Ej)+ -fli )]Xi (k) + [t;i(i - E;)+ #fhi]X(k)
-Xi (k) + #li;L + aj (1 - Ey; )X (k)
Eij ) + 1 #li; X (k)
+ 2 fij ] X (k)
Xi(k + 1) = (1 - wij) -Xi(k) + (wij) -Xj(k)
=Xi (k) - (wij ) -Xi (k) + (wij ) -Xj (k)
Writing the dynamic this way illustrates that agent i's attitude at the next interaction is equivalent
to his ownfull attitude at the previous interaction, plus the weighted attitude of agent j at the
previous interaction, minus his own weighted attitude at the previous interaction. Again, note
that this dynamic occurs with probability -(piij+pji).
We can then write the expected value of agent i's attitude at interaction k+l over the possible
interactions it initiates or is subject to by the others' initiation, conditioned on every agents'
attitude at the previous interaction k.
[Xi (k + 1)|IX(k)] = Xi (k) + Zi -pij - wi; -X (k) - Zj}-p;- i ik
+2; -p1 - ; -X (k) - Z n;{ Il -,pji - 01; - Xi (k)
Next we combine the like terms of Xi (k) and X (k), as well as factor out Xi (k) because we
recognize that it is not affected by summing overj.
1E [Xi (k + 1)|IX(k)] =Xi (k) + - -j [pi; -wi; -X(k) + pi - wi; -X(k)]
- 1- Xi(k) -j j(pi; -wij + pi -*;)
1E [Xi (k + 1)|IX(k)] =Xi (k) +{ -Ej[(pi; -wij + pji -wij ) -X(k)]
- 1- Xi (k) - j (pij -wij + pji -wij)
We now desire to succinctly express the expected attitude of all agents at interaction k+1,
conditioned on all the agents' previous attitudes. This step draws on both the law of iterated
expectations and the linearity of expectations. First, we simply take the expression
E[Xi(k + 1)IX(k)] and assemble a vector of all entries for each i:
E [X(k + 1)IX(k)] = X(k) + Q -X(k)
Where each component of the matrix Q E RIvIXIvI is defined as
1 - (pij - Wij + pi - wij), i E A,j E V and i #j
Qij = - - y (p. -o;+ ~ i) i E A~j E V and i =j (3.5)
0, i ES,VjE V
Then we take the expected value of this vector and use the linearity of expectations.
E[E[X(k + 1)IX(k)]] = E[X(k + 1)] = E[X(k)] + Q - E[X(k)]
For ease of notation, let px(k) E Rnx1 be the vector of the expected value of X(k), i.e. px(k) =
E[X(k)]. Therefore,
px (k + 1) = px(k) + Q -px(k) (3.6)
This discrete dynamical system captures the expected change in attitudes of all agents from
interaction k to k+l. In this work, we are interested in the long-term behavior of this system.
Future work involves analyzing it for shorter time horizons.
To solve this system of equations at steady state, we consider when k -> oo such that:
Ix(oo) = px(oo) + Q - ix(oo) => Q -px(oo) = 0
In order to solve this system of equations efficiently, we can decompose the matrix and vector as
Q = [A B] and ix(oo) = [/Z]
The Q matrix is decomposed into:
1) A E RIAIII: sub-matrix of the columns of agents E A, rows of agents E A
2) B E RIsAxls|: sub-matrix of the columns of agents E S, rows of agents E CA
The sub-matrix of the columns of agents E A, rows of agents E S and the sub-matrix of the
columns of agents E S, rows of agents E S are both 0 because of (3.5).
The px(oo) vector is decomposed into 2 parts:
1) py E RlIAIx: vector of expected long-term attitudes of agents E A (mutable agents) at
interaction k -> o.
2) pz E RISIx1: vector of expected long-term attitudes of agents E S (immutable agents) at
interaction k -> oo. This vector is known because immutable agents in S never change
their attitude.
We can then express the dot product of the decomposed system of equations as:
A -py + B - pz = 0 (3.7)
=> py = A-' (-B -pz)
Solving for py yields the vector of expected long-term attitudes for all mutable agents, for a
given influence-probabilities on a deterministic social network. Table 3-1 provides a summary
of the notation we used in this subsection.
Notation Description
US Set of all US agents.
TB Set of all TB agents.
S Set of agents who have immutable attitudes, and S = US U TB.
A Set of all other agents who have mutable attitudes.
V Set of nodes in the network. By convention lVI = n, where n is the number of
nodes in the network. Also V = S U A.
Xi(k) Agent i's attitude at the k-th interaction, where Xi(k) E [-0.5,0.5].
Pij Conditional probability agent i meets agentj, given agent i initiates.
aij Interaction-type probability: i is forcefully influenced byj.
fli Interaction-type probability: i andj have a regular interaction.
yi; Interaction-type probability: i andj have an identity interaction.
Eij Self-weight. Fraction of attitude that agent i retains when interacting with agent
j, where Eij = [0,1]
G Social network, an undirected graph (V, a).
j1, if agent i connects to agentj
a-- ai = 10, otherwise
We assume symmetric connections such that a 1 = agi. Then a is the symmetric
n x n adjacency matrix of graph G.
R c A Set of regular agents, those who exert influence only within their own
household.
F0 c A Set offorcefulo agents, those who exert influence to within the village (a village
leader).
F1 c A Set offorcefulz agents, those who exert influence to within the region (a
district/regional leader).
F2 C S Set of theseforceful2 agents, US and Taliban agents with immutable attitudes.
Wij The expected weight agent i gives to the attitude of agentj. Each entry of a is
calculated by wi; = (1 - Ei- ai + f .
X(k) E Rx1 Vector of random variables for the attitude of all agents at interaction k
px(k) E RxI Vector of the expected value of X(k). Equivalently, E[X(k)] = px(k).
pyi E py Expected attitude of agent i, for i E A at interaction k -0 o (expected long-
term attitude). It is an element in the vector py E RIAI'l which the expected
attitude for all agents in A.
pzi E pz Expected attitude of agent i, for i E S at interaction k -+ oo (expected long-term
attitude). It is an element in the vector py E Risix1 which the expected attitude
for all agents in S.
Table 3-1: Afghan COIN Social Influence Model Notation and Descriptions
3.3.4.2 Implications of the Analytic Result for Optimization
The analytic method of calculating the expected long-term attitudes for all agents is a powerful
result. Rather than conducting a Monte Carlo simulation of thousands of interactions, we can
now explicitly determine the effect of adjusting agent parameters as well as network connections
on the expected long-term attitudes of the entire population. This result gave us a value function
for decisions on certain connections, and led us to the optimization formulation which we will
discuss in the following section. We also make two important notes. First, this analytic result is
for the long-term expected attitude (as the number of interactions approaches infinity). Our
simulation provided us insight that occasionally agents arrive at these expected long-term
attitudes fairly quickly (a result which seemed related to the number of agents in the network, the
particular topology, and influence structure). Knowing near-term attitudes after a pre-
determined number of interactions may become very useful for 'red-blue' adversarial modeling
in a game-theoretic approach. However, we do not consider shorter time horizon effects in this
thesis and leave it as future work. Second, this analytic result characterizes the expectation of
attitudes, and the optimization formulation that follows is for the expectation metric. However,
the variance of agent attitudes is also clearly a significant consideration in the decision-making
process. For example, an optimization formulation that minimizes variance (i.e., stabilizes
attitude fluctuations of the agents) may also prove useful and operationally relevant. As with the
study of near-term attitudes, we save this for future work.
3.3.5 Network Connections
Having identified the agents and explained their associated properties and behaviors, we now
discuss how the agents are connected. In our model, the agents are arranged in a social network
where a connection is broadly defined as a relationship between two people that is supported by
frequent person-to-person interaction. Recall that we previously defined interactions as any
exchange of information or ideas, including discussion, appeals, arguments, threats, or
intimidation. We represent the social network as an undirected graph G = (V, a), where V is the
set of agents, and a is the symmetric n x n adjacency matrix of graph G. Note that while we
assume that the social network is comprised of undirected edges (the person-to-person
interactions occur between pairs of agents), we distinguish this idea from the nature of the
interactions when clearly persons may transmit unequal amounts of influence along those edges.
In the next section, we discuss a model to rapidly develop hypothetical network connections that
are informed by case studies and knowledge of Pashtun society.
3.4 Network Generation Model
In this section, we propose a model that approximates the social interaction network among
Pashtun local leaders in a rural Afghan district based upon our understanding of qawms, and
actors and roles in the society. To understand the network, US counterinsurgents face the dual
challenge of identifying both the agents as well as the connections between them. In order to
identify the agents (local leaders and Taliban), US soldiers must draw upon an analysis of the
operational environment and intelligence gathered during their repeated interactions with the
population. While time-consuming and labor-intensive to the counterinsurgent, identifying
specific local leaders is the easier of the two challenges because such personalities are public
knowledge. More difficult is identifying the interpersonal relationships between the individuals.
The reasons for this include 1) the difficulty of detecting person-to-person conversations (absent
telephonic or internet-based communication), 2) inaccuracy of self-report data on interactions
[81], and 3) the difficulty of coherently assembling and processing the volume of potential
information. In order to avoid these difficulties, we first draw upon the principle of homophily 12
( [82], [83], [84]) to generate likely connections (opportunities for social interaction) between
agents, and then subsequently allow the US intelligence cells to selectively modify the network
based on specific additional information. The homophily-based links between local leaders
(listed in the following subsection) are grounded on the characteristics of rural Pashtun society,
particularly the strength of qawms as well as the geographical isolation of many rural villages.
The resulting local leader social network serves as baseline for analysis. The network can further
be modified for the presence or absence of specific connections as intelligence reveals, as well as
support the probabilistic presence of 'random' connections to others outside the qawm (providing
us the ability to determine the robustness to missing links). Figure 3-3 depicts the network
generation model and its associated inputs and output. We shall discuss each component in
further detail.
12 Researchers at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center (TRAC) and Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) first applied the principle of homophily in generating network connections in an irregular warfare
environment ( [84], [109]). Their research was embedded in a more complex agent-based simulation and required
the analysis of multiple dimensions of every agent in the network.
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Figure 3-3: Network Generation Model
3.4.1 Inputs
In Sections 2.2 and 2.4.3.2 we discussed the US Army methodology of analyzing the population
and the enemy using the operational and mission variables (PMESJI-PT and METT-TC) and IPB3
process, respectively. Additionally, counteriVsurgents as part of their daily operations collect
human intelligence that feed into subsequent updates of the PMESII-PT and METT-TC
variables. Human intelligence, in the form of field notes and patrol debriefs, is collected during
the counterinsurgents' interaction with the population during various meetings and engagements.
From this collective in-depth analysis, we assume that US counterinsurgents are able to
determine for their area of operations the inputs to the network generation model: 1) a list of
local leaders that includes the specific roles they fill in the village and district and their estimated
attitude, and 2) a list of Taliban agents (number of cells and size) and whom among the
population they influence or specifically interact with.
3.4.2 Assumptions
The network generation model is based on several assumptions. First, we assume static edges in
our model, which are more reasonable in stable relationships like kinship ties [85] but are not
necessarily reasonable for Taliban ties with the population. We acknowledge this shortcoming
and save the modeling of dynamic adversarial connections for future work. We also assume that
homophily of roles, qawm, and geographical proximity can be a fairly accurate predictor of
connections between different Pashtun local leaders. Homophily, while it is a well studied
phenomenon in among some groups [82], has not yet been rigorously applied to Afghans.
3.4.3 Homophily Link Generator
Identifying the interpersonal connections among different local leaders is obviously difficult.
We use the principle of homophily, that "contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate
than among dissimilar people" [83], to derive the likely connections between agents. A
connection, as defined earlier, is any relationship that supports frequent person-to-person
interaction. While there are generally two types of homophily, status (based on major socio-
demographic dimensions) and value (based on beliefs) [83], we consider only the former in this
work. Based on the strength of qawms in rural Pasthun society, we believe that status homophily
based an individual's qawm, which also likely induces geographical proximity and association
with those with a similar role in society, is an appropriate focus. The link generation rules we
derived and their justification are in Table 3-2. The rules are not exhaustive of the types of
connections that can be formed by qawms, but are the more obvious ones based on visible
characteristics such as locality and roles in society. The link generator receives the list of agents
and subsequently assigns connections among the agents based upon these homophily rules. The
resulting network is denoted as G = (V, a), which is a list of agents and a symmetric matrix
representing undirected edges.
3.4.4 Intelligence Cell Validation
The homophily link generator assigns probable links between local leaders based upon qawm,
geographical proximity and role identities. While this is a rapid method of forming an initial
social interaction network, it requires validation and correction from soldiers in the intelligence
analysis cell. Any of the previous sources of intelligence, including the human intelligence, IPB,
and operational and mission variable analysis, may lead the soldiers to identify connections
which are not necessarily based upon the specific rules listed. For example, a Soldier may
discover that a particular head of household in a village is related to the district chief of police
and that they often interact. While obtaining such pieces of intelligence about relationships
between villagers is common, networks created solely from such information would likely be
79
very sparse. Augmenting an existing homophily-based interaction network with specific
connections provides a more complete network.
A head of household has a connection with Small number of heads of households in every
1 every other head of household in the village. village. Sedentary rural communities and
geographical proximity and shared kinship [29].
2 A malik has a connection with every head of He is the public authority in the village, and ishousehold (and jirga member) in the village often even selected by the villagejirga [39].
A malik has a connection with the district sub- He is the representative of the village to the
3 governor district leadership. The sub-governor holds
regular meetings with them ( [39], [34]).
4 A malik has a connection with the district police He is the representative of the village to the
chief district leadership ( [39], [34]).
A malik has a connection with the every other Sedentary rural communities and geographical
5 malik of the neighboring village (same village proximity and shared kinship [29].
cluster)
A mullah has a connection with every head of Prominence of the mullah, the mosque, and
6 household (and jirga member) in the village religion in daily life. ( [42], [86], [34], [41])
Mullahs provide attend and bless the jirga [29].
7 A mullah has a connection with the district Some evidence that mullahs communicate with
ulema higher level ulema [41]
A mullah has a connection with the mullah of Some evidence that mullahs have more
8 the neighboring village (same village cluster) interactions with neighboring communities [41].
A khan (sub-tribal leader of a village) has a Sedentary rural communities and geographical
9 connection with the khan (tribal leader of a proximity. Villages and village clusters and often
village cluster) and the khan (sub-tribal leader made up the same kin ( [34], [29]).
of a neighboring village)
10 A member of the district jirga has a connection District sub-governor has a relationship with
with the district sub-governor district jirga to assist in conflict resolution [43].
11 A member of the district jirga has a connection Religious clergy attending the higher leveljirgas
with the district ulema are well-known, not local mullahs [29].
12 A member of the district jirga has a connection Members sit in a circle, and interact throughout
with every other member of the district jirga the meeting [29].
A local commander at the village level has a Regional hierarchy of local commanders [33].
13 connection with the regional commander (at the
district level)
A local criminal at the village level has a Regional hierarchy of some criminal networks
14 connection with the regional 'crime boss' (at [44].
the district level)
Table 3-2: Homophily Rules Used in the Network Generation Model
3.4.5 Accounting for Random Connections
Even though the link generator and the intelligence cell validation creates a basic topology that
is consistent with the sociological data available and informed by specific intelligence, we
recognize that it is still an approximation and that (many) links may be absent from the network.
In order to effectively capture (and appropriately parameterize) the extent of the missing links,
we draw upon a modification of the Watts and Strogatz approach [87] of accounting for
randomness of small-world ties in regular networks". In their work, the researchers tried to
bridge the gap between regular (lattice) and completely random graphs, both of which were
primarily studied at the time but neither of which truly represented real-world networks. They
developed a method rewiring links in a regular network with increasing randomness. This
rewiring created links which acted as small-world ties. Each existing connection, with some
probability determined a priori, was rewired to another randomly selected node. The process
continued until all connections were considered once. The resulting small-world network
exhibited properties known to exist in real-world topologies, namely high clustering14 and short
average path lengths. Figure 3-4 illustrates the effect of rewiring connections by tuning a single
parameter [87].
Regular Small-world Random
p=O j p=1
Increasing randomness
Figure 3-4: Rewiring Procedure [87]
13 Path length is the distance (as measured by the smallest number of links) between two agents. Small-world ties
are those links which cause a large network to have small diameters (longest path length) and small average path
lengths [4]. Small average path length is a common characteristic in real-world graphs [4]. Regular networks are
those networks in which all nodes have the same degree [4].
14 Clustering is a naturally occurring network phenomenon where agents, who are commonly connected to the same
agent, are also likely to be connected with each other [4].
If we view the topology from our network generating model as analogous to a regular network,
then we can similarly add random connections exclusively between villagers (and not with US
and Taliban agents) to effectively account for how villagers may have 'small-world' connections
with others in the district. In order to determine which agent the rewiring connects with, we
explore two different types of network augmenting processes: 1) uniform attachment, and 2)
modified preferential attachment [4].
3.4.5.1 Uniform Attachment Process
The uniform attachment process [4] proceeds as follows:
* Select every agent i E A once. Recall that A = R U F0 U F1 .
e With probability 7, agent i forms a connection to some other agent E A uniformly in the
network. The conditional probability that i connects with any other particular agent is
p = 1 .
The parameter w is effectively the uncertainty of the base structure, i.e., the probability that each
agent is missing one link. Varying w creates alternative networks that allow us to test the
robustness of our models.
3.4.5.2 Modified Preferential Attachment Process
The modified preferential attachment [4] process proceeds as follows:
e Select every agent i E A once.
* With probability w, agent i forms a connection to some other agent E A in the network. The
conditional probability that i connects with an agent whose level of forcefulness is regular,
forcefulo, andforceful; is PR, pF0, and pF1, respectively, where 0 PR < PFO < pF1  1, and
PR + PF0 + PF1 = 1. Agents within the same level of forcefulness are chosen uniformly at
random.
Once again, we use 7 capture some of the uncertainty we have with the base structure. But
instead of an agent connecting uniformly to another agent, we introduce a weighted distribution
where an agent is more likely to connect to agents with a greater level of forcefulness. This is
similar, but not equivalent, to the pure preferential attachment model where the probability of
being connected to is proportional to the degree of the node [4]. This variant of network
generation appeals to our intuition that a forceful agent is also more likely to have a greater
number of connections because he is more visible to the public, or more proactive in
communication and influence
3.4.6 Output
Our model produces a resulting network that is 1) based on homophily of qawm, geographic
proximity, and role similarity, 2) modified through human-in-the-loop validation by the
intelligence cell, and 3) probabilistically accounts for the presence of random connections among
villagers. We believe the model produces a reasonable and informed representation of the
interaction network among Pashtun local leaders.
3.5 Nonlethal Targeting Problem
Thus far, we have described both the COIN social influence and network generation models.
Further, we have analytically derived a technique to calculate the expected long-term attitudes of
the local leaders (mutable agents) given a particular topology as well as a parameterization of the
influence-type probabilities. A natural question that follows is what topology produces the
attitudes most favorable to the counterinsurgents? More specifically, how should the US agents
form connections to other agents in the network that maximizes the favorable attitudes of the
population? In this section, we formulate this nonlethal targeting problem as a nonlinear
program (NLP). Drawing from the general methodology of the classical static weapon-target
assignment (WTA) problem, we seek to find the assignment of a fixed number of US agents to
fixed number of local leaders in a social network that maximizes the expected long-term attitudes
of the population in favor of the US forces.
3.5.1 Assumptions
In formulating this problem, we make the following key assumptions.
e The social interaction network is known and static. Furthermore, we assume that the network
is connected, meaning that there must exist a path of links from every agent to every other
agent in the network.
" Each pair of agents' influence-type probabilities is known and fixed.
e The order of interaction (whether agent i initiates an interaction with agentj, or vice versa)
has no effect on the outcome of the interaction
* Each agent has a uniform probability of initiating an interaction.
* The number of Taliban agents and their connections to the social network are known and
static.
* In this work, we only consider expected attitudes as interactions approach infinity (long-
term).
3.5.2 Decision Variables--Actions/Controls
We had previously identified a US agent as representative of various US Army organizations
who collectively conducted nonlethal activities: the platoon, company, and battalion. Within
each of these organizations, there is a leader who serves as the 'face' of the unit to the population
(the platoon leader, the company commander, and the battalion commander). However, these
organizations also include the soldiers and staff who carry out the missions in support of the
leaders. Within each of these organizations are also an increasing amount of resources such as
money, equipment, authority. The various endogenous characteristics of each US agent
subsequently determine an estimated forceful influence probability.
The number of US agents modeled in the network is dictated by the number of units operating in
the area. Based on recent organizational assignments, a battalion typically operates in a province
(each with 4-7 districts), a subordinate company operates in 1-2 districts within that province,
and its 3-4 subordinate platoons operate within the company boundaries as a whole or further
subdivide the district(s) into even smaller sectors.
Given a fixed number of US agents with (possibly) different influence probabilities, the decision
one makes is which US agents are assigned to which non-US agents (j E A', where / = A U
TB) in the network to connect with. We designate this decision variable as
1, if US Agent i connects to agent ] . . ,
U'j =0, otherwise
The US agents can form a link with either 1) the mutable local leaders, or 2) the immutable
Taliban leaders. A link formed between a US agent to any mutable agent in the network (and the
subsequent propagation of influence from the US agent to that agent) can be interpreted in
various ways including those listed in Section 2.5.1. In practical application, this link can be
representative of any activity or communication in which the targeted local leader is frequently
reinforced with pro-counterinsurgent attitudes. For example, when US forces single out an
individual for nonlethal targeting, it may conduct weekly scheduled meetings with him to discuss
grievances or offer security, resources, and support, as well as initiate a reconstruction project in
the targeted individual's village and frequently inspect its progress during friendly visits. All
these activities, assuming that they are properly resourced and executed, are designed to shape
the local leader's attitude in favor of the counterinsurgent.
A link formed between a US agent and any immutable Taliban agent in the network has a
different interpretation. Unlike the local leaders, the assumption is that these ideologically-
motivated Taliban agents never change their attitude in favor of the counterinsurgents.
Therefore, the US agents are not able to influence Taliban attitudes along a link, but are able to
alter the meeting probabilities with which the Taliban agent negatively influences others. Such a
link in this case can be interpreted as conducting any operation in which US agents disrupt the
enemy's freedom of movement. For example, US forces might conduct vehicle searches and
checkpoints along roads leading into a village and thus interfering with the Taliban efforts to
interact with the population.
The number of connections that each US agent makes is pre-determined as well. Each additional
connection signifies that the same US agent meets its targets less frequently and therefore is able
to influence them less frequently. Because of constrained resources, each US agent should
identify a limited number individuals with whom a connection is most beneficial. One of the
goals of this work is to help the US agent identify a much more focused set of local leaders to
influence.
3.5.3 Derivation of Optimization Formulation
In Section 3.3.4.1, we derived a procedure to analytically calculate the expected long-term
attitudes of all agents, given a specific topology of agent connections in a network. We draw
heavily upon this procedure to arrive at the subsequent optimization formulation for finding the
topology (US agent connections only) that maximizes the weighted expected long-term attitudes
of all mutable agents.
Recall equation (3.5), the discrete dynamical system that governs the change in expected
attitudes for all agents at each interaction k:
Whx(k + 1) = px (k) + Q - wex (k)
Where each of the components of the matrix Q E RIVIX VI was defined (3.6) as
1 (pq -i; + pji -y), i E Aj E V andi #
Qij - -j (pij - i; + pji - ij) i E A~j E V and i =j
0, iES,VjEV
After decomposing the Q matrix and vector px into its parts as described in Section 3.3.4.1, we
arrived at the system of linear equations (3.7):
A -py + B - pz = 0
Both the matrices A and B are dictated by the specific meeting probabilities and weights for each
pair of agents, and the vector pz is fixed for the immutable agents E S. In the nonlethal
targeting problem, our objective concern is the attitude of the population, py (expected long-term
attitudes for all agents E A).
3.5.4 Objective Function
While the population's collective favorable attitude is the overall objective in the nonlethal
targeting problem, everyone does not necessarily have the same importance to the commander.
The unit commander can subjectively determine a weight for each local leader's expected long-
term attitude based of a variety of factors including 1) the tactical importance of the village
where the local leaders are from, and 2) political factors that may demand that one portion of the
population be aligned earlier or in lieu of others. We denote the commander's valuation for the
expected long-term attitude of each agent i E A as value, where valuei E R+
and XEA value = 1. This is data that is derived by the commander's intent for the population.
We define the objective function in the nonlethal targeting problem: the maximization of the
weighted average of the expected long-term attitudes for all mutable agents in the network.
maxu >ELA value -pf-i (3.8)
If all the numerical values of value V i F cA were all equivalent, then this objective function
reduces to the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitudes for all the agents. The
particular decisions of who the US agents connect with, u, affect the expected long-term attitude
of agent i, py,i, V i E cA. Having established the objective function, we now turn to the
constraints.
3.5.5 Constraints
In order to write the optimization formulation for maximizing the weighted expected long-term
attitudes, we must first determine how to express the analytic formulation for py in terms of the
decision variable ui1 , which is the assignment of the i-th US agent to thej-th agent E A'. We
allow the US agent to connect with Taliban agents as well, so we expand set A to A' = A U
TB.
The first constraint is derived when we rewrite (3.7) in terms of Q
Ej E+ ' IYj jES QiZj) = 0, V i E A, Q E RIVIXIvI (3.9)
Next, we proceed to define the terms of Q (3.5) as additional constraints. The simplest one is
carrying forward,
QI] = 0, for i E S,Vj E V (3.10)
For all the other components of Q, we rewrite 1) the meeting probabilities pij and pjj and 2) the
weights w11j all in terms of the decision variable. We modeled the meeting probabilities as the
reciprocal of the number of agents that i orj are connected to, so this process is straightforward.
Recall that we defined
(1, ifagenticonnects to agentj
a= 0, otherwise
We view these aj 's as binary data for all agents i,j E A', meaning that we know which local
leaders are connected to each other and which Taliban agents are connected to which local
leaders. Additionally, we declare a priori the number of connections that the i-th US agent can
make and denoted this as nUSconnecti, i E US. Then we can rewrite the meeting probability pi1
as a fraction of the existence of a connection between agents i andj, over the total number of
connections that agent i makes with everyone else in the network.
a, iE ' and j E
kEA, aik -IZmEUS Umi
, iE A'andj E US
Pi; = ESk aik+Em EUS Umi
U j ., i EUS and j E A'
nUSconnect i
0, otherwise
Next, we also rewrite the weights wi; in terms of the decision variable. Recall that
ij = c(1-Eij )aj + f- , for i,j E cA
Since Eij, aij, fi are all data inputs for ij E A' , (i) is completely deterministic for ij E A'.
However, there are two other different cases we need to be concerned with. For i EC A and j E
US, we can express the following:
10ij = u;;[1 Eij )aij + - #ij
Multiplying o&i by the decision variable ui essentially activates wi whenever thej-th US agent
connects with the i-th agent. For cases where j E US we can choose to model a realistic scenario
with variability in 1) the effectiveness each US Agent, and 2) the stubbornness of each agent E
A. For every US agent j, let fli = 0. Then the probability of the effectiveness of every US
Agent j is determined strictly by atj. Let us assume that this probability is exogenous to the
network and the pair-wise connection, and is only based upon the resources, talent, and
persuasiveness of the particular US Agent j. Example values of aij,j E US are:
Effectiveness a. Logic
Low .40 Low level of resources
Moderate .75 Moderate level of resources
High .90 High level of resources
Table 3-3: Parameters for the Forceful Influence-Type Probability for US Agents
Additionally, we can make the self-weight of an individual with respect with a US agent to be
completely endogenous to the individual, regardless of the effectiveness of the US agent trying
to influence him. Let an agent's self-weight, Eij,j E US, be a function of 1) the initial
attitude xi (0), and 2) the level of forcefulness. We parameterize these self-weights in
accordance with the following table:
Bin # xi (0) regular Forceful Forceful Forceful2
1 [-0.5, -0.3) 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.00
2 [-0.3, -0.1) 0.23 0.48 0.75 -
3 [-0.1,+0.1] 0.15 0.35 0.60 -
4 (+0.1,+0.3] 0.07 0.23 0.45 -
5 (+0.3,+0.5] 0.00 0.10 0.30 -
Table 3-4: Parameters for the Self-Weight of Non-US Agents to US Agents
This particular set of parameters illustrate the belief that 1) agents who are initially unfavorable
to US counterinsurgents have a greater self-weight when interacting with US agents because they
are more resistant to US influence, and 2) agents who are more forceful have a greater self-
weight when interacting with US agents because they are less susceptible to US influence or
require more US effort to influence.
We can rewrite wiq for i C A and j E US:
lot] =j uf[1-Eij at; +} -#;j
=u;[(1 - Ej) ac]
Additionally, for i E S and j E V, we can express the following because all agents i E S are
stubborn, or immutable.
10i =- uji [(1 - eij) aij + ljpt]= 0
Thus, all associated a;, fli = 0, and E = 1 (because immutable agents are perfectly stubborn
and always retain 100% of their belief).
We now have all the pieces to rewrite each of the other components of Q (3.6):
Qij= -i' (pi - oij + pji - wij ), where i E A,j E V and i j
= - ke'\i(Qik) -ZI - a) kaik mui+ nUSconnect I)'
(3.11)
i = j, V i,j E A (and k E .A, and m, 1 E US)
Additionally,
Q.; = - (pi; ' oij + pi - wo;), where i E Aj E V and i # j can be broken into three
expressions:
1=a -(w q)- aj 
Uik +I U11 >
2k ajk +ZI U,1  (3.12)
i # j,V i,j E cA (and k E A', l E US)
Q; =(uji (1 - E-. a Qk aikI u nUSconnect (3.13)
V i E A, j = US (and k E A', 1 US)
Q = n (W iq) (Xk ak +Xi Ui + k ajk Z 1 Ul
(3.14)
V i E Aandj = TB (and k E A',I E US)
For all the other constraints, we justify them below:
EXE ui; = nUSconnecti, V i E US (3.15)
PZ,i 0.5 , Vi E US (3.16)
pZ,i= -0.5, V i E TB (3.17)
uy =tO,1}, V i E USj E A' (3.18)
--0.5 iy, 5 0.5, V i E A (3.19)
Constraint (3.15) limits the number of connections for the i-th US agent. This limitation may be
based off the leader's assessment of his or her ability to reach the local leaders with limited
resources. Constraints (3.16) and (3.17) permanently establish the attitudes of both sets of
immutable agents (the US and Taliban). Constraint (3.18) declares the decision variable as
binary (0,1) between each US agent and all non-US agents in the network (Taliban and local
leaders). And lastly, constraint (3.19) limit the range of expected attitudes for all mutable agents
between the minimum (-0.5) and the maximum (+0.5) values.
Table 3-5 summarizes the notation we used in this subsection, and Figure 3-5 captures the entire
nonlethal targeting problem formulation.
Notation Description
value, Commander's value or importance assigned to agent i, for i E A
nUSconnect, Number of connections that the i-th US agent makes, for i E US
Al A U TB: The union of the set of mutable local leaders and the set of
Taliban agents.
ug 
_ 1, if US agent i connects to agent , where i E US, j E A't0, otherwise
(binary decision variable)
ai _1, if agent i connects to agent],for i,j E A'
(0, otherwise
(adjacency data)
0) ; = (1 - Eg ) - ag + fl#, for i,j E A'
(weight matrix from data)
Table 3-5: Notation for Optimization Formulation
maxu LieA value 
- py
s. t. Ey EA(Q .I . y ) + Eies(Q. ' zj) = 0
= 0
Vi EA, Q E RIVIXIVI
V i F S, andj E V
Qij = - EkEA'\i(Qik) - > (ip (1 - Ei) - a (k aik m Umi
Qil = j(wj) (E Xkj2 IUh +kak+Z ~
Qij = (uij c j a iu U+ i + U
= (uji(1 - E.;) a )I ai u+1U1 nUSconnect 4
1 a1- +Qij =;-oij) (k aik +I U1 +
EjEA' ui1 = nUSconnecti
Izi = 0.5
Pzi = -0.5
uji = {0,1}
nUSconnect ,) I
ak
Ek aj Iz u j
i = j, and V ij E A (and h, k E A'; m, 1 E US)
i #j, and V i,j C A (and k C A' E US)
V i E A, andj = US (and h, k ', 1 E US)
ViE A, andj = TB (and h, k F A, I E US)
Vi F US
Vi F US
Vi E TB
V i E USj E A'
-0.5 yy'i 0.5
Figure 3-5: Nonlethal Targeting Problem Formulation
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)
(3.19)V i E A
While this optimization formulation naturally follows from the analytic expression for the
expected long-term attitudes of the population, some of its properties make it difficult to solve
exactly. Specifically, the formulation is both nonlinear as well as nonconvex, which requires
heuristic methods to solve and often arrives only at local optima. Additionally, there are 0(n 2 )
variables and O(n 2 ) constraints, where n is the total number of agents in the network, which
means the problem is very large. We discuss in the following subsection a simplification to the
formulation which significantly reduces the number of variables and constraints.
3.5.6 Simplifying the Formulation
In order to reduce the computational complexity of the problem, we perform a variable
substitution:
hi = k aik + XIu 1iV i E A' (and k c A',I e US) (3.20)
Due to the connectivity assumption, we also know that hi > 1. We can then rewrite the
constraints of the optimization formulation in terms of this new variable:
Qij = keAk\i(Qik) - E i L ji c(1 -ij) ' . il + u i 'hinUSconnect 1 (3.11 a)
V i = j, i,j E A and l E US
Qij =I(W.)(iju.+2i) i *j,andVi,jFE (3.12a)
i= (uji (1- Eij ) ( + Upco )c V i E A, and j = US (313a)
Qij (Oij + V i E A, andj =TB (3.14a)
Next, we try to remove any fractional terms by writing them with a common denominator.
Therefore, we arrive at following:
Qi;= -kE'\i(Qink) - 1i (lji(1 - E ij ) (ui-nUSconnect I+ui.hinUSconnect (3.1lb)
i =, V i,j E A, and l E US
Q = (i)h a i +h ai) i # j, and V ij E (3.12b)
Qij (uji -i) aE - ui -nUSconnect j+uji -hi ,V i E A,andj = US
n hi~nUSconnectj
Qijj= .(ij) (h aj +hiajt, V i E A,andj = TB
Now the next step is to rewrite constraint (3.9) by substituting in (3.12b), (3.13b), and (3.14b):
;E EA Q Mi Y,]j) + EjeS(Q . - Z, ) = 0,
=~ j~ ~[ij [(O) (hjaij +hiaji)+> EA\i=j (hn a +hiap
+- E T B j h hi a
V i C A
ZyjP* YI]
- E j uji -nUSconnect j +uj -hi
hi-nUSconnect ;
'Iz,]I = Z
Because of the complexity of cases where i = j, V i E c/I,j F V, we examine it more closely:
(Qi; -pyi _ = -k E.'v=j[Qik * -Y I
- a) (ujinUSconnect I+2uiLh)
hi-nUSconnect 1
= -EE\i= [Qik - y] - E keTB [Qik ' Yj
-
[1euS u 1 - E;) - a.) (ui-nUSconnect i+u -hi
n hi-nUSconnect I
" Mv~i]
~ kEA\i=j [ 1(Oik (hkaik hiaki) MY,] - keTB [ (Wik (hkak +hiaki
~ E US 1 (u -(1 - - a ) u -nUSconnect i+ui-h1
n hi-nUSconnect I * Pj]
Putting this latter expression back into the constraint (3.9) and re-indexing gives us:
je.A\i=j [ ij ) (hjat +hiaji)
hkaik+h aki
h ihkl
EZeTB (wlk)
n
+ E jeTB [n(Wj
hkaik +hiaki
hihkJ
hja +hiaj
Mv,i
, Zj ]
- jEUS [1 UjEi - .j) ( ui-nUSconnect i+uit.hi
n hi-nUSconnect I
+ jEUS (Uji - E ai) up -nUSconnect j+uji -hi
= 0
We combine terms defined over the same indices:
\ [ )) M + aeB ij ) h i aji - (Izj - Mvi)]
(3.13b)
(3.14b)
* yj I
.P,1]
" Y,]
" IMzji
+ U Y- s[, (uj (1
jE A\i=j [1(UGij ) (h aj +hi -apj-py_
+ (Qij -Ityj) I i=j
ZEvS (U ( -ei)
Yj] ~ EjEA\i=j (Oik)
+ j EUS ji (1 - ij i uji -nUSconnect j +uji -hi ' ( IZ Y,i
We now write this equation with a common denominator, carefully noting that there is really a
different constant for nUSconnect; in the denominator for eachj E US. For our particular
parameterization, however, we can assume that nUSconnect; = C for Vj E US. This means
that we solve the problem for which all US agents can connect to the same number of agents.
Ej Uij = C, V i E US (3.15a)
Also, we define h; = C, V j E US. This is because hj is really the total number of connections
that agentj has with other agents in the network, and we fix the number of connections that
agent j E US can make.
Y-jEA4\i=] [n(. )c(hihia) (fiyj - iv,i)]
jEAiB V( )(C)h ai +hiai)
+ Ej E=TB ij hjhj h ia Z j ~ tY i)
+ jEUS (ui (1 - Ej ) a C) (uC+u h -Zj ti] 0
Dividing through by C and hi we get the new constraint in formulation which replaces (3.1 lb),
(3.12b), (3.13b), and (3.14b):
Zj EA\i=j [( h) ( h+ .) - ivr)
+ Ej ETB [(Wij (hj ai +hiai) (l-IZ - (3.9c)
± j EUS [(Uji Eij 'ij (ui -C+ui h (lAZj -- Ihyi) = 0
The primary benefit of this new formulation is that the computational complexity is greatly
reduced. While the problem is still nonlinear and nonconvex, there are only 0(n) variables and
O(n) constraints, where n is the total number of agents in the network. Figure 3-6 captures the
revised nonlethal targeting problem formulation.
(3.8)
V iE cA
NLTP: maxu LE value- py,
s.t. E A\i=j I(oii) hj ai+hiaj - (p; - py,3 + Ej ETB [(ij h) ai; +hi aji) 'Zj ~y
+ EjEUS [(uji - Ei ) a ) (ui -C+uji -h i (Z,j - Y,i)I = 0
hi = Ek aik + >I U11
hi ;> 1
jeA' Ui = C
Pz,i = 0.5
PZ,i = -0.5
uij = {0,1}
-0.5 py, < 0.5
A' (and k E A', l E US)
A' (and k E A', l E US)
US
US
TB
US,j E A'
A
Figure 3-6: Revised Nonlethal Targeting Problem Formulation
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4 Experiments and Analysis
In this chapter we describe the design, implementation and analysis of experiments that
demonstrate how our modeling approach can assist with the nonlethal targeting problem.
Experiment I analyzes the capabilities of the optimization formulation in terms of size of the
network it can handle, the number of US agents and connections it can prescribe on the network,
and the associated computation time. Experiment II analyzes the performance of the
optimization by validating its solution with a complete enumeration of the possible connections
on limited cases using both small and large networks. Lastly, Experiment III analyzes the
operational performance of the nonlethal targeting model by comparing its simulated and
analytically calculated expected long-term attitudes with random (control) and doctrine-based
methods of target selection. It shows the value of our modeling approach and also reveals some
operational insights gained by using our models to assist with nonlethal targeting in COIN.
4.1 Implementation
Before describing each of the experiments, we briefly explain the implementation of the models.
All programs and experiments were run on a personal computer with an CAMD AthlonTM 64 X2
2.91 GHz Dual Core Processor, and 2.00 GB of RAM.
4.1.1 Agent Database
We produced an agent database file in CMicrosoft Excel 2007, which allows users to specify 1)
the local leaders in their area of operations, 2) the roles in society that those leaders fill, 3) the
estimated attitude of each local leader, 4) the value assigned to each local leader, and 5) the
number of Taliban agents present and their suspected connections to the local leaders. An
example of this file is included in Appendix B. We believe that our choice of Excel for the
database interface is appropriate because of its familiarity and availability among US Army
leaders and intelligence specialists, as well as its ease of manipulation.
4.1.2 Network Generator
We implemented the network generator in CMATLAB, Version R2008A. The software can
read the agent data from the Excel file, generate the social interaction network data according to
the homophily rules and specified S2-directed connections, and produce a visual representation
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of the network. This latter step requires the automated arrangement of nodes to make large
networks more visually appealing. In order to create such an organization of nodes, we relied on
the use of the Kamada-Kwai force-directed drawing algorithm [88] found in ©Pajek, Version
1.08. The network generator in MATLAB exported the adjacency matrix into a format readable
by Pajek. The adjacency matrix was manually imported into Pajek, which arranged the nodes
according to the algorithm, and exported x-y coordinates for each node. This list of coordinates
was then manually imported back into MATLAB in order to complete the visualization function.
Since we chose to work with one large network, we only had to perform this process once.
4.1.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
We implemented the Monte Carlo simulation in MATLAB in order to analyze the attitude
dynamics of the population according to the Afghan COIN social influence model on the
topologies created from the network generation model. A Monte Carlo simulation is a technique
of replicating the probabilistic behavior of a system with the aid of computers [89]. MATLAB
simulated the dynamics at each interaction by randomly selecting an agent, selecting a neighbor
of that agent, and adjusting the attitudes of the pair of agents according to the interaction-type
probabilities. This process was performed over a specified number of interactions.
4.1.4 Optimization with AMPL and KNITRO
The nonlethal targeting model was coded in CAMPL, Version 20100122, and solved using the
commercial nonlinear solver CKNITRO, Version 6.0.0 by Ziena Optimization, Inc. The data for
this implementation was manually imported into an AMPL data file from a MATLAB-generated
Excel file.
KNITRO [90] is a commercial solver designed to handle a wide range of optimization problems,
including mixed-integer, nonlinear problems (MINLP). However, since our problem contained
nonconvex constraints, it was difficult to solve it to true optimality. The default setting in
KNITRO was to return the first locally optimal solution. However, KNITRO also offered a
multi-start heuristic to find a set of local optima, the best of which has the greatest chance of
being closest to the global optimum. In this multi-start heuristic, KNITRO by default generated
max(200, 10n) number of start points, where n is the number of variables in the problem. The
solver generated a start point by randomly selecting feasible values for each component of the
decision variable (satisfying the upper and lower bounds of each component). The solver then
found a local optimum for each start point generated. The targeting assignment that the solver
returned, therefore, was simply the best of the local optima but was still not guaranteed to be the
global optimum.
KNITRO uses a branch and bound algorithm to solve MINLPs. This algorithm involves
partitioning the feasible set of integer solutions, and solving the sub-problems defined by those
sets of solutions (hence the term 'branch'). Additionally, this algorithm assumes our ability to 1)
efficiently compute upper bounds (in the case of maximization) often through the relaxation of
integrality constraints, and 2) occasionally solve a sub-problem to optimality and thus obtaining
an incumbent lower bound. This algorithm saves time by ignoring sub-problems whose upper
bound is less than the current feasible solution (hence the term 'bound') [91].
4.2 Network Data and Other Parameters
In order to avoid any potential security or other issues, we constructed two fictional datasets of
Afghan agents, roles, and attitudes. While fictional, these datasets were based upon our study
and knowledge of Pashtun society, and loosely correlated with publically available aggregate
data on Pashtun districts ( [92], [93], [94]). See Appendix B for more information. We
determined two reasonable sets of agents to study in our experiments: one with 16 local leaders
and another with 73 local leaders. Recall that local leaders as those individuals within the
population who by virtue of their authority, power, or position have influence over the attitudes
of a group of people (see Section 2.6.1.2). The number of Taliban and US agents were
exogenous to these initial setups. We will discuss both of the networks generated by our
network generation model in more detail in the following sub-sections.
Interestingly, the topologies created from our network generation model were similar to the
structures generated from the islands model, which is an economic model of network formation
developed by Jackson ( [4], [95]). Essentially the model captures the process by which agents
form connections with other agents based upon the connection costs. The model posits that
connections within one's own 'island' (or closer neighbors) is strictly less costly than
connections with those outside the island, and that only a few agents with enough social capital
can afford these latter connections. While we do not explicitly discuss the economics of how
Pashtun local leaders form connections with others, we believe that this concept is implicitly
embedded in the principle of homophily. Although certainly not without exception, we see rural
Pashtun villagers more likely forming local connections than with distant ones.
17i~~j
2. ~
Figure 4-1: A sample network generated from the 'islands' economic model [95]
4.2.1 A Small Network
We first developed a small 16-node network that is a representative sub-graph of a more realistic
social interaction network. We used this smaller network for initial model development, testing,
and analysis. The list of agents used to generate the 16 node network is shown in Table 4-1.
Node # Village Societal Position Forcefulness Level Initial Attitude
1 - District Sub-governor forceful, -0.3
2 A Village Malik forceful -0.3
3 A Head of Household regular 0.0
4 A Head of Household regular 0.0
5 A Head of Household regular 0.0
6 A Head of Household regular 0.0
7 B Village Malik forceful 0.3
8 B Head of Household regular 0.0
9 B Head of Household regular 0.0
10 B Head of Household regular 0.0
11 B Head of Household regular 0.0
12 C Village Malik forceful 0.3
13 C Head of Household regular 0.0
14 C Head of Household regular 0.0
15 C Head of Household regular 0.0
16 C Head of Household regular 0.0
Table 4-1: Agent List and Characteristics in Small Network
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Note that this table includes information that the network generation model required in order to
create a topology, including: village, societal position, and initial attitude. Observe also that this
list contains local leaders in three villages, notionally named A, B, and C. Within each village
were four heads of household and one village malik (executive). Furthermore, a sub-governor of
the district presided over these three villages. The network generator received this data and
formed links between agents based upon the homophily rules previously described in Table 3-2.
Additionally, we added 2 links for hypothetically-known relations beyond our homophily rules
shown in Table 4-2. This step is analogous to the intelligence analyst adding links to the
network based on credible information as discussed in Section 3.4.4.
# Undirected Links Description
1 7 12 Village B Malik to village C Malik
2 2 7 Village A Malik to village B Malik
Table 4-2: Intelligence-informed Connections in Small Network
Additionally, based upon an agent's societal position, the network generator assigned a
forcefulness level and the appropriate influence-type probabilities for that level (which were
determined a priori). We also note the initial attitude states of the agents: all the regular agents
had a neutral attitude, two forceful agents had a positive attitude (0.3), and both a forceful and
forcefull agent had a negative attitude (-0.3) towards the counterinsurgents. Lastly, the network
generator also provided a pictorial representation of the network as shown in Figure 4-2
according to the legend in Figure 4-3.
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Figure 4-2: A Small Network
Forceful2 Agent
A Forceful1 Agent
Forceful Agent
Regular Agent
Local Leader to Local Leader Connection
- Taliban Connection
- US Connection
Agent Attitude States:
Unfavorable to
Counterinsurgents
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
NeutralFavorable to
Insurgents
Favorable to
Counterinsurgents
0.3 0.4 0.5
Unfavorable to
Insurgents
Figure 4-3: Legend for Network Generator Graphs
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4.2.2 A Large Network
We then developed a network that is a more realistic representation of a rural Pashtun district by
increasing the number of agents to a larger proportion of the sizes found in two real datasets (see
Appendix B), and including more types of local leaders found in Pashtun society. This larger
network consisted of 73 nodes, and is depicted below in Figure 4-4.
The complete list of agents is given in Appendix B. Note that this network consisted of several
district-level authorities as well as 7 principal villages (labeled A through G), each of which
included heads of households and village leaders. Additionally, we assigned initial attitudes of
the population generally by village, reflecting the common observation that villages collectively
exhibit clear friendliness, unfriendliness, or neutrality towards US forces [15]. Lastly, note that
this network was constructed almost entirely by homophily from the network generation model.
Only 15 links were added that were not covered by the homophily rules in our model (see the list
of links in Appendix B). These links were additional connections to the local and regional
criminals, as well as to the regional warlord and district police chief. As with the small network,
this later step is analogous to the intelligence analyst (S2) adding links to the network based on
credible information.
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Figure 4-4: A Large Network
4.3 Experiment I
The ultimate goal of Experiment 1 was to estimate the network sizes as well as the number of US
agents and respective connections that our model can reasonably handle (in terms of runtime) to
maximally increase the expected long-term attitudes of the population. In order to do this, we
experiment with 1) changes to the multi-start settings for the KNITRO solver, and 2) fixing the
decision variables of connections between US agents to regular agents to 0. Both of these
modifications are explained in more detail below.
As explained earlier in this chapter, the KNITRO solver we chose offered a multi-start option
that increases the likelihood of finding a better local optimum for a given problem. This feature
can be enabled for the default number of start points, enabled to a different number of start
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points, or disabled altogether. Obviously, the more start points that the solver uses the more
likely it is to find a solution closer to the global optimum but also the greater amount of time it
takes to obtain a solution. While we desired a solution to the nonlethal targeting problem that is
close to optimum (maximally increases the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude of
the population), we did not require it to be globally optimal. We qualified our goal as such
because we recognized that possible enemy counteractions (such as changing its connections to
certain people) would dampen or change the expected attitudes we are trying to maximize before
they ever reached their value as the number of interactions approached infinity. However, we
also desired to obtain a good locally optimal solution quickly and identified the trade-off
between potentially better solutions and runtimes. Accordingly, in this experiment, we wished to
determine comparative runtimes and performance of the nonlethal targeting optimization model
for various cases of the multi-start settings, as well as to analyze the effect of increasing network
size on runtimes.
Additionally, we modified the formulation of the revised nonlethal targeting problem (NLTP) in
order to reduce computation time. In preliminary testing, we observed that the model never
assigned connections from US agents to regular agents if the number of connections was fewer
than the number of forceful and forceful1 agents. This is intuitively obvious because regular
agents, as parameterized, have the lowest level of influence. They represent the local leaders
whose influence does not extend beyond the household and immediate neighbors (who are also
heads of household). If the objective was to simply increase the arithmetic mean of the expected
long-term attitude of the entire population, connections with forceful agents are more effective
because such connections subsequently propagate to more agents in the network. As such, we
decided that we can better constrain the set of feasible solutions to the nonlethal targeting
problem by fixing all the binary decision variables of connections from US agents to regular
agents to 0. Equivalently, we added the following constraint to the NLTP formulation:
Ut1 = 0 V i E R,j E US (3.21)
We will refer to this revised formulation as NLTP 1.
Throughout all of Experiment 1, we configured the problem according to the default
parameterization shown in Section 3.3.3.1. Specifically, we set aij = 1, and fli = 0 for i E A'
and ] E US (which is the highest level of forcefulness) and Eij = EUS = 0 (the same for all
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agents that the US agents connected to). This particular modeling parameterization made the US
agents as forceful as the Taliban agents.
Additionally, we conducted Experiment 1 on both small and large networks. The small network
we used is the same one described in Section 4.2.1. The large network we used was same as the
one described in Section 4.2.2, except that it did not include the intelligence-directed
connections. It therefore had the same number of nodes, the same types of nodes, and the same
homophily-derived connections.
We subdivided Experiment 1 into 3 separate experiments. Experiment lA analyzed runtimes on
both small and large networks on the NLTP formulation when KNITRO multi-start was enabled
to the default number of start points. Experiment lB analyzed the comparative runtimes and
performance on both small and large networks on both the NLTP and NLTP 1 formulations for
various multi-start settings. And finally, Experiment IC focused on determining runtimes for
even larger networks using only the NLTP1 formulation and multi-start disabled. A summary of
these experiments is shown below in Table 4-3.
Experiment Multi-Start Setting Formulation Purpose
IA Enabled, default NLTP Analyze runtimes of NLTP for small and
number of start large networks and an increasing number
points of US agents and connections.
1B Varied NLTP and Compare runtimes and performance of the
NLTP1 2 formulations for different multi-start
settings on the same networks
1C Disabled NLTP1 Analyze runtimes ofNLTPI for larger
networks and various numbers of US
agents and connections.
Table 4-3: Summary of Experiment 1
4.3.1 Experiment 1A
4.3.1.1 Design
In Experiment IA, we analyzed runtimes of the revised nonlethal targeting formulation, NLTP,
as shown in Figure 3-6, Our expressed purpose was determining how runtimes with multi-start
enabled in all cases were affected by 1) changes in the size of the network, 2) changes in number
of US agents, and 3) changes in the number of connections those US agents are allowed to make.
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For each case within the experiment, we varied these properties and solved for the US
connections that maximally increased the expected long-term attitude.
Throughout this experiment, we used the NLTP formulation. Additionally, we used KNITRO's
default number of start points, max(200, 10n), where n is the number of variables in the
problem. The topologies (local leader and Taliban connections) remained fixed for cases 1-8, 9-
12, and 13-15. The only variations we made within those cases were the number of US agents
and connections to assign. The topologies used for the 3 sets of cases are shown in the Appendix
B.
4.3.1.2 Results and Analysis
The summary table of results of Experiment 1A is shown in Table 4-4. The table records: 1) the
network configuration, 2) the corresponding number of nodes visited (branch points in the
branch and bound algorithm), and 3) the runtimes to arrive at a solution.
Case Number of Number of Number of Connections Nodes Runtime
# local leaders TB agents US agents per US agent Visited (in secs.)
1 16 1 1 1 3 10.289
2 16 1 1 3 3 10.212
3 16 1 3 1 23 138.705
4 16 1 3 3 2 15.922
5 16 1 3 5 2 13.788
6 16 1 5 1 11 142.063
7 16 1 5 3 11 123.822
8 16 1 5 5 2 20.812
9 16 3 3 1 2 17.798
10 16 3 3 3 15 94.601
11 16 3 3 5 29 164.162
12 16 3 5 5 23 201.781
13 73 3 1 1 17 1210.499
14 73 3 2 1 181 15246.169
15 73 3 3 3 - >50400
Table 4-4: Experiment 1A Results
We observed that with multi-start enabled, runtimes for a large network and moderate numbers
of US agents and connections (cases #14-15) can become very large. KNITRO found a locally
optimal solution for 2 US agents and 1 connection for the large network only after more than 4
hours of computation time. It could not fmd a solution for 3 US agents and 3 connections after
14 hours. See Appendix B for the complete table of results.
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Figure 4-5: Plot of Experiment 1A Runtimes by Case Number
Figure 4-5 depicts the dramatic increase in runtimes for cases 12-14, which involved an
increasing number of US agents and connections on the large network. We concluded that while
enabling multi-start to the default number of starting points seems to be a useful feature to find
very good local optima, it caused a significant increase in computation time for the large network
and a moderate number of US agents and connections.
4.3.2 Experiment 1B
4.3.2.1 Design
In Experiment 1B, we analyzed runtimes and performance of both NLTP and NLTP1 across a
range of multi-start settings, network sizes, and network topologies. The goal here was to
determine whether using the NLTP 1 formulation and/or enabling multi-start for a fewer number
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of start points would noticeably affect the quality of the local optima obtained or the runtime it to
obtain it.
Because the NLTP 1 formulation precluded US agent targeting assignments to regular agents, we
note upfront the number of regular agents in the test topologies. For the 16- and 73-node
networks, there were 12 and 38 regular agents, respectively, who were not considered for US
agent connections.
We divided Experiment lB into two different parts. In Part 1, we compared the performance and
runtimes between the NLTP and NLTP 1 formulations when multi-start is enabled to the default
number of start points. In this part, we selected the identical case conditions from cases 1, 3, 6,
and 13 in Experiment 1A. In those case conditions, we compared previously obtained results
from Experiment 1A (using the NLTP formulation) with those obtained using the NLTP1
formulation where we fixed binary decision variables of US to regular agents to 0. In Part 2, we
varied the multi-start settings using only the NLTP 1 formulation and compared performance and
runtimes.
4.3.2.2 Results and Analysis
In Part 1 of Experiment IB, we observed that there are generally small differences in
performance between NLTP and NLTP 1. In each case listed in Table 4-5, the NLTP 1
formulation always obtained the same target assignment as NLTP but in roughly a third of the
runtime. The first number of the case number label signifies identical test parameters with the
associated Experiment 1A case. The "B 1" label signifies that the case belongs to Part "1" of
Experiment 1-"B". See Appendix BO for the complete table of results.
Case # Number Number Number Number Connect- Nodes Runtime % %
of local of of TB of US ions per Visited (in secs.) Deviation Deviation
leaders Regulars agents agents US agent from from
NLTP NLTP
OBJ Runtime
1-Bi 16 12 1 1 1 3 3.503 0 34.0
3-BL 16 12 1 3 1 21 49.703 0 35.8
6-B1 16 12 1 5 1 11 35.726 0 25.1
13-BI 73 38 3 1 1 17 397.79 -0.00027 32.9
14-B1 73 38 3 2 1 129 4374.327 0.00003 28.7
Table 4-5: Experiment 1B, Part 1 Results
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Figure 4-6 depicts the differences in runtimes between the NLTP and NLTP 1 formulations using
the same case configurations 1, 3, 6, 13, and 14.
Comparison of Runtimes for NLTP and NLTP1 Formulations
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Figure 4-6: Comparison of Runtimes for NLTP and NLTP1 Formulations for Select Case Numbers
In Part 2 of Experiment IB, we observed that there are in general small differences in
performance between various multi-start settings with the NLTP1 formulation, but significant
savings in runtime for when multi-start is disabled. The results of this experiment are
summarized in Table 4-6, and shown complete in Appendix B. Note that the savings in runtime
could not be calculated for cases 15-B2, 16-B2, and 17-B2 because we never ran the
corresponding cases for the NLTP formulation due to the projected runtime. Additionally, for
those specific cases, we only ran the NLTP1 formulation with multi-start enabled to 10 start
points (and not the default due to the project runtimes) and obtained objective values from those
runs (denoted with a *).
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Case # Sub- Number Number Number Number Connect- Nodes Runtime Multi- % %
# of local of of TB of US ions per Visited (in secs.) Start Deviation Deviation
leaders Regulars agents agents US agent Enabled/ from from
# Points NLTP1 NLTP
OBJ Runtime
6-B2 1 16 12 1 5 1 7 0.064 N 0.00000 0.045
13-B2 1 73 38 3 1 1 15 176.767 Y/100 0.00002 14.602
13-B2 2 73 38 3 1 1 15 16.481 Y/10 0.00035 1.361
13-B2 3 73 38 3 1 1 13 0.671 N -0.00046 0.055
14-B2 1 73 38 3 2 1 161 2649.34 Y/100 -0.00014 17.377
14-B2 2 73 38 3 2 1 123 199.238 Y/10 0.00009 1.307
14-B2 3 73 38 3 2 1 31 2.394 N -0.22088 0.016
15-B2 1 73 38 3 2 2 37 4.514 N -0.00090* N/A
16-B2 1 73 38 3 3 1 229 35.979 N -0.00040* N/A
17-B2 1 73 38 3 3 3 159 19.985 N -0.40000* N/A
Table 4-6: Experiment 1B, Part 2 Results
For various numbers of US agents and connections on both the 16-node and 73-node networks,
we tried enabling the multi-start option at 10 or 100 start points (different from the default
number) or disabling it altogether. We noticed that for each of the cases, the percent deviation of
objective values from multi-start disabled and fully enabled (to a default number of start points)
was no more than 0.23% (case 14-B2, sub #3) and often much lower. Additionally, the percent
deviation of objective values from multi-start disabled to partially enabled (to 10 start points)
was no more than 0.40% (case 17-B2, sub #1). Correspondingly, disabling multi-start allowed
us to achieve runtimes that were only several hundredths of a percent of the runtimes from the
NLTP formulation. Figure 4-7 depicts the drop in runtimes in cases 13 and 14 by decreasing the
use of the multi-start function (using a fewer number of start points) or disabling it altogether.
In the figure's legend, "Y" denotes that multi-start was enabled to the default number of start
points max(200, 10n), "Y/100" denotes that multi-start was enabled to 100 start points, and "N"
denotes that multi-start was disabled.
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Figure 4-7: Comparison of Runtimes for NLTP and NLTP1 for Various Multi-Start Settings
From Experiment lB, we concluded that disabling multi-start seems to have a negligible effect
on the quality of the local optima obtained while significantly decreasing runtimes.
4.3.3 Experiment 1C
4.3.3.1 Design
From the previous experiment, we concluded that using the NLTP 1 formulation and disabling
multi-start was an efficient way to proceed. In Experiment 1 C we analyzed runtimes under those
conditions for even larger networks and connections.
In order to create experimental data for larger networks, we first expanded the 73-node data set
by replicating 27 existing agents (in several whole and partial villages) and adding it to the
network. This created a 100-node data set. The connections between the agents in this data set
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were determined by the network generation model and the homophily-based connection rules
within it. No other intelligence-directed connections were added. To create a 200-node data set,
we simply duplicated the entire 100-node network. Again, the connections between agents in
this data set were determined by strictly by the network generation model. Note that for the 100-
and 200-node networks, there were 50 and 100 regular agents, respectively, who were not
considered for US agent connections. For cases 18-24 and 25-28, the topologies remained fixed
and the only variations were the number of US agents and connections to assign.
4.3.3.2 Results and Analysis
The summary table of results of Experiment IC is shown in Table 4-7. As before, the table
entries include: 1) the network configuration, 2) the corresponding number of nodes visited
(branch points in the branch and bound algorithm), and 3) the runtime to arrive at a solution.
See Appendix B for the complete table of results.
We observed that runtimes were very sensitive to initial conditions and that for each topology
(100- or 200-node) there was not necessarily an increasing relationship between runtimes and the
number of US agents or connections to be assigned. Additionally, assigning 10 US agents and
10 connections to the 100-node network took very long (case 24) while assigning the same
number or even a larger number of US agents and connections on the 200-node network took
significantly less time (cases 27-28). However, despite this dichotomy and based on an overall
analysis of the observed runtimes, we believe that our model can likely handle a multitude of
additional configurations of networks with 200-nodes or less in reasonable amounts of time.
Case # Number of Number of Number of Number of Connections Nodes Runtime
local leaders Regulars TB agents US agents per US agent Visited (in sec.)
18 100 50 10 5 5 13 8.384
19 100 50 10 5 10 35 19.78
20 100 50 10 7 5 15 10.797
21 100 50 10 7 10 8 5.852
22 100 50 10 9 5 11 8.696
23 100 50 10 9 10 1333 821.586
24 100 50 10 10 10 4846 3175.334
25 200 100 20 5 5 57 53.249
26 200 100 20 5 10 36 45.640
27 200 100 20 10 10 39 85.673
28 200 100 20 20 20 8 36.793
Table 4-7: Experiment 1C Results
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4.3.4 Experiment 1 Conclusions
In summary, there are a couple of conclusions we can make from Experiment 1. First, the
NLTP1 formulation with multi-start disabled was preferable to NLTP because it often provided
negligible differences in target assignment and performance while significantly decreasing
runtimes. In fact, we relied on this formulation and the absence of multi-start in order to achieve
reasonable runtimes for determining assignments on large networks. Second, provided that we
used the NLTP 1 formulation with multi-start disabled, we can determine targeting assignments
for networks up to 200 agents in size and for up to 20 US agents and 20 connections each in
reasonable amounts of time. It is likely that we can solve problems even larger.
4.4 Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to compare the performance of nonlethal targeting optimization
approach with a complete enumeration of the possible connections for simple configurations of
the small and large networks. As stated previously, both versions of the NLTP optimization
formulation contained nonconvex constraints and were theoretically very difficult to solve to
global optimality. We therefore accepted the likelihood of the KNITRO solver returning locally,
but not globally, optimal assignment solutions. However, in this experiment, we wished to
examine the performance of the optimization on network configurations where we could
explicitly calculate the globally optimal solution through complete enumeration of the solution
space.
4.4.1 Experiment 2 Design
In Experiment 2, we compared the performance and runtime of the optimization and enumeration
on a number of networks and configurations. For the optimization, we utilized the NLTP 1
formulation with multi-start disabled (identical conditions as Experiment 1 C). For the
enumeration, we made significant use of our analytic result, equation 3.7, to calculate the
arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitudes of the agents for particular network
configurations. We wrote a script in MATLAB that receives the topology and parameter inputs
as well as the number of US agents and connections allotted to each US agent. The program
then proceeded to determine all the possible combinations of connections between US agents and
non-US agents (who are the regular, forceful, forceful,, and Taliban agents) and calculated the
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arithmetic mean expected long-term attitude for each combination. The program stored the
highest performing combination and reported the overall best as the global maximum after it has
enumerated through all possible combinations.
Suppose there were n number of non-US agents, m US agents with k allotted connections. The
total number of possible combinations that the program needed to enumerate through to calculate
the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude was simply () . This was clearly
inefficient, but does allow us to determine the k best connections for each of the m US agents
and the globally optimal solution.
In this simple experiment, we standardized the conditions as follows: 1) interaction-type
probabilities between agents were fixed according to the default parameterization in Section
3.3.3.1, and 2) all local leaders (non-US and Taliban agents) have equivalent self-weights when
interacting with US agents, i.e., Eg = 0 for i E A' and j E US. Additionally, the small and large
networks we used in Experiment 2 were the same as the ones used throughout Experiment 1.
4.4.2 Experiment 2 Results and Analysis
We compared the solutions and runtimes between the optimization and enumeration. The
complete table of results is shown below in Table 4-8. In all but the last case, the optimization
arrived at the same solution and same objective value as the enumeration method in a fraction of
the time.
Connect- # Possible MATLAB NLTP
# Local # TB # US ions per Combi- Enumeration Enumeration Optimization Runtime
Case # leaders agents agents US agent nations Time (in secs.) Solution Solution (in sees.)
1 16 1 1 1 17 6.5156 [1] [1] 0.061
2 16 1 1 2 136 44.0156 [1,2] [1,2] 0.031
3 16 1 1 3 680 215.5313 [17,2,1] [17,2,1] 0.032
4 16 1 2 1 289 105.875 [1],[2] [1],[2] 0.061
5 73 3 1 1 76 41.6563 [71] [71] 0.671
6 73 3 1 2 2850 1394.9 [69],[71] [69],[71] 1.556
7 73 3 1 3 70300 29043 [1 69 71] [2169 71] 3.062
Table 4-8: Experiment 2 Results
In case #7, the optimization solution and the enumeration solution differed by one assignment.
The enumeration method showed that [1, 69, 71] was the best connection strategy for the single
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US agent, resulting in an arithmetic mean expected long-term attitude of 0.14616. The
optimization solution reported [21, 69, 71] as the local optimum, resulting in an arithmetic mean
expected long-term attitude of 0.13936. The difference was 0.0068 or 0.68% of the range of
possible attitudes (over 1.00). One cannot, however, discard the savings in runtime. The
enumeration runtime and optimization runtimes differed by nearly 4 orders of magnitude. We
also ran the NLTP1 formulation for case #7 with multi-start enabled and arrived at the same
solution and objective as the enumeration in 3010.060 seconds.
4.4.3 Experiment 2 Conclusions
This experiment allowed us to compare our locally optimal solutions from NLTP 1 to globally
optimal solutions obtained by complete enumeration. We observed that the optimization and
complete enumeration approaches resulted in identical targeting strategies. In only one case, the
optimization returned a slightly inferior assignment strategy but in a much shorter amount of
time. While this experiment clearly did not (nor was it intended to) provably show that the
optimization approach returned a solution within a small percentage of the globally optimum, it
did show that in a few cases the approach's performance was good.
4.5 Experiment 3
The goal of Experiment 3 was to determine the usefulness of our nonlethal targeting assignment
approach. We compared our method of nonlethal targeting that utilizes knowledge about the
population with US Army doctrine that offers relatively vague principles of selection.
4.5.1 Experiment 3 Design
In Experiment 3, we performed analysis on two different size networks (16- and 73-node) and
varied a number of parameters to explore how different methods of assignment selection
(control, doctrine, and optimization) performed under the various conditions. We calculated
performance both analytically (using equation 3.7) as well as in simulation.
4.5.1.1 Experimental Control
We devised two means of establishing the experimental control. The first was a completely
random agent selection among all non-US agents in the network. This essentially represented
the completely naYve approach, where every non-US agent had an equal chance of being
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assigned as a target for each available connection for each US agent, independent of other
assignments. The second type of control was a random agent selection among only forceful,
forceful1, and Taliban agents (not among regular or US agents). This modification to
randomness reflected the same reasoning used to develop the NLTP1 formulation: regular agents
by parameterization influence only a small number of others. Since US connections to such
agents are inefficient, a more realistic benchmark for performance was random assignments
among those more influential, i.e., the forceful, forceful1 and Taliban agents.
We subsequently divided Experiment 3 into 2 parts based on the size of the network analyzed
and the method of experimental control. Analysis in Experiment 3A occurred exclusively on the
16-node network and a completely random control, while analysis in Experiment 3B occurred
exclusively on the 73-node network and the modified control (random among non-regular
agents). These two parts are summarized in Table 4-9.
Experiment Network Size Method of Control
3A 16-node Completely Random (among all agents except US)
3B 73-node Modified Random (among all agents except regular and US)
Table 4-9: Summary of Experiment 3
In portions of Experiment 3, we conducted cases which analyzed the assignment of
homogeneous US agents as well as non-homogeneous US agents. Homogeneous US agents all
had the same influence-type probabilities. Non-homogeneous US agents had different influence-
type probabilities based on resource level as explained in Section 3.5.5. The higher resource
level, the higher the probability for forceful influence, a. In particular, we parameterized the
resource level of the US agents according to Table 4-10.
Resource Level a-*
Low (L) .40
Moderate (M) .75
High (H) .90
Table 4-10: Resource Level and Forceful Influence-Type Probability for US Agents
4.5.1.2 Network Topologies and Taliban Connections
The two networks we used in Experiment 3 were precisely the ones described in Sections 4.2.1
and 4.2.2 (i.e., we now utilized the large network with inclusion of the S2-directed connections).
For each network, we fixed the Taliban connections a priori and show them in red links in the
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following figures. For the 16-node network shown below in Figure 4-8, we specifed 3 Taliban
agents, each connected to a different local leader.
Figure 4-8: Experiment 3 Small Network (with Village Labels)
In the 73-node network shown below in Figure 4-9, we specified 3 Taliban agents as well,
however now with 4 connections each.
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Figure 4-9: Experiment 3 Large Network (with Village Labels)
4.5.1.3 Parameter Adjustments for Cases
While there were many different parameter adjustments that could have been made in this
experiment, our cases were comprised of the single and, in some cases, combined applications of
the modifications listed below:
* Non-homogeneous US agents and agents with non-homogeneous self-weights when
interacting with US agents.
" Forceful interaction-type probability between forcefuli and forceful agents for aq =
0.1, 0.4}, where i E FOj E F1 .
e Network uncertainty using uniform attachment with 7r = {0.0, 0.5}.
* Network uncertainty using preferential attachment with 7r = { 0.0, 0.5}.
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The specific modifications for each case for Experiment 3A and 3B are shown in Table 4-11 and
Table 4-12, respectively. For the 16-node network, we sought assignments for 3 US agents with
1 connection each. For the 73-node network, we sought assignments for 3 US agents with 3
connections each.
Adjustments
Non- a
homogeneous between
Connect- US agents and forceful, Uniform Prefer.
# local # # TB # US ions per self-weights to Attachment Attachment
Case # leaden Regulars agents agents US agent (Y/N) forceful (a=-) (N=-)
1 16 12 3 3 1 N 0.4 0 0
2 16 12 3 3 1 Y 0.4 0 0
3 16 12 3 3 1 Y 0.1 0 0
4 16 12 3 3 1 Y 0.4 0.5 0
5 16 12 3 3 1 Y 0.4 0 0.5
6 16 12 3 3 1 Y 0.1 0.5 0
7 16 12 3 3 1 Y 0.1 0 0.5
8 16 12 3 3 1 N 0.4 0 0.5
Table 4-11: Table of Cases for Experiment 3A
Adjustments
Non- a
homogeneous between
Connect- US agents and forceful, Uniform Prefer.
Case # local # # TB # US ions per self-weights to Attachment Attachment
# leaders Regulars agents agents US agent (/ forceful (M=) (
1 73 38 3 3 3 N 0.4 0 0
2 73 38 3 3 3 Y 0.4 0 0
3 73 38 3 3 3 Y 0.1 0 0
4 73 38 3 3 3 Y 0.4 0.5 0
5 73 38 3 3 3 Y 0.4 0 0.5
6 73 38 3 3 3 Y 0.1 0.5 0
7 73 38 3 3 3 Y 0.1 0 0.5
Table 4-12: Table of Cases for Experiment 3B
Notice that within each experiment 3A and 3B, we fixed the number of local leaders and Taliban
agents, as well as the number of US agents and connections. Our intent was to analyze the effect
from various case conditions on the performance of the NLTP1 optimization-based selection
methods, compared to random (control) and doctrine-based selection methods.
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4.5.1.4 Doctrine-Base Selection
In order to determine at the doctrine-selected targets, we drew upon the prescriptions found in
the US counterinsurgency field manuals. Current US Army COIN doctrine states the following
principles in reference to nonlethal targeting:
e "Identify leaders who influence the people at the local, regional, and national levels"( [2]: 5-
9).
* Win over "passive or neutral people" ( [2]: 5-22)
e "[Nonlethal targets include] people like community leaders and those insurgents who should
be engaged through outreach, negotiation, meetings, and other interaction" ( [2]: 5-30).
* "Meetings conducted by leaders with key communicators, civilian leaders, or others whose
perceptions, decisions, and actions will affect mission accomplishment can be critical to
mission success" ( [3]: 4-13).
e "Start easy... Don't try to crack the hardest nut first-don't go straight for the main insurgent
stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the
insurgents. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by
extending your influence through the locals' own networks" ( [3]: C-5).
Based on such statements from US Army doctrine, we selected targeting assignments for the two
networks. The targeting assignments of the non-homogeneous US agents on the small and large
networks and the doctrinal justification are explained in Table 4-13 and Table 4-14, respectively.
In the case of the homogeneous US agents, we simply considered the set of all assigned targets to
be interchangeable among US agents. It is important to note that our selections were based on a
particular interpretation of doctrine and accept that there are certainly other valid interpretations
which could lead to different targeting assignments. Determining these other assignments and
analyzing their performance, however, are tasks in future research.
US Agent Tar ting Assignment
Agent Resource Agent Initial
# Level # Societal Position Attitude Doctrinal Justification
20 L 7 Village A Malik +0.3 To win over the most sympathetic local leaders
and work to extend US influence through them.
21 M 12 Village B Malik +0.3 To win over the most sympathetic local leaders
and work to extend US influence through them.
22 H 1 Sub-governor - 0.3 Identify local leader at district level to conduct
outreach and negotiations.
Table 4-13: Doctrinal Justification of Targeting Assignment in Experiment 3A
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US Agent
Agent Resource
# Level
District Jirga
Member/Khan +0.3
29 Village C Mullah +0.3
Village C Malik
Village G Mullah
+0.3
+0.2
55 Village G Malik +0.2
District Jirga
Member +0.2
10 win over tne most supportive vimages ana
work to extend US influence through them.
Village C is the friendliest in the district.
Achieving a solid supportive base in Village C
might help with winning support in the
neighboring Village D. The three most influential
community leaders in Village C are the mullah,
malik, and the member of the districtjirga (who
is also from that village and is a tribal khan).
To win over the most supportive villages and
work to extend US influence through them.
Village G is the next friendliest in the district.
Bolstering support in this village might help with
winning neighboring Villages E and F. The three
most influential community leaders in Village G
are the mullah, malik, and the member of the
districtjirga (who is also from that village).
Because immediate neighbors are more
unfriendly, this assignment might require a unit
with a higher resource level.
District Ulema Identify local leaders at district level who can
Member influence all the villages. Build a solid support
79 H 71 Sub-governor +0.3 base among those who are already sympathetic to
the US. This assignment deals with individuals
68 District Police +0.3 who are 'higher-ranking' and may require a unitChief with the highest resource level.
Table 4-14: Doctrinal Justification of Targeting Assignment in Experiment 3B
4.5.1.5 NLTP Optimization Selection
Throughout Experiment 3A, we utilized the NLTP 1 formulation with multi-start enabled to the
default number of start points. Since the network size was small in Experiment 3 A, this did not
cost us much in terms of computation time. However, for Experiment 3B conducted on the
larger network, we utilized the same formulation but with multi-start disabled. As Experiment 1
demonstrated in many cases, this configuration provided much shorter runtimes and only small
losses in performance.
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4.5.2 Experiment 3 Results and Analysis
Compared to both the random- and doctrine-based selection methods, we observed that the
NLTP 1 optimization-based method produced higher mean expected long-term attitudes both
analytically and in simulation, on both the small and large networks, in all cases. We analyzed
the key results in this subsection but include the complete set of results and analysis in Appendix
B.
4.5.2.1 Analytical Performance
Recall that equation 3.7 allowed us to analytically calculate the expected long-term attitude of all
agents as the number of interactions approaches infinity. For each case in experiments 3A and
3B, we obtained targeting assignments according to the optimization-based, random, and
doctrine-based selection methods. We simply calculated the resulting arithmetic mean of the
expected long-term attitudes produced by each selection method for each case. The graphical
depiction of this performance for Experiments 3A and 3B is shown in Figure 4-10 and Figure
4-11, respectively.
The results of Experiment 3A showed that optimization out-performed both doctrine-based and
random (control) methods of selection. We observed that while the arithmetic mean of the
expected long-term attitudes, regardless of the selection method, were predominantly negative
(signifying that the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude was against the
counterinsurgents), it was important to note how 'less negative' was the mean with optimization-
based agent selections. This result showed that in this particular topology and given the specific
Taliban presence and existing connections, close to the very best you could do was to influence
the population to a mean attitude of around -0.1, which was slightly against the
counterinsurgents.
We wished to test for the statistical significance of the performance of the optimization-based
selection method over the random or doctrine-based selection methods in Experiment 3A. We
declared two null hypotheses: 1) the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitudes
produced from optimization-based selection and doctrine-based selection across the cases were
drawn from identical continuous distributions with equal medians, and 2) the arithmetic mean of
the expected long-term attitudes produced from optimization-based selection and random
selection across the cases were drawn from identical continuous distributions with equal
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medians. We then conducted pair-wise Wilcox Rank Sum (non-parametric) tests on the
arithmetic mean of the expected attitudes obtained in Experiment 3A. We discovered that we
could not reject the first hypothesis, but could reject the second. With a p-value of 0.1304,
which was not significant, we concluded that there was no statistical difference between the
means achieved by optimization or by doctrine. However, with a p-value of 0.0001, which was
significant, we concluded that the mean expected long-term attitudes obtained by the
optimization-based selection method are statistically higher than those obtained by the random
(control) method.
Plot of Arithmetic Mean of the Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method
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Figure 4-10: Experiment 3A Results-Performance of 3 Selection Methods in 8 Cases
As shown in Figure 4-11, the optimization-based selection method out-performed the random
and doctrine-based methods in all cases for Experiment 3B as well. There are two points worthy
to note. First, the modified random selection (experimental control) in this experiment
performed relatively better than the purely random selection in Experiment 3A. This was
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because the modified method selected only among forceful agents (forceful, forceful1, and
Taliban agents) rather than both forceful and regular agents. Second, all the mean expected
long-term attitudes in Experiment 3B were now positive which signifies only that the Taliban
presence was relatively light in this topology rather than any fundamental differences in the
selection methods applied to Experiments 3A and 3B (other than the change noted above in the
experimental control).
Once again, we wished to measure the statistical significance of these results. We declared the
same two null hypotheses except that the cases were now from Experiment 3B. Using the
Wilcox Rank Sum test, we obtained p-values of 0.0023 and 0.004 1, both of which were
significant, for hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. We concluded that we could reject these null
hypotheses and stated that the optimization-based method achieved a statistically significant
higher mean expected long-term attitude than both the doctrine-based and random methods.
Plot of Arithmetic Mean of the Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method
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Figure 4-11: Experiment 3B Results-Performance of 3 Selection Methods in 7 Cases
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We also produced a visual representation of the analytically obtained expected long-term
attitudes of the population achieved by each selection method. These images were appealing in
that they showed the expected long-term attitude of each agent in the network as a color code. In
this section, we only showed the results from Experiment 3B, case #7. The results for the other
cases in Experiment 3B are shown in Appendix B.
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Figure 4-12: Experiment 3B, Case #7- Picture of Expected Long-Term Attitudes for Random Selection
Figure 4-12 depicts the randomly obtained connections for US agents (77, 78, and 79) and the
effect on the expected long-term attitudes of the population. We observed that Village F was
moderately unfavorable to the US; Villages B, C, E, and G were predominantly neutral; and
Villages A and D were slightly in favor of the US.
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Figure 4-13: Experiment 3B, Case #7- Picture of Expected Long-Term Attitudes for Doctrine-Based Selection
Figure 4-13 depicts the doctrine-based connections for US agents (77, 78, and 79) and the effect
on the expected long-term attitudes of the population. We subsequently observed that better
sentiments were achieved among the people. Village F was moderately unfavorable to the US;
Villages A, B, and E were predominantly neutral; and Villages C, D, and G were moderately to
strongly in favor.
127
- ------------ 
.............0.00---omp
79 78 77
F
7
4
A C
7
B
Figure 4-14: Experiment 3B, Case #7- Picture of Expected Long-Term Attitudes for NLTP Optimization-Based
Selection
Figure 4-14 depicts the NLTP optimization-based connections for US agents (77, 78, and 79) and
the effect on the expected long-term attitudes of the population. We observed an even greater
increase in pro-US sentiments achieved among the people. Villages B, E, and F were
predominantly neutral; and Villages A, C, D, and G were moderately to strongly in favor.
4.5.2.2 Simulation Performance
In addition to comparing the performance of the methods analytically, we also examined the
performance of the selection methods using simulation. For each case, we obtained the targeting
assignments based on the various selection methods. We then ran our simulation on each
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resulting topology and produced plots of the arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude
at each interaction, k. We simulated 5000 and 10000 interactions for each network for each case
in Experiment 3A and 3B, respectively. Figure 4-15 shows the plots of the arithmetic mean of
the expected long-term attitude versus the interaction number k for each of the selection methods
in Experiment 3B, case #7. The results for the other cases in Experiment 3B are shown in
Appendix B. We conducted 50 realizations for each selection method within each case. Each
realization produced an arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude (over all agents in the
network) for each interaction, k. We then averaged over those realizations to produce the
arithmetic mean (over all realizations) of the arithmetic mean (over all agents) of the expected
long-term attitudes for each interaction, k. For simplicity, we will refer to these calculations as
the averaged mean expected long-term attitudes.
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Figure 4-15: Experiment 3B,
60 7000 800 9000 10000
Case #7 Results-Plot of Averaged Mean Expected Long-Term Attitudes versus
Interaction Number
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We observed that NLTP optimization-based selection method generally achieved a higher
averaged mean expected long-term attitude than the other selection methods. We also observed
some interesting results within the first roughly 2000 interactions: 1) up to around the 7 5 0th
interaction, random selection in fact achieved a slightly higher averaged mean expected long-
term attitude than the optimization-based method and 2) up to around the 16 0 0 th interaction,
random selection achieved a higher averaged mean expected long-term attitude than the doctrine-
based method. These observations could be due to stochasticity, or possibly signify that different
selection methods may be more appropriate for shorter time horizons as opposed to our
optimization-based method used in this work for long-term (infinite) time horizons. This is
certainly an area for doing additional analyses or future research.
We also selectively captured the distribution of the mean expected long-term attitudes over all 50
realizations for each selection method at the 5 0 0 0 "b interaction to provide additional insight into
the simulation results.
Histogram of Mean Expected Attitudes @ 5000th Interaction
from 50 Realizations of Each Selection Method
Experiment 3B, Case #7
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Figure 4-16: Experiment 3B, Case #7--
Histogram of Mean Expected Long-Term Attitudes at the 5000 Interaction Over 50 Realizations of Each Selection
Method
Figure 4-16 depicts a histogram approximating distribution of these mean attitudes for each
selection method obtained at the 5 0 0 0 th interaction for Experiment 3B, case #7. The plot was
produced by sorting the mean expected long-term attitudes into bins of size 0.1. While the
distributions were far from separable, we still observed a generally higher performance from the
optimization-based selection method.
4.5.2.3 Analysis of the Optimally Selected Agents
In this subsection, we examined the characteristics of the agents that were selected by the
optimization-based method in order to detect any possible patterns or insights into the nonlethal
targeting assignment problem. In Experiment 3B, using the NLTP1 formulation, there were a
total of 38 possible candidates for assignment for each US agent (73 local leaders plus 3 Taliban
agents minus 38 regular agents). There were 3 US agents with 3 connections allotted in each
case. Aggregated across all 8 cases, there were only 18 different agents selected for assignment
to a US agent. Table 4-15 lists these agents, the number of times they were selected across the 8
cases, and their characteristics.
# Times Agent Village Forcefulness Initial
Selected # Village Cluster Societal Position Level Attitude
1 7 21 C 2 District Jirga Member/Khan forcefuli 0.3
2 7 49 F 3 Village Jirga forceful -0.2
3 7 69 - - District Ulema forceful, 0.3
4 6 56 G 3 District Jirga Member forceful, 0.2
5 6 68 - - District Police forceful 0.3
6 6 71 - - Sub-governor forceful1  0.3
7 5 1 A 1 District Jirga Member forceful, 0.0
8 4 13 B 1 Village Jirga forceful -0.3
9 3 12 B 1 Village Jirga forceful -0.3
10 2 39 E 3 District Jirga Member forceful, -0.2
11 2 67 G 3 Village Mullah forceful 0.2
12 2 73 - - District Criminal forcefuli -0.4
13 1 2 A 1 Village Jirga forceful 0.0
14 1 19 B 1 Village Mullah forceful -0.3
15 1 29 C 2 Village Mullah forceful 0.3
16 1 37 D 2 Village Mullah forceful 0.0
17 1 40 E 3 Village Jirga forceful -0.2
18 1 70 - - District Ulema forceful -0.3
Table 4-15: Overall NL TP Agent Selection Analysis
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At a high level, we observed that some forceful agents are selected more often than some
forceful1 agents. We suspected that this is due to the topology and the initial conditions of agent
attitudes. For example, agent #49 (forceful Village F jirga member) was among those selected
most often across the 8 cases. This was likely due to the fact that 1) Village F is small and the
jirga member has a greater relative influence, 2) Village F was moderately against the US and
improving this village's attitude would help the population-wide mean, and 3) other forceful
agents in the village were already affected by others since agent #54 (forceful Village F mullah)
was strongly connected to all Taliban agents and agent #48 (forceful Village F malik) was
connected to others the US agent favorably influenced (agents #69, 71, 1, and 56). In this way,
the optimization-based selection mathematically reasoned through the merits of selecting each
agent for targeting.
Further recall that in Experiment 3A cases 2-8, and Experiment 3B cases 2-7 we allowed for
non-homogenous US agents based upon resource availability. Given the likelihood of this
situation, we also examined the frequency a particular agent was assigned with a high-,
moderate-, and low-resourced US agent. We hoped that this will give us insights as to how to
prescribe connections for US agents with various forceful influence-type probabilities. Table
4-16 below shows this assignment analysis by US agent type.
We observed that high-resourced US agents were often assigned to the friendly district-level
(forcefuli) local leaders who have a generally positive effect on attitudes of all village-level
leaders connected to them. However, it is also interesting to note that high-resourced US agents
were also sometimes even assigned to forceful agents. This was likely due to the same
mathematical reasoning explained earlier based on two apparent principles: 1) the need to
overcome Taliban influence in certain unfriendly villages, 2) the careful selection of agents to
distribute US influence while not being redundant with other US influence efforts.
4.5.3 Experiment 3 Conclusions
In Experiment 3, we demonstrated the potential usefulness of the optimization-based method
making nonlethal targeting assignments by showing the performance improvement both
analytically and in simulation over doctrine-based and random methods.
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Times Selected
Force-
By By By Agent Village fulness Initial
# Total Hi Med Low # Village Cluster Societal Position Level Attitude
1 6 0 2 4 21 C 2 District Jirga Member/Khan forceful1  0.3
2 6 1 2 3 49 F 3 Village Jirga forceful -0.2
3 6 0 3 3 56 G 3 District Jirga Member forceful, 0.2
4 6 4 1 1 68 - - District Police forcefuli 0.3
5 6 4 2 0 69 - - District Ulema forceful1  0.3
6 6 4 2 0 71 - - Sub-governor forceful, 0.3
7 5 1 3 1 1 A 1 District Jirga Member forceful 0
8 4 1 0 3 13 B 1 Village Jirga forceful -0.3
9 3 1 1 1 12 B 1 Village Jirga forceful -0.3
10 2 1 0 1 73 - - District Criminal forceful, -0.4
11 1 0 1 0 2 A 1 Village Jirga forceful 0
12 1 0 1 0 39 E 3 District Jirga Member forceful, -0.2
13 1 0 0 1 40 E 3 Village Jirga forceful -0.2
14 1 1 0 0 67 G 3 Village Mullah forceful 0.2
15 0 0 0 0 19 B 1 Village Mullah forceful -0.3
16 0 0 0 0 29 C 2 Village Mullah forceful 0.3
17 0 0 0 0 37 D 2 Village Mullah forceful 0
18 0 0 0 0 70 - - District Ulema forceful, -0.3
Table 4-16: NLTP Agent Assignment Analysis by US Agent Resource Level (Forcefulness)
4.6 Summary of Experimentation
In this chapter, we conducted various tests of the performance and usefulness of our modeling
approach. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated the effect of network size on runtimes and
determined the solver settings which produced good local optima reasonably quickly. In
Experiment 2, we showed that the optimization model performed fairly well when required to
find global optima for specific configurations of small and large networks. Lastly, in Experiment
3, we demonstrated the merits of the optimization model in nonlethal targeting with its
significantly better performance over both doctrine-based and random methods of assignment in
a large network.
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5 Future Research and Application as a Decision Support
Tool
In the first part of this chapter, we discuss aspects of our modeling approach for nonlethal
targeting that warrants further exploration and research. In the second part of this chapter, we
describe how our work can be possibly integrated as a decision support tool to assist in company-
and battalion-level nonlethal targeting.
5.1 Future Work
We believe that this work makes a significant contribution in addressing some of the difficulties
with nonlethal targeting in COIN. Our modeling approach provides a useful framework for
capturing many of the relevant concepts in the problem including: changeable attitudes of local
leaders, an approximation of the social interaction network among the population, and
probabilistically representing the effect of agent interactions on attitudes. The synthesis of the
Afghan COIN social influence and network generation models allowed us to develop a means to
quantitatively measure and visualize the effect of nonlethal targeting by US agents. As our
experimental results have shown, our methodology produces assignments that perform quite well
both analytically and in simulation. However, despite laying this foundation, we recognize that
our models require more refinement. We identify several focus areas that warrant further
exploration and research: 1) more realistic agent dynamics, 2) shorter time-horizon effects and
analysis, 3) adversarial actions and game-theoretic approaches, and 4) alternative formulations of
the NLTP model.
5.1.1 More Realistic Dynamics
Our COIN social influence model accounts for very basic types of interactions, namely those
which have an averaging, forceful or identify effect on agents' attitudes. While the use of scalar
attitudes and different types of interactions is already an improvement from traditional 0-1
(on/off) attitude modeling, we recognize that the dynamics can be improved further still.
Specifically, we see the need for future research in incorporating thresholds and boomerang
effects.
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5.1.1.1 Threshold-Type Models
In our work, agents change their attitudes towards the counterinsurgents after pair-wise
interactions with neighbors in a network. Depending on the interaction-type probabilities,
usually every interaction involves some sort of adjustment of attitudes, which is not necessarily
the case in reality. In order to make these dynamics more realistic, we propose the view that an
agent's attitude towards counterinsurgents may very well be a complex contagion, a notion that a
willingness to adopt an attitude or participate in a collective behavior "require[s] independent
affirmation or reinforcement from multiple sources" especially "when these behaviors are costly,
risky, or controversial" [96]. We posit that an agent may require confirmation from several other
neighbors before it decides to adjust its attitude towards the counterinsurgents (or insurgents).
This idea may have validity among Pashtuns who may require reinforcement from other
members of the same qawm before he changes his attitude.
There are a couple of ways to potentially implement this modification to the model in simulation.
First, we can designate for each agent some threshold k that is the number of confirming
interactions (signals) an agent requires before he will adjust his attitude in the direction of the
previous signals. We can also implement the following: 1) at each time-step, every agent
determines the "prevailing sentiment" of his neighbors; and 2) an agent makes adjustments to its
attitude not only as a function of the interaction-type probability but whether the other interacting
agent's attitude brings him towards or away from this prevailing sentiment.
Despite the apparent ease in implementing this type of dynamic in simulation, we recognize the
significant challenge of collecting data of individual local leader thresholds
5.1.1.2 Boomerang Effect
As described in Section 3.3.3, the boomerang effect occurs when agents take on attitudes which
specifically oppose that of certain neighbors [66]. There is some anthropological support for this
effect among Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Specifically, one of the tenets of Pashtunwali, the
customary code of Pashtuns, is agnatic rivalry often among cousins. It would be interesting to
study further how this modification to the interaction dynamics effects how US agents can best
nonlethally target the population.
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5.1.2 Short-term Expected Attitudes
In this work, we are concerned with the expected attitudes of the population as the number of
interactions gets large. However, as was shown in our experimental simulation results in Section
4.5.2.2, we observed that in some cases at some smaller number of interactions, random
assignment methods outperformed the optimization assignment methods. If we consider that
many aspects of the operational environment (including influence parameters, Taliban
connections, and local leader connections) can potentially change before a large number of
interactions occur, we see a strong need for future research in understanding the agent attitude
dynamics over shorter time horizons. We believe that a good starting point is by solving
equation (3.6) in Section 3.3.4.1, the discrete dynamical system that shows the change in
expected attitudes of all agents from interaction k to k+l.
5.1.3 Adversarial Actions and Game-Theoretic Approaches
We made the significant and unrealistic assumption in this work that Taliban agent connections
remained fixed over time. In fact, we are likely to observe Taliban agents repeatedly re-
evaluating their strategy and initiating a coercion and intimidation campaign targeting those local
leaders who are sympathetic to the counterinsurgents. Accordingly, future work in this area
needs to take into consideration changing enemy actions when deciding US agent assignments.
This is by no means trivial. One can begin by determining an analytic solution to near-horizon
expected attitudes (as discussed above) for a particular set of both US and Taliban connections.
Afterwards, it may be possible to formulate an optimization problem for each side, US and
Taliban, and to analyze how the connection strategies counter one another after a certain number
of interactions. What we described is in essence a simulation of some type of sequential game
where each side tries to vie for the attitude of the population. Even beyond this, one can explore
how to represent this contest as a two-player game and determine some equilibrium which might
be helpful in informing US forces how to best counteract the set of possible Taliban actions.
5.1.4 Alternative Formulations
In our NLTP optimization formulation, our objective was to find the US assignment strategy that
achieved the maximum arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude of all agents in the
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network. However, future research should also explore other formulations that would provide
additional insight into solving the nonlethal targeting assignment problem.
5.1.4.1 Threshold Objective Function
We posit that there are cases when a commander does not necessarily want to achieve the highest
arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitude. In fact, the commander may choose to
conduct nonlethal targeting to win strong support, albeit with a smaller number of people or
villages. For example, one may want to find the optimal US assignment strategy that maximizes
the number of villagers who exhibit expected long-term attitudes greater than some threshold
(say 0.25). In order to address this problem, we propose modifications to the NLTP and NLTP 1
formulations. Specifically, we can declare a new objective function (5.1) and add three more
sets of constraints (5.2-5.4) to the previous formulations:
max value- qi (5.1)
UIe
s. t. (py,i - b) qi V i E A (5.2)
(b - pty,j) -5 (1 - qi) V i E A (5.3)
qi = {0,1} V i E A (5.4)
Constraint (5.4) declares a new binary variable q1 . Constraints (5.2) and (5.3) are paired
constraints that ensure that qi = 1 only when py,j ;_ b, meaning that agent i's attitude is greater
than some threshold b. The objective function (5.1) then gives a value for every villager whose
attitude is over that threshold. The point is to get the most number of villagers who are
significantly more aligned with US forces than just slightly pro-Taliban or even neutral. It is
important to note however that depending on the parameters, network structure, and number of
US agents and connections, it may not always be possible to influence even a single local
leader's attitude above some threshold b because b is too high and unrealistic. Even this result is
useful because it informs the command of the true number of local leaders that he can win over
firmly.
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5.1.4.2 Multi-Objective Function
While the previous threshold formulation's objective is to maximize the number of agents with
an expected long-term attitude above a certain value, we may also be interested in exploring the
option of simultaneously using other US connections to maximally raise everyone else's
attitudes. We determined through preliminary trials that the threshold formulation ineffectually
assigned US connections that were not enough to bring another agent over the attitude threshold.
This multi-objective modification to the original NLTP and NLTP 1 formulations might involve
the following:
max A -Yvaluei -qi + (1-A) - value - py, (5.5)
s. t. (py, - b) qi V i E A (5.2)
(b - py,1) (1 - qi) V i E A (5.3)
qi = f0,1j V i E A (5.4)
Equation (5.5) is the multi-objective function, where A E [0,1] is a weight parameter determined
a priori to balance between achieving the greatest number of agents with expected long-term
attitudes over a threshold and achieving the maximum arithmetic mean of the expected long-term
attitude of all agents.
5.1.4.3 Constrained Assignment
In order to delineate clear lines of responsibility and authority, US Army units often divide up
their area of operations into geographical sub-areas for subordinate units. An example of this in
practice is when a company, responsible for an Afghan district, divides up all the villages within
that district for each of three platoons in which to conduct COIN operations (e.g., platoon 1 is
responsible for villages A,B, and C; platoon 2 is responsible for villages D, E, and F; and platoon
3 is responsible for villages G and H). However, our model fails to take these assignment
constraints into account when determining the optimal targeting strategy and can conceivably
assign two different US agents (say two platoons) to connect with different local leaders in the
same village. Future work needs to be done to modify the constraints of the NLTP and NLTP1
formulations to account for these realistic exogenous assignment constraints.
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5.2 Application as a Decision Support Tool
In this section, we discuss briefly how this modeling approach can be integrated into the US
Army's nonlethal targeting process as well as the some insights about data collection.
5.2.1 Integration into Nonlethal Targeting
In Section 2.5.2, we described the functional decomposition of the nonlethal targeting process, a
process by which the US Army identifies, prioritizes, and allocates resources to engage nonlethal
targets. We believe that the suite of models we developed in this thesis, collectively called the
NLTP decision support tool, can be integrated into this process to aid commanders and staffs in
determining the best courses of action (COA) to win support of the population. This decision
support tool is most suited to help in the Decide step in targeting process, depicted in Figure 5-1.
Inputs Outputs
Higher HO Approved:
*-Target Synch Matrix SM)
i44gh-PayoffTarget st(HPTL)
-SR synch plan
Com ~nder's~ 
-Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)
-PreTious unit S
---------- .largettdectionitan ards
Asss
Figure 5-1: NLTP Decision Tool in the Targeting Process
The NLTP Decision Support Tool would receive inputs (such as Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB) products and analysis, and the human intelligence gathered from soldiers in
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previous operations) that already currently feed into the Decide function. The user of the tool,
who we recommend to be an intelligence staff officer, would employ the tool to provide to the
targeting working group with quantitative analysis of targeting specific individuals and to enable
the working group to perform "what-if' analysis. The model and other inputs can be refined
through repeated iterations of the targeting process.
Within the Decide function, the NLTP decision support tool can aid the commanders and staffs
by helping them complete specific tasks. These tasks are highlighted in red and shown in Figure
5-2. We describe how the tool assists in each of these steps below.
-Higher HQOPORD
-Unit mission analysis and IPB
-Previousunit assessments and
reports
.Commander'sguidance
Outputs
Approved:
*Target Synch Matrix (TSM)
-Nigh-Payoff Target Ust (HPTL)
-Intelligence synch plan
-Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)
*Target Selection Standards
-Targeting FRAGO
*Reflned ipS Products
-Thrteatmodel Drafts: COA
-.Situation template -Friendly COA sketch and statement COA -TargetSynch Matrix (TSM) Approval
Mission -Enemy COA COA *Potential gh-PayoffTargets (HPT) A -High-PayoffTarget Lis(HPTL)
* ~Wn -Enem eac-h Friendly COA -itllgnenychdaAnalysis 4 bvalu Targts sT M Developmnent and 4Wn syck ud M (AGM) Orer
-argt-Value Aages U(V) -Targetdce-cnfliction -Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM) OrU r
-Commander's targeting -Assessmentcriterla -Target Selection Standards Production
guidance/objectives
NLTP Decision Tool
Figure 5-2: NLTP Decision Tool Integration into the Decide Function
5.2.1.1 Target Value Analysis (TVA)
One of the problems that staff officers in the targeting working group currently have is
conducting a rigorous target value analysis. This analysis is supposed to detail how an individual
enables enemy actions. For example, this analysis might address how a pro-Taliban mullah from
Village A affects the attitudes of the population and enables the Taliban forces by providing
popular or logistical support. The NLTP decision support tool provides staff officers with a
means to conduct quantitative analysis and to predict the effect on the sentiments of the
population if US forces had co-opted those individuals. This level of analysis and predictive
capability help inform the targeting working group of the value of one nonlethal targeting
strategy over another.
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5.2.1.2 High-Payoff Target List (HPTL)
Staff officers repeatedly assess and pare down the high-value target list (HVTL) (which is a list
of local leaders determined by intelligence analysis to be valuable in winning support) to a high-
priority target list (HPTL). The HPTL ranks in order of precedence the individuals in the HVTL
which should be targeted. The NLTP decision support tool can perform this task quite rapidly
and provide qualitative support to prioritizing some local leaders over others.
5.2.1.3 Course of Action (COA)
Once the HPTL is determined, staff officers must also develop synchronized plans, known as
COAs, in order to conduct the targeting actions. The NLTP decision support tool also provides
an analytic "what-if' capability that allows the user to test the result of assignments by specific
US agents.
5.2.1.4 Target Synchronization Matrix (TSM)
The NLTP decision support tool currently cannot provide analysis of the effect on attitudes when
targeting assignments are executed at different points in time. However, it can inform
commanders and staff on the effect of assigning a certain set of targets to one unit versus
another. This form of synchronization is necessary in order to produce the target
synchronization matrix.
5.2.1.5 Targeting FRAGO
Lastly, all of the above tasks, aided by the NLTP decision support tool, are also used to create
the targeting FRAGO, the order which instructs subordinate units whom to nonlethally engage,
with what means, and at what times.
5.2.2 Data Collection
We believe that we have made appropriate use of data from specific case studies by cultural
anthropologists and political scientists, polls by various agencies, and case studies from field
researchers to arrive at a notional but accurate representation of the rural Pashtun social influence
structure. However, collecting true empirical data on the village- or district-level social network
and the level of influence of each local leader in Afghanistan is difficult for two reasons. First,
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Afghanistan is a third-world country with little of the technological innovations (like the
widespread use of cell phones or internet) that have offered recent social scientists opportunities
to collect rich data sets on networked human interactions and creative ways to conduct
experiments on a subject's influence over known networks 5 . Most research on Afghan attitudes
still rely on self-reporting and questionnaires, and there is some cause to believe that any social
network data collected in this manner may be debatable in reliability and accuracy [97]. Second,
because Afghans live in an environment where they perceive threats from both insurgents and
counterinsurgents, we suspect that self-report data on ties and attitudes is not only inaccurate but
perhaps protectively untruthful as well ( [81], [13]). Given this difficulty, we recommend
exercising careful construction and analysis of data collection efforts in this area. Future work
on parameter and network sensitivity analysis also needs to be done to find targeting assignments
when portions of the data are approximations or simply unknown.
As US soldiers conduct missions in these villages and get to know particular local leaders and
their relative influence among other actors, many of the generalizations used in the models can
be tightened and produce more tailored targeting assignments to increase public support.
Currently, the US Army is employing Human Terrain Teams (HTT) to collect cultural and
ethnographic data from among the Afghans to help inform commanders of the population
sentiments, needs, and potential issues and persons to leverage to win popular support. They
have produced questionnaires that have already been used in the field to collect information
relevant to this work. These questionnaires are shown in Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4.
" For more on this line of research, see for example [110], [111], [112].
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Figure 5-3: Example Tribal Questionnaire [98]
Government Official Semi-Structured Questionnaire
Human Terrain Team. 4*4 Brigade Combat Team. 8 2 '' Airborne Division
24 February 2008
Research Program: The objective of this research piogriam is to exanuine the iter-
relationship betseet: officials backgrounds: their affiliations and relationships
(their current and pie% ious ties): and their values (views of fntire actioi Critical
questions include: Ate affiliation networks inteiningled or distinct' Do individuals
cooperate and connuunicate with those with different backgrotunds' Some tentative
hypotheses include:
Histonc affiliation determines cut-cnt political position
DSGs coie fion iore siinlar rather thon dissiiilai backgrotunds
DSG ties constitute a distinct separate social network. separate
from other networks
Visual Assessmlenr. Assess i ho spends ante rogether: Obse-ne fotmal seaning
versus infornal mteracnonts
Pior to beginmig intevies. deernine ihethet oficial has completed tite
quesnonnalre.
Personal Background:
Host old are you'
Where wsere you born'
Wiete were yot raised'
Wlat is yot qawin and klel'
Where and when did you finish your school'
What groups hase you previously belonged to iNGOs. universities. newspapers.
tanzuinis ?
Are you a mieshar or ma lawi?
What is Vote fathers profession'
Wlat are your brothers professions'
Do you have relatives who work in government. pohce ot nuilitary'
If you has e fanuly nemubers in the gos ernent. how can you help each othei for
solving problems'
hiat did you do duing previous governinents?
Please list any previous govemnient positions (years held. district provice :
Government Background:
What is your position'
How long hase you been in tIs position?
What are the responsibilities of your position?
How did you decide to become a [insert position]"
Hos were you selected for a goennunent position'
Who first recominiended you for a goveninent position'
Can you support your fanily by doing this job'
Network and Affiliation Mapping:
What 5 people here hat e you know ithe longest?
What 5 people here were you iost recently in contact'
Who are the most important people here"
Who ate the most iuposant people in Logar'
What othei piovincial officials do you wvork with'
What DSGs do you know\ the best? Hots loig have you kiowsn them'
We heaid that one can only becoie the DC if he knows soie goeruniient oflicial
Is that tiue'
We heard that one of Logar's DC is the MOSt powerul. Can you tell us ho he is'
Views on DSGs District Commissioners:
What is the job of a sub-goveior'
Whliat qualities should a sub-govemnor or distct conmutssioner have?
What are DC s responsibilities to the Provincial Govemnor?
Wiat is the DC's responsibilty to the people"
What kind of Gosetnunent officials do the people wvant" Do they want religious
people, educated people, or Mujahid"
Wio should get the higher positions. inl your opilion'
Why do people wsant to get higher positions'
Cirently. what knd of people can easily get ltgh govenuneut positions'
Views on Afghanistan:
What needs to be done in Afghanistan
Hos does the conrent goeiilent compare to previous goventuinents,
What is a good govetnient?
Host should gasovteiulent be nm?
Pioduced by Toni Gacianmd tchail Bhatia Verson 2 Aug 2008
Figure 5-4: Example questionnaire for assessing influence and connections [99]
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I am interested in learning about the tribes. I would like to learn about your tribe
and which tribes are above and below your tribe.
1. What is your Ethnicity?
a. Pashtun?
b. Tajik?
c. Other?
2. What is your tribe?
3. Which tribes are under your tribe?
4. Which tribes are above your tribe?
5. Would you write the information for me in Pashto?
6. What is the history of your tribe?
a. How long has your tribe been in this area?
b. Are they any disputes with other tribes?
c. Which tribes are your allies?
d. What other villages do people of your tribe live?
7. In which other villages do people in your in your village have family?
8. What it your first language?
9. Why is that your first language?
a. Is that the language of your mother?
b. Is that the language of your Father?
c. Is that the language of your village?
6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we review the work we presented in previous chapters and offer some conclusions
based upon the models, results, and analysis.
6.1 Summary
We identified the nonlethal targeting assignment problem of US forces in the counterinsurgency
in Afghanistan. In Chapter 2, we provided a detailed operational overview of the struggle for
popular support in counterinsurgencies. We described how US forces view the
counterinsurgency operational environment and the most pertinent characteristics of both the
population and the insurgents that they must consider in order to be successful. We also
provided a functional decomposition of the nonlethal targeting process, a process by which
resource-constrained units identify important local leaders to co-opt, and prioritize and
synchronize nonlethal engagement efforts in order to win the support of the population. We
focused on the Decide function in this work and described the difficulties of accomplishing the
tasks within it in counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan. Lastly, we illustrated the complexity of
conducting nonlethal targeting with a detailed description of the insurgency in Afghanistan and
the efforts of the US Army to succeed there.
Having provided an operational overview and where our problem fits within the
counterinsurgency context, in Chapter 3 we developed our technical models to address the
problem. We formulated three models: the Afghan COIN social influence model, the network
generation model, and the nonlethal targeting problem. In the social influence model, we
represented the actors in the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Pashtun local leaders and US and
Taliban forces) as agents in a social network. Each agent possessed a scalar value for its attitude
towards the US counterinsurgents, and local leaders changed those attitudes after interactions
with network neighbors according to interaction-type probabilities. We derived the method to
analytically calculate the expected attitudes of all the agents as the number of interactions
approached infinity. In the network generation model, we developed an automated means of
approximating the social network among agents by drawing on the concept of homophily as well
as allowing the input of specific intelligence-confirmed connections. We also built in functions
to account for the possibility of missing connections and ties. Lastly, we formulated the
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nonlethal targeting problem as a mixed-integer, nonlinear program (MINLP) designed to find the
optimal assignment of US agents to local leaders and Taliban agents which maximized the
arithmetic mean expected long-term attitudes of the entire population.
In Chapter 4, we described the conduct of three experiments. The first experiment demonstrated
the capabilities of our optimization formulation in finding targeting solutions for 20 US agents
and 20 connections each on networks up to 200 agents in reasonable amounts of time. The
second experiment demonstrated the performance of the optimization formulation in finding
global optima. We tested this by selecting networks of a limited size and comparing the
solutions obtained on them by optimization and by a complete enumeration of possible US
assignments. We showed that the MINLP found the globally optimal solution in almost all
cases. Finally, the third experiment illustrated the value of our work by comparing the simulated
and analytic performance of the optimization-based assignment strategy with that of both
doctrine-based and control (random) methods of selection. On the large network of 73 nodes,
the optimization-based assignment performed significantly better analytically as well as in
simulation.
In Chapter 5, we identified areas for future research and proposed how this work can be
integrated into the US Army targeting process. The four areas for further research were: 1) more
realistic agent dynamics, 2) shorter time-horizon effects and analysis, 3) adversarial actions and
game-theoretic approaches, and 4) alternative formulations of the NLTP model. We also
proposed where this suite of models, what we called the nonlethal targeting decision support
tool, can be integrated into the existing US Army targeting process. We described how this tool
can be extremely useful for determining the value of potential targets and for performing "what-
if' analysis in the Decide step in nonlethal targeting.
6.2 Conclusions
In this section, we close this work by offering some final conclusions and insights concerning the
modeling the social networks and influences among Pashtun local leaders, and the merits of
optimization-based methods of targeting.
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6.2.1 Modeling Social Networks and Influences among Pasthuns
The operating environment in counterinsurgencies is extremely complex because of the
multitude of variables and civilian considerations that US Army units must be concerned about
in order to win support of the population. However, given this complexity, we also recognize the
need to develop meaningful representations of the interconnectedness of the population and
suggest the application of social networks to that end. Our study of Pashtun social structure and
influences supports the idea of modeling actors within a counterinsurgency (local leaders and
Taliban and US agents) as nodes and the interpersonal influences among them as links. While
great care needs to be taken to parameterize the model based on real data, we can clearly see the
potential predictive power of this tool to help guide decision making in nonlethal targeting.
6.2.2 Merits of Optimization-Based Methods of Targeting
The optimization-based assignments of US forces to local leaders on large networks achieved
significantly higher arithmetic mean of the expected long-term attitudes than doctrinal-based
strategies. Our approach is a consistent, quantitative method of determining the value of US
assignments to specific individuals in a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Previously,
commanders and staffs relied on intuition, doctrinal training, and the qualitative analysis of
intelligence in order to determine the high priority target list (HPTL) and conduct the target
value analysis (TVA). Our modeling approach and optimization-based method of target
selection, however, provide a systematic means to 1) synthesize intelligence and incorporate
human-in-the-loop parameterization of interpersonal influences, 2) generate interaction networks
supported by intelligence analysis and social science, and 3) quantitatively determine the
potential value of a nonlethal targeting assignment strategy as well as its predicted effect on the
population. This technology's capabilities signify that it as an important step to helping
commanders and staffs solve the nonlethal targeting assignment problem.
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Appendix A Abbreviation and Acronyms
Abbreviation/
Acronym
AGM
AO
ASCOPE
COA
COIN
FM
FRAGO
HPTL
HQ
HTT
HUMINT
HVTL
IPB
ISAF
KPP
LOE
MDMP
METT-TC
MINLP
NATO
NLP
NLTP
NPS
OE
OPORD
PMESII-PT
PS
S2
SWEAT-MSO
TB
TRAC
TSM
TVA
US
WTA
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Term
attack guidance matrix
area of operations
areas, structure, capabilities, organization, people and events
courses of action
counterinsurgency
field manual
fragmentary order
high payoff target list
headquarters
Human Terrain Team
human intelligence
high value target list
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
International Security Assistance Force
key person problem
line of effort
military decision making process
Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations
mixed-integer, nonlinear problem
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nonlinear program
nonlethal targeting problem
Naval Postgraduate School
operational environment
operations order
Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time
Personality Strength
intelligence section of a US army unit (brigade and below)
Sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations
Taliban
Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center
target synchronization matrix
target value analysis
United States
weapon-target assignment
[This Page Intentionally Left Blank]
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Appendix B Experimental Data and Results
B-1. Datasets for Large and Small Networks (Excel Format)
Disnensions f Inuec (Iid WeltO TalhanAgent
incatio Ioreful_1} Characteistc onniection
AgentTb
Attitude Value TB1 T2 TUB3
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 1 0 0 -0.3 1 0 1 0
2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 000 0 0 0 0 0 -0.3 1 1 0 0
3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
7 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 1 0 0 0
8 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
9 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
10 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
11 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
12 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 1 0 0 1
13 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
14 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
15 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
16 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Figure B- 1: Dataset for Small Network
Figure B- 2: Legend of Colors for Dimensions of Influence
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I- zC
B-2. Realistic Data
Mesue6  DistrictMeasure 16 Hisarak Sherzad
Estimated population (2002)" 28,462 66,392
Average number of households per village 85 124
Average population per village 1,274 1,136
Average population per household 11 7
Average number of village council members (jirga) 9 9
Average number of villages"' 22 58
Table B- 1: Table of Pashtun District Characteristics
B-3. Large Network Agents
Node Village Village Societal Position Forcefulness Initial
# # Cluster # Level Attitude
1 A 1 District Jirga Member forceful, 0.0
2 A 1 Village Jirga forceful 0.0
3 A 1 Village Jirga forceful 0.0
4 A 1 HH regular 0.0
5 A 1 HH regular 0.0
6 A 1 HH regular 0.0
7 A 1 HH regular 0.0
8 A 1 HH regular 0.0
9 A 1 HH regular 0.0
10 A 1 Village Mullah forceful 0.0
11 B 1 Village Malik forceful -0.3
12 B 1 Village Jirga forceful -0.3
13 B 1 Village Jirga forceful -0.3
14 B 1 Local Criminal forceful -0.3
15 B 1 HH regular -0.3
16 B 1 HH regular -0.3
17 B 1 HH regular -0.3
18 B 1 HH regular -0.3
19 B 1 Village Mullah forceful -0.3
20 C 2 Village Malik forceful 0.3
21 C 2 District Jirga Member/Khan forceful, 0.3
22 C 2 Village Jirga forceful 0.3
16 All data, unless otherwise specified, is from the National Solidarity Program (NSP) Impact Evaluation study [92].
17 Based upon 2002 UN estimates ( [93], [94]).
" This figure was simply calculated by dividing the estimated population in the district and the average population
per village. It is a very rough measure for the number of villages in each district.
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Node Village Village Societal Position Forcefulness Initial
# # Cluster # Level Attitude
23 C 2 Village Jirga forceful 0.3
24 C 2 HH regular 0.3
25 C 2 HH regular 0.3
26 C 2 HH regular 0.3
27 C 2 HH regular 0.3
28 C 2 HH regular 0.3
29 C 2 Village Mullah forceful 0.3
30 D 2 Village Malik forceful 0.0
31 D 2 Village Jirga forceful 0.0
32 D 2 HH regular 0.0
33 D 2 HH regular 0.0
34 D 2 HH regular 0.0
35 D 2 HH regular 0.0
36 D 2 HH regular 0.0
37 D 2 Village Mullah forceful 0.0
38 E 3 Village Malik forceful -0.2
39 E 3 District Jirga Member forceful -0.2
40 E 3 Village Jirga forceful -0.2
41 E 3 HH regular -0.2
42 E 3 HH regular -0.2
43 E 3 HH regular -0.2
44 E 3 HH regular -0.2
45 E 3 HH regular -0.2
46 E 3 HH regular -0.2
47 E 3 Village Mullah forceful -0.2
48 F 3 Village Malik forceful -0.2
49 F 3 Village Jirga forceful -0.2
50 F 3 HH regular -0.2
51 F 3 HH regular -0.2
52 F 3 HH regular -0.2
53 F 3 HH regular -0.2
54 F 3 Village Mullah forceful -0.2
55 G 3 Village Malik forceful 0.2
56 G 3 District Jirga Member forcefuli 0.2
57 G 3 Village Jirga forceful 0.2
58 G 3 Village Jirga forceful 0.2
59 G 3 HH regular 0.2
60 G 3 HH regular 0.2
61 G 3 HH regular 0.2
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Node Village Village . . Forcefulness Initial
# # Cluster # Societal Position Level Attitude
62 G 3 HH regular 0.2
63 G 3 HH regular 0.2
64 G 3 HH regular 0.2
65 G 3 HH regular 0.2
66 G 3 HH regular 0.2
67 G 3 Village Mullah forceful 0.2
68 - - District Police forceful1  0.3
69 - - District Ulema forceful1  0.3
70 - - District Ulema forceful1  -0.3
71 - - Sub-governor forceful1  0.3
72 - - Regional Warlord forceful1  -0.4
73 - - District Criminal forceful1  -0.4
Table B- 2: Condensed List of Agentsfor Large Network
Note: HH stands for 'head of household.'
B-4. Large Network S2-Directed Connections
Undirected Link Description
Links
14 5 Local criminal to neighboring head of househould
14 3 Local criminal to neighboring villagejirga member
14 2 Local criminal to neighboring village jirga member
73 72 District criminal to district warlord
73 70 District criminal to member of ulema (unfavorable to US)
73 48 District criminal to malik (unfavorable to US)
73 11 District criminal to malik (unfavorable to US)
72 71 Regional warlord to subgovernor
72 70 Regional warlord to ulema (unfavorable to US)
72 39 Regional warlord to district jirga member from local warlord's village (unfavorable to US)
72 40 Regional warlord to localjirga member from local warlord's village (unfavorable to US)
68 21 Police chief to district jirga member (favorable to US)
68 22 Police chief to villagejirga member (favorable to US)
68 69 Police chief to ulema (favorable to US)
68 56 Police chief to district jirga member (favorable to US)
Table B- 3: List of S2 Connectionsfor Large Network
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B-5. Experiment I Data Sets
Figure B- 4: Small Network (with 1 Taliban Agent)
Figure B- 5: Small Network (with 3 Taliban Agents)
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Figure B- 6: Large Network (with 3 Taliban Agents)
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B-6. Experiment I Results
Number of Conseet-
local Number of Number of Number of ions per US Nodes Runtime
Case 0 leaders Regulars TB agents US agents agent Visited (in sees.) msfs DoJ Decision
1 16 12 1 1 1 3 10.289 Y/d 0.201785 [17]
2 16 12 1 1 3 3 10.212 Y/d 0.322812 [1,2,17]
3 16 12 1 3 1 23 138.705 Y/d 0.391058 [1],[2],[2]
4 16 12 1 3 3 2 15.922 Y/d 0.451317 [2,3,17],[2,5,17],[1,2,17)
5 16 12 1 3 5 2 13.788 Y/d 0.459645 [2,4,6,1,17],[2,3,5,6,17),
1 [1,2,3,4,17]
6 16 12 1 5 1 11 142.063 Y/d 0.449465 [2][2](1][17][2]
7 16 12 1 5 3 11 123.822 Y/d 0.481257 [2,5,17][1,2,17][2,7,17],
[2,4,17][2,3,6]
[2,3,4,5,17],[2,3,6,12,17),
8 16 12 1 5 5 2 20.812 Y/d 0.483055 (1,2,6,7,17],[2,3,4,5,17],
1 [2,4,5,6,17]
9 16 12 3 3 1 2 17.798 Y/d 0.0651728 [12][21[7]
10 16 12 3 3 3 15 94.601 Y/d 0.16648 [2,12,17],[1,7,12],[1,2,17]
11 16 12 3 3 5 29 164.162 Y/d 0.235759 [1,2,7,12,17],[1,2,12,17.19],[1,2,12,18,19)
[1,2,7,12,17],[1,2,12,18,19],
12 16 12 3 5 5 23 201.781 Y/d 0.360519 [1,3,12,17,18],[2,5,7,12,16],
[1,2,12,17,19]
13 73 38 3 1 1 17 1210.499 Y/d -0.0658268 [71]
14 73 38 3 2 1 181 15246.17 Y/d 0.0965545 [70][71)
15 73 38 3 3 1 - >50400 Y/d
Table B- 4: Experiment 1A Results
Nenor of Conmeetio ms- Error
loal Number of Number of Number of as per US Nodes Runtime (In from X RunTime
Case 0 leaders Regulars TB agents US agents agent visited sees.) msme NLTP1bb Savings DJ Decision
6-B2 7 0.064 N/0% 0.00000% 0.04505% 0.449465 [2](2][1][17](2]
13-B2 73 38 3 1 1 15 176.767 Y/100 0.00002% 14.60282% -0.0658297 [71]
13-B2 73 38 3 1 1 15 16.481 Y/10 0.00035% 1.36150% -0.065833 [71]
13-B2 73 38 3 1 1 13 0.671 N/ -0.00046% 0.05543% -0.0658341 [71]
14-B2 73 38 3 2 1 161 2649.34 Y/100 -0.00014% 17.37709% 0.0965562 [70],[71]
14-B2 73 38 3 2 1 123 199.238 Y/10 0.00009% 1.30681% 0.0965539 [70],[71]
14-82 73 38 3 2 1 31 2.394 N/ -0.22088% 0.01570% 0.094346 (69],[71]
15-B2 73 38 3 2 2 37 4 514 N/ -0.00090% N/A 0.21885 [1,70],[69,71]
16-B2 73 38 3 3 1 229 35.979 N/ -0.00040% N/A 0.210042 [69],[70),[71]
17-B2 73 38 3 3 3 159 19.985 N/ -0.40000% N/A 0.327607 [1,21,39,[49,56,69],
L-____ I____ I_____ I____ I__ 1__1 [12,70,71]
Table B- 5: Experiment 1B Results
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Number of Connect-
local Number of Number of Number of ions per US Nodes Runtime (in
Case 0 leaders Regulars TB agents US agents agent Visited sees.) OBJ
18 100 50 10 5 5 13 8.384 0.343464
19 100 50 10 5 10 35 19.78 0.359555
20 100 50 10 7 5 15 10.797 0.36202
21 100 50 10 7 10 8 5.852 0.371405
22 100 50 10 9 5 11 8.696 0.376617
23 100 50 10 9 10 1333 821.586 0.389183
24 100 50 10 10 10 4846 3175.334 0.395857
2-5 200 100 20 5 5 57 53.249 0.378942
26 200 100 20 5 10 36 45.640 0.40753
27 200 100 20 10 10 39 85.673 0.436216
28 200 100 20 20 20 8 36.793 0.456267
Table B- 6: Experiment 1C Results
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B-7. Experiment 3 Data Sets
Figure B- 7: Small Network with Uniform Attachment (7r = 0.5)
Figure B- 8: Small Network with Preferential Attachment (7n = 0.5)
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Figure B- 9: Large Network with Uniform Attachment (7r = 0.5)
Figure B- 10: Large Network with Preferential Attachment (it = 0.5)
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B-8. Experiment 3 Results
C -onol (NaTye) D trine-Infoneod
Case Nodes entiene Pefformance, Perforsance
3 Visited (i sees.) mnsit os Decision Dd Decision Dok OJI Decision Dea
1 2 3.913 Y/d 0.0651728 [2][7][12] -0.2890313 [4][9][31 -0.3542041 -8.86E-05 (7][12][1] -0.0652614
2 3 6.267 Y/d -0.0854988 [2][7][12] -0.3335 [1][17](121 -0.2480012 -0.1394 [7][12][1] -0.0539012
3 3 5.612 Y/d -0.0268916 [7][2][121 -0.3896 [6][16](19] -0.3627084 -0.101 [7][121[11 -0.0741084
4 3 6.915 Y/d -0.114279 [7][21[12] -0.304 [5][2][111] -0.1897210 -0.1617 (7][12][1 -0.0474210
5 3 6.94 Y/d -0.149119 [7][12][2] -0.4048 (18][12][8] -0.2556810 -0.1764 [7][12][1] -0.0272810
6 3 6.202 Y/d -0.0615016 [7][2][121 -0.3725 [18][12][18] -0.3109984 -0.131 [7][12][1] -0.0694984
7 3 6.193 Y/d -0.111434 [7][12][2] -0.378 [4][1][4] -0.2665660 -0.1533 [7][12][1 -0.0418660
8 23 33.447 Y/d 3.21E-08 (2][12][1] -0.2473 [10][6][21 -0.2473000 -0.0237 [7][12][1] -0.0237000
Table B- 7: Full Results of Experiment 3A
case Nodes nosOMe Pefonamee Pedfonae
0 Vsited (in sees.).,ss OJ [Denis OBJ DeDisMon Deka DOJ DenisoM Deka
1 24 2.652 N/ 0.249689 [37,49,67](21,29,39][19,69,701 0.2176 [72,68,69][29,74,20][14,37,21 -0.0320890 0.2151 [21,29,20][67,55,56][69,71,68 -0.0345890
2 3 0.326 N/ 0.24077 (21,56,68][1,12,49][69,71,73] 0.0621 [70,74,29] [71,20,3][14,3,1] -0.1786700 0.1794 [21,29,20][67,55,56][69,71,68] -0.0613700
3 3 0.276 N/ 0.20613 [12,13,56][21,68,711[1,49,69] 0.113 [47,13,56][39,1,21][11,75,1] -0.0931300 0.1577 [21,29,20)[67,55,56][69,71,68] -0.0484300
4 3 0.398 N/ 0.251735 [21,49,56][1,39,71][12,68,69] 0.1424 [39,69,21][56,30,75][23,37,23] -0.1093350 0.2021 [21,29,20][67,55,56](69,71,68] -0.0496350
5 2 0.231 N/ 0.235697 [13,49,73][1,21,561168,69,71] 0.0979 [71,73,19][3,21,23][47,72,11] -0.1377970 0.1782 [21,29,20][67,55,56][69,71,68 -0.0574970
6 3 0.455 N/ 0.216696 [1,21,40][49,56,69][13,68,71] 0.1651 [21,72,40](71,72,21][1,69,11 -0.0515960 0.1794 [21,29,20][67,55,56][69,71,68 -0.0372960
7 2 0.294 N/ 0.206225 [13,21,49][2,56,69][67,68,71 0.0514 [31,73,70][1,10,13][75,39,3] -0.1548250 0.1575 [21,29,20][67,55,56[69,71,68] -0.0487250
Table 8- 8: Full Results of Experiment 38
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Figure B- 11: Visual Comparison of Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method of Nonlethal Targets, Case
#1
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Figure B- 12: Visual Comparison of Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method of Nonlethal Targets, Case
#2
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Figure B- 13: Visual Comparison of Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method of Nonlethal Targets, Case
#3
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Figure B-14: Visual Comparison of Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method of Nonlethal Targets, Case
#4
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Figure B- 15: Visual Comparison of Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method of Nonlethal Targets, Case
#5
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Figure B- 16: Visual Comparison of Expected Long-Term Attitudes by Selection Method of Nonlethal Targets, Case
#6
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Figure B- 17: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #1
Experiment 3A: Trial #2-Comparing Selection Methods: Average Mean Expected Attitude vs. Interactions
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Figure B- 18: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #2
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Figure B-19: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #3
Experiment 3A: Trial #4- Comparing Selection Methods: Average Mean Expected Attitude vs. Interactions
0.5
NLTP Selection
Doctnne Selection
Random Selection
03
02-
014
B
00
402-
-03
0 SW0 1(XX0 15m 2000 2500 3K  350 4CXW 4510 MK
interaction Number
Figure B- 20: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #4
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Figure 8- 21: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #5
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Figure B- 22: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #6
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Figure B- 23: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #7
Experiment 3A: Trial #8-Comparing Selection Methods: Average Mean Expected Attitude vs. Interactions
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Figure B- 24: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3A, Case #8
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Figure B- 25: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3B, Case #1
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Figure B- 26: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3B, Case #2
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Figure B- 27: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3B, Case #3
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Figure B- 28: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3B, Case #4
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Figure B- 29: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3B, Case #5
Experiment 38: Trial #6- Comparing Selection Methods: Average Mean Expected Attitude vs. Interactions
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Figure B- 30: Simulation Performance, Experiment 3B, Case #6
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